to the Archdeacon. The position of both towards the Ordinary is very distinctly defined in the following words :—“ 'Whereas the jurisdiction of the said Archdeacon is plainly distinguished from the jurisdiction of the said Chancellor, as well in the nature of the dealings, [contractuum,] as in that of the persons and causes, and it is ascertained that both are immediately subject to us," &c. Balsham's connexion with Cambridge may be compared to that of Grosseteste with Oxford: and the quarrel may probably have begun under his successor. I find that Lamb (Collect. &c. p. 12) communicates a document relative to the occurrence of 1529, from which he thinks he can adduce arguments against the Bishop's right of Visitation; but like almost all his predecessors, in treating of Oxford and Cambridge, he confounds the right of Visitation with the Jurisdiction. As well in the Barnwell case as in this affair, it is the latter and not the former that is referred to.

NOTE (65) REFERRED TO IN PAGE 132.

On the Functions of the Chancellor.

The functions of the Chancellor are certainly described in as comprehensive a form in the Elizabethan Statutes of 1570 as any where else. "The Chancellor," it says "shall have authority, summarily, and without any legal solemnities, to hear and decide, according to civil law" - (probably before the Reformation, it was, Civil or Canon Law,) "and their own privileges and customs, all disputes of all scholars and scholars' servants: to call Congregations of the Graduates and Scholars: to adorn deserving men with Scholastic Degrees, and to reject and repel the undeserving: to punish all violators of these (statutes and privileges): to take care, moreover, that every University-servant keep to his duty: to punish idle strollers, spendthrifts, sulky and disobedient, by suspension from their Degrees, by imprisonment, or any other lighter punishment, at his discretion, and with the consent of the Heads of the Houses." (Of course this clause was not in existence before the developement of the Colleges.) For the same Chancellor

it shall be lawful, with the consent of the whole University, to enact new Statutes for the extension of learning and the preservation of decorum and propriety among the Scholars."

The attributes exercised by the earlier Chancellors by apostolic authority, namely, excommunication, absolution and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, were in a great measure abolished by the Reformation. The Cambridge Chancellor however still at the end of every term grants ("by the authority committed to us ") a general absolution for all unintentional violations of the Statutes.

As to his Veto, the existence of it is denied by modern liberal writers, such as Walsh and others: but this can only show their shallow prejudices. If we consider realities rather than forms, a Veto was contained in the Chancellor's authority to convoke the University; in the admitted fact, that every transaction, every decision, which did not take place in presence of him or his deputy, was invalid. (Walsh, p. 29.) He could thus at any moment end a conference, and stop a measure by breaking up the sitting. Besides, there is no doubt, that it lay with him to prepare the business for deliberation: although naturally his will or caprice alone could not determine such matters without reasonable grounds. (v. Lamb. Collect. p. 16.) If the above may seem to prove too much, the following is decisive. In the first place, Walsh appears not to have noticed, that the Veto is most decidedly ascribed to the Chancellor in the Statutes of 1549, so highly praised by Walsh for their republican liberality of opinion. We find in them, word for word, the same enactment, as that which I have cited above from the Statutes of 1570, decried by Walsh as tyrannical. To the same Chancellor also it shall be lawful with the consent of the whole University to enact new Statutes," &c.: an arrangement, which, beyond a doubt, makes the concurrence of the Chancellor with the University essential to Academic legislation. As now the Edwardian Statutes in so many points return to an earlier state of things, even from this we might infer that the arrangement belonged to the very oldest Statutes, or at all events to the earliest practice of the University. The inference is fully confirmed by two Statutes of 1303. (v. Lamb Collect. p. 21.)

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(1.) The first says: "By the authority of the whole University, it is ordained, that in decreeing, &c., &c., that alone shall be accounted a Decree (Statutum) which shall have been decreed with the consent of the larger and sounder [sanioris] part of the said Regents, and with the consent of the non-Regents." — Lamb fancies, in his favorite way, that the jus statuendi was then, and by that means, first transferred from the Chancellor to the Senate : but this needs no refutation. The object is evidently only to protect the decisions of the majority against factious minorities.

(2.) The next Statute, "On the duty of the Chancellor not to innovate," says: "Let not the Chancellor presume to pass any new Statute, without the consent of the larger and sounder part of the Regents and non-Regents.". The sense is palpably the same as in the clause of the Statutes of 1549: namely, that neither the Chancellor nor the Senate could decide any thing alone, and consequently, that the former had a Veto. Of course every proposal that fell within his own sphere, he could à fortiori reject. As to the old Statute quoted by Walsh, (p. 26,) "That the Chancellor is bound to execute the decisions of the Masters, when they had been announced to him;" it is impossible for me to take it into consideration, without having the original Latin before me; for I am aware of the caprice of these Gentlemen. As here translated, (perhaps freely enough,) the passage is either nonsense, when we consider the well known system of procedure, or only proves that the Chancellor was bound to execute the decisions of the Statutes which had been enacted with his consent in the manner described. As for Oxford, we may presume that the usual analogy holds good. Besides, the point is distinctly proved in the Statutes of 1636; and there is no reason for thinking it an innovation.

That both in Oxford and Cambridge from the remotest times the Chancellor did possess a negative vote, in my opinion can scarcely be doubted: how he obtained it, is not so easy to say: particularly when there is so much confusion as to the original Chancellor and Rector. No Rector (at least to my knowledge) ever possessed a negative attribute of this kind. In the Chancellor,

on the contrary, we often find something of the kind, as he originally had to defend the rights and interests of others against the University; thus, in Oxford and Cambridge, the rights and interests of the Ordinary. This may explain how the Chancellor not only kept the right in latter times, but even extended it to matters which perhaps did not before concern him. I say perhaps : as it would be very difficult to name any point, in which the Ordinary, (or the Chancellor in his name,) might not have interfered as VISITOR. According to a documentary account in Wood, dated A. D. 1257, some other Episcopal Officer, - the Archdeacon, for instance, was accustomed in those times to be present at the deliberations of the Masters, in order to watch over the rights of the Ordinary probably, because the Chancellor was even then being more and more drawn over into the "Corpus Scholasticum,” and estranged from the Bishop.

:

NOTE (66) REFERRED TO IN PAGE 133.

On the Courts of Jurisdiction of the Chancellor.

It appears to me quite unnecessary to enter into any further explanations respecting these matters, or to give any detailed evidence upon the point, as I cannot imagine that any objections will be made to what has already been advanced upon the subject, which more properly belongs to the Law department. The procedure in the Chancellor's court is prescribed in detail by the Cambridge Statutes of 1570, and by those of Oxford of 1636:undoubtedly in accordance to long existing Statutes and usages. The rest may be gathered from scattered notices and general deductions, the indication and repetition of which would lead us too far.

As to the Penal Code, Wood asserts, it is true, that fines of money were introduced in 1433 first: but it would be very easy to prove the contrary. In fact, he almost does this himself: for he adds, that the fines were "originally" paid over to the University, but afterwards divided between the Chancellor, Proctors and the

Common Chest. This error arises, as in many other instances, from the injurious habit of regarding any single documentary or other unconnected account as decisive.

NOTE (67) REFERRED TO IN PAGE 134.

Concerning the Commissaries.

As to these Commissaries, I depend upon the statement of Wood, (ii. 387,) which is confirmed in the "Fasti" and in other incidental accounts. The Hebdomadarius or Assessor appears to have been a more permanent office. The former title is used in the Compact of 1267 between the Southernmen and Northernmen. "If umpires* are not to be had, let the matter be judged by the Chancellor or by the Hebdomadarius, or by judges appointed for the purpose." What is meant by these judges is not very clear to me:- they were probably umpires. The same need must have been felt in Cambridge also. For instance in the year 1406, we find mention of a Chancellor, who was sent to Rome as King's orator. (Wilkins's Concil. iii. 190.) No doubt, on such and similar occasions, recourse must have been had to the same measures as at Oxford.

NOTE (68) REFERRED TO IN PAGE 135.

On the Functions and Duties of the Proctors, &c., and on the Veto. A long list of the functions and duties of the Proctors, at about the beginning of the fifteenth century (as it appears) is given by Wood, (ii. 387.) It will be as well to quote it here. "It was formerly the business of the Proctors to give judicial and penal sentence against all those who did not come to the schools, those who passed their Lent in the schools (trahentes in scholis quadragesima) those who determined" when of insufficient standing, or without the logical disputation, those who did not become + [Austräge.]

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*[ Arbitris.]