rate enough to allow its Government to act of discussion would it is said be the permafor it, and will scarcely force on a desperate nent surrender of Venetia to Italy, possibly war until it is quite certain that peace will for compensations, possibly also without not give it the advantage it seeks. There- them, and some final settlement of the great fore, whether we look at the three nations German difficulty by a division of territory which are on the eve of war, or at France, between the Austrian and Prussian Courts. which generally regulates the wars of the The attempt, though no doubt humane and Continent, there seem signs of a greater dis- in its way wise, is not one which prima facie position to peace than might be fancied, and appears likely to be crowned with very consequently the proposal for a Congress is great success. Congresses called to arrange not wholly chimerical. If it is true that territorial cessions are seldom popular, each Austria has in any way entertained the power believing that as to its own especial sacession of Venetia as a possibility, the Con- crifices it will be outvoted, will have in fact gress might meet with a very fair prospect to give away too much, and receive too litof being useful in the highest degree. Nor tle. It is only after a war in which both does it make this prospect worse that the sides have suffered great losses, and see great Congress would meet at a time when Aus- dangers in the distance that ideas of cession tria is in an exceptionally good position. are honestly entertained. Of course, a genShe would now be treated with a respect eral concensus of Europe to use force might that might soften the jealous pride of her compel any one power to submit to unpalaEMPEROR; and her satisfactory position, table terms, but there seems at present little both in Germany and in Hungary, might chance of such a revival of the European open to her the way to new combinations tribunal, England at all events being entirely on which she would set a high value. Prus- indisposed to enter upon a continental war sia could be very easily satisfied in Ger- in order to compel Austria or Prussia to be many, and abroad could be readily induced a little more reasonable in their demands to give up the glory of seeing a HOHENZOL- upon each other. The Congress if it met LERN in the Danubian Provinces. The would be only a deliberative body, and the answer to the question, Will there be war? time for deliberative meetings almost apseems then to be, that any day accident pears to have passed by. The powers inor misunderstanding may bring on a collision terested are at last fully armed. The pubthat will be the prelude to one of the great-lic has at heart believed for weeks that the est wars Europe has ever seen, but that no combatant has any apparent intention of beginning the war immediately; and that, meantime, great efforts to preserve peace are being made, that Europe generally desires peace, that the combatants have many secret motives for desiring peace, and that it seems possible there may be a solution of the present difficulties which shall be at once peaceable and satisfactory.

From The Economist May 19th. THE CONTINENTAL CRISIS. WAR has not yet been declared, but that final effort to preserve peace which usually precedes hostilities appears at last to have been made. The Moniteur and M. E. Forcade, who is perhaps an equally good authority, unite in declaring that the three Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg and London, have proposed to call a Congress to settle the fate of the Elbe Duchiesi Venetia, and German reform so far as it may affect the European equilibrium. The basis

delay in commencing hostilities showed want of earnestness, an expectation as it were of compromise, but this is, in part at least erroneous. Even military monarchies cannot arm in a minute. The mere concentration of troops takes weeks; for not only have the men to be moved, in itself a considerable task, but their food, munitions, and horses. By immense exertions the Italian Government has just succeeded in clearing its northern railways, but they have been taken up for more than a fortnight by the conveyance of about 150,000 soldiers. Then even military governments do not keep up the number of horses requisite in a campaign, and their collection is a most tedious affair, so tedious that the Italian Ministry has issued a decree authorising the seizure of any which may be found suitable for a campaign. Vast numbers of men, too, are absent, on furlough, on leave, in the depots, and they have all to be summoned back to the colours; while the conscription, in itself a process occupying weeks, fills the barracks with recruits to be trained for the reserve. Almost all these processes have now been accomplished, and the Governments of Prussia, Austria, and Italy, announce in a hundred ways that they are ready for imme

have a Congress or a sudden surrender of Venetia, can now prevent the catastrophe, and neither of these contingencies is very probable. The Emperor would have spoken before had he intended to speak, and has indeed said openly that it is not his interest or his policy to support the crumbling arrangements of 1815. He is now asking for a Congress, but he has not yet announced that its decrees are to be effective, and that is the main point. The Austrians, on the other hand, consider that to surrender Venetia without

diate action. Each, it is true, hesitates to begin lest it should incur condemnation for its rashness; but this expectant attitude soon becomes wearisome, and is moreover just as expensive as war. The faintest excuse will suffice to terminate the pause, and as the nations have become interested the excuse is sure to be offered speedily. The feeling of the Prussian people is still not quite clear, but the soldiery show a temper so high that they can scarcely be kept from attacking the Austrians wherever stationed within sight. The Government, too, though cooler, is becoming more determined-Hanover, a blow would be dishonourable, and argue for example, having been warned that un- that even after defeat they could not be less she desisted from certain preparations, called on to do more. They will hold all her territory would be placed under mili- they have as long as they can, trusting, as tary occupation. The Austrians again they have always trusted, to the immense evidently believe that war would be more number of fighting men of different races bearable than the present peace. Their whom they have at command, and who, press uses language of inflammatory pa- whatever their private opinions, will obey triotism, and their officers eagerly demand orders in the field. With questions so insothat the honour of Austria shall not be com- luble to settle, and nations so excited, promised by any further concessions. When war,becomes a certainty; and there are signs, a continental army begins debating about such as the seizure of the Holstein railways, its honour, its rulers hesitate to be pacific. which show that actual fighting may be very The commanders of the different armies near at hand. Looking quietly at the prehave been named, and at least 200,000 ad- sent state of preparation, and the attitude ditional men added to the strength of the of the three nations engaged, we shall feel army, an expense which indicates a fore- some surprise if, when our next issue apgone conclusion. In Italy the enthusiasm pears, Europe is not either at war, or waitfor war is universal. The King writes pub-ing anxiously for the result of a Congress, lic letters about it. The Municipalities vote assembled to decide the great questions as funds for its support. The people besides absolutely as if the war had been fought filling up the regular army, are forming out. volunteer corps in such numbers that there is a difficulty in finding arms. From every part of the country the heads of families are urging their sons to the war, and from every seaport in the Mediterranean we have reports of the embarrassment caused to business by the swarming home of Italian workmen, all intent on assisting to strike one blow for the final liberation of their country. It will be very difficult indeed to repress en- It was a sorry sight for the honour of the thusiasm such as this, and according to all ap- British flag when the English squadron was pearance the Italians have made up their seen slinking away from Valparaiso in obeminds to fight Austria even should the Prus-dience to the signal given by the Spanish sian alliance break down. Their army is very large and all available, their people are in earnest, and they think they can recover Venetia for themselves without incurring any serious risk of dismemberment. Even if the regular army does not begin the conflict, the volunteers may; and, as we have said, the slightest excuse will be sufficient for Governments so fully armed, and armies so exasperated. Nothing, so far as we can perceive, but an open declaration from the Emperor Napoleon, that he shall join one side or the other, or that he absolutely will

From The Examiner, 19 May. THE BOMBARDMENT OF VALPARAISO.

Admiral, who wanted it out of the way of his barbarous operations. The case was like that of a man leaving a room that a murder might be committed more conveniently in his absence. But what were the English and American commanders to do, their instructions enjoining a strict neutrality? Were they to plunge their respective countries into a war with Spain? There can be but one reply to that question; but was there no middle course between an act of war and giving place to an act of barbarity contrary to all the usages

of civilized hostilities?
right nail on the head in the question,
Whether an English Admiral was justified
in moving his ships in order to permit the
Spanish Admiral to perpetrate an atrocity?
And Mr. Whiteside cuttingly asked·

Sir L. Palk hit the of Valparaiso. The American and English commanders then requested the Spanish Admiral to give due notice to the inhabitants of Valparaiso of his intention to bombard the place if he came to the conclusion that it was his duty to do so. The Spanish commander led the British Admiral to believe that he refused to comply with his request in the event of torpeWhether, when a British fleet was before does being used; and Admiral Denman then such a town as that described by the Under- said that if torpedoes were used against the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, containing both Spanish fleet, and the Spanish Admiral thereupBritish subjects and British property, and a on opened fire on the town without further notice, Spanish fleet were to come, and, acting under thus endangering the lives of British subjects and instructions such as those which had been others, he would interfere and stop the proceedvaguely described, its commander were to re-ings of the Spanish fleet. That, it would be quest the British admiral to sheer off in order seen, was a very different thing from declaring that he might bombard this unoffending and he would, under any circumstances, predefenceless town, it was, as a matter of course the duty of the British Admiral thus to sheer off, and, after watching the operations, land his sailors, not after the manner of Nelson, but to extinguish the flames by water.

It is said that if the British and American squadrons had remained at their moorings, so as to obstruct the operations of the Spanish Admiral, he would have fired into them; but the answer to this is, that British and American Admirals are not the only commanders who have to consider the consequences of involving their countries in war, and the Spanish Admiral would not have been so mad as to risk a war between Spain and the two greatest maritime Powers, who in two months would have swept the seas of the Spanish flag. Active resistance was out of the question, but passive resistance must have been successful, unless the Spanish Admiral was wholly free from the responsibility that weighed upon the other commanders. He might have sunk Admiral Denman's wooden ship, it is said, and the possibility is not to be denied; but the country would have been more reconciled to the loss than to the fact of her steaming away upon signal from the Spanish Admiral. But after the perpetration of the mischief the British squadron returned to take care of the broken bits. But armed interference had been contemplated, though the British Admiral's ship was not ironclad; as Mr. Layard shows in his answer to a rep resentation of the English merchants at Valparaiso that Admiral Denman had undertaken to prevent the bombardment :

Moreover, the Spanish commander, when informed by Admiral Denman that it was probable torpedoes would be used, declared that their use would be followed by a bombardment

vent the bombardment of Valparaiso. But the President of the Chilian Government saw that by using torpedoes they would place themselves in a very false position, and he accordingly forebore to carry his original intention into effect, and that ended the incident referred to as the base of the assertion made by the Valparaiso merchants.

Now it certainly seem most inconsistent, to say the least, that if the Chilians had provoked a bombardment by the use of torpedoes our squadron would have interfered to protect them, but as they remained inoffensive they were left to the most ruthless punishment. It comes to this, that if Valparaiso had forfeited claims to protection, to proect it And if anything could justify Admiral Denman would have run all risks the bombardment of a defenceless city, it would be resort to torpedoes, which are submarine engines of distruction not less cruel than shells showered through the air. But, as usual, our interference was too much or too little, and unfortunate Valparaiso has the fate of the hare with many friends, who obligingly turn their backs while the hounds are tearing her to pieces. This may be called neutrality, but neutrality does not go three miles away to leave a foul field for an enormity.

There has been what the lawyers would call a misprision of barbarism dishonourable to the British name, and it is no consolation that other flags are equally miral Denman hauled down and hid away compromised. By the way, we hope Adhis colours when, in compliance with the Spaniard's signal, he showed his stern to Valparaiso and steamed off out of the bay. In so getting out of the way, the sign of nationality should have been suppressed, as well as the feelings which must have revolted against the course taken.