thoroughfare by a telephone company would be a nuisance, for the right of the company to place them there would not exist. So it would seem that where one undertakes to defend such act under the statute, it is for him to show that he brought himself within its terms. And unless he proves that they were placed in such a manner as not to discommode the public in the use of the streets, there is a failure of such proof on his part. Wolfe v. Erie Tel. and Tel. Co., 33 Fed. Rep., 320; Shearm. & Redf. on Neg., sec. 13.

The appellant having erected the telephone pole in dangerous prox imity to the main traveled portion of the street, it follows from the principles of law stated, that it is liable for the injuries inflicted if its location there was the proximate cause of the collision, and there was no negligence on the part of Mrs. Billingsley contributing thereto.

"The proximate cause of an event must be understood to be that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces that event, and without which that event would not have occurred." Shearm. & Redf. on Neg., sec. 26; Gonzales v. Galveston, 84 Texas, 3.

"Where there is negligence, and injury flowing from it, and there is also an intermediate cause, disconnected from the negligence, and the operation of this cause produces the injury, the person guilty of the negligence can not be held responsible for the injury. The inquiry must be whether there was any intermediate cause disconnected from the primary fault, and self-operating, which produced the injury. * *** Intervening agencies sometimes interrupt the current of responsible connection between negligent acts and injuries, but as a rule these agencies, in order to accomplish such result, must entirely supersede the original culpable act, and be in themselves responsible for the injury, and it must be of such a character that they could not have been foreseen or anticipated by the wrongdoer. If it required both agencies to produce the result, or if both contributed thereto as concurrent forces, the presence and assistance of one will not exculpate the other, because it would still be the efficient cause of the injury. The intermediate cause must supersede the original wrongful act or omission, and be sufficient of itself to stand as the cause of the plaintiff's injury, to relieve the original wrongdoer from liability. One of the most valuable of the criteria furnished us by the authorities is to ascertain whether any new force has intervened between the fact accomplished and the alleged cause. If a new force of power has intervened of itself sufficient as the cause of the misfortune, the other must be considered too remote.' * * * The new force of power here would have been harmless but for the displaced wire, and the fact that the wire took on a new force with the creation of which the company was not responsible, yet it contributed no less directly to the injury on that account." Ahern v. Telegraph Co., 22 Law. Rep. Ann., 640; Wehner v. Lagerfelt, 27 Texas Civ. App., 524.

It must therefore be held that dangerous proximity of the pole to the

main traveled part of the street was, and not the momentary swerving of the horse, the proximate cause of the collision, which resulted in the injury to Mrs. Billingsley. City of San Antonio v. Porter, 24 Texas Civ. App., 444, 59 S. W. Rep., 923; Eads v. City of Marshall, 29 S. W. Rep., 171; 1 Shearm. & Redf., p. 593; 1 Thomp. on Neg., last ed., sec, 93; Cleveland v. Bangor Railway Co., 32 Atl. Rep., 892.

The question of contributory negligence was one for the jury. Al though Mrs. Billingsley was aware of the situation of the pole, such knowledge did not constitute her undertaking to drive along the road between it and the two fence posts at the corner negligence per se. Beach on Con. Neg., sec. 247; 15 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 2 ed., 468; City of Denison v. Sanford, 21 S. W. Rep., 785; Kelly v. Railway Co., 9 N. W. Rep., 588; Maus v. City of Springfield, 14 S. W. Rep., 630; City of Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S., 436; Cleveland v. Bangor Railway Co., supra. Nor did the fact that she might have driven on the other side of the street charge her with such negligence. City of San Antonio v. Porter, supra; Ball v. City of El Paso, 23 S. W. Rep., 835; McKeigue v. City of Janesville, 31 N. W. Rep., 299; Walker v. Decatur Company, 25 N. W. Rep., 257; Shearm. & Redf. on Neg., sec. 376, and cases cited under note 9.

All questions raised by assignments of error not disposed of by what we have said have been carefully considered, and we think none present such an error as would require a reversal of the judgment. It is therefore affirmed.

Writ of error refused.

Affirmed.

GALVESTON, HARRISBURG & SAN ANTONIO RAILWAY COMPANY V. W. E. FALES ET Ux.

Decided November 11, 1903.

1.-Damages-Negligence-Proximate Cause-Evidence.

Evidence considered and held sufficient to establish negligence on the part of the railway company as proximate cause for the injuries and property losses declared on in the suit. for damages.

2.-Common Carriers-Liability for Loss of Baggage.

In the absence of legislation limiting the responsibility of carriers it can not be assumed that the general law prescribes any definite fixed limit to the value of baggage beyond which the carrier is not liable. What is a reasonable quantity of baggage for which a carrier should be held liable under the circumstances is a question of fact for the jury. It is not required that when the passenger delivers his baggage for transportation he shall inform the carrier of the specific articles constituting it.

3. Practice on Appeal-Assignment of Error.

An assignment of error complaining of two distinct rulings of the court in no wise related or connected and presenting two separate and distinct questions, is not entitled to consideration on appeal.

4.-Contract Limiting Liability-Interstate Commerce-Charge.

The provision of our statute which prohibits common carriers from limiting their liability, as it exists at common law, by stipulations in the bill of lading, is valid as applied to contracts for interstate transportation of property. Special charge stating the converse of this principle was correctly refused.

5.-Measure of Damages-Evidence-Lost Baggage.

The measure of damages for lost baggage is the reasonable value of the same at the point of destination, and not at an intermediate point though that point be where the initial carrier's line connects with the terminal carrier's. Proof, therefore, of the value at El Paso of baggage destined to San Francisco was properly excluded.

6.—Carrier of Passengers-Accident-Negligence Presumed.

Where an accident happens upon a railway from which a passenger sustains an injury by the breaking down of the carriage, or by the running off of the train, or the spreading or breaking of the rails, the very nature of the occurrence will be prima facie evidence of the negligence of the company or its servants. Note a charge objectionable as directing conclusive effect to a particular fact, held under the principle stated to be harmless error. 7.-Same-Presumption.

Otherwise and briefly stated, the plaintiff is not bound to prove more than enough to raise a fair presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant and of resulting injury to himself. Having done this, he is entitled to recover, unless the defendant produces evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption.

Appeal from the District Court of El Paso. Tried below before Hon. J. M. Goggin.

Baker, Botts, Baker & Lovett and Beall & Kemp, for appellant.

Richard F. Burgess, for appellee.

NEILL, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE.-This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries to Mrs. W. E. Fales and loss of baggage of appellees caused by the alleged negligence of appellant. It was alleged in appellees' petition that on the 6th day of May, 1902, they were passengers on one of appellant's cars from San Antonio to El Paso, and thence to

California; that "said train was, through the negligence and carelessness of defendant's agents and employes, derailed and thrown from the track;" and that the accident resulted in serious and permanent personal injuries to Mrs. Fales, and the destruction of their baggage of the value of $2669.95.

The appellant answered by special demurrers, some of which were sustained and some overruled; pleas of not guilty and general denial; inevitable accident, unreasonable and improper items of baggage, and by pleading a special contract limiting the baggage to wearing apparel not exceeding in value $100.

The case was tried before a jury, and the trial resulted in a judgment for appellees for $10,000 for personal injuries to Mrs. Fales, and $1000 for loss of baggage, and $1000 for loss of services and time of his wife. to Mr. Fales.

Conclusions of Fact.-On the 6th day of March, 1902, W. E. Fales bought two tickets in San Antonio from appellant company, which were stamped "G. H. & S. A. Ry., San Antonio, March 6, 1902, city office." Each ticket bore the following words: "Issued by the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company, good for one second class passage to point on Southern Pacific Company, Pacific system, designated on coupon attached, when officially stamped, subject to the following contract: In selling this ticket this company acts only as agent, and is not responsible beyond its own line. 5. Baggage liability is limited to wearing apparel not exceeding $100 in value." The contract part of the tickets upon one was signed by Mrs. W. E. Fales, and the other by Mr. W. E. Fales. The point designated in the coupon attached to the ticket as the destination of the passengers was San Francisco, Cal. On the same day, by virtue of said tickets, they took passage at San Antonio on one of appellant's trains for San Francisco. The train on which they were riding, and in which their baggage was carried, was derailed, wrecked and burned near Maxon Springs, Texas, on March 7, 1902. The following testimony taken from the record, is all it contains. in regard to the catastrophe: "At the time of the accident appellees. were riding in one of the tourist sleeping cars. The train, with the exception of one of the standard Pullman sleepers, was derailed, wrecked and burned near Maxon Springs, Texas, about 3:30 a. m. on the 7th day of March, 1902. Some time prior to the derailment Mr. Fales was awakened in his berth by the fast running of the train and swaying of the car, and thought it was running about fifty or sixty miles an hour when it struck the curve where the derailment occurred. The engine, tender, baggage, mail and all the other cars, with the exception of the Pullman mentioned, were derailed, thrown one upon the other, wrecked and burned. About five minutes after the derailment occurred Mr. Fales found and carried his wife from the wreck. She was for about fifteen minutes thereafter unconscious, and, when she recovered consciousness, complained of pains in her head and back."

Since the disaster Mrs. Fales has suffered continuous mental and physical pain from the injuries inflicted, has required the constant care and attention of her husband, has been unable to discharge her household duties or render him any service, and her physical and nervous condition has continued to grow worse, and the evidence is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that she will remain a helpless suffering invalid for life.

The two trunks containing appellees' baggage were received by appellant and placed on the same train upon which they took passage. The trunks nor their contents have never been delivered to appellees, but were destroyed by fire in the wreck near Maxon Springs. The value of said baggage at its place of destination, San Francisco, was $1000.

From the evidence we conclude that the derailment and wreck of the train, the consequent injuries to Mrs. Fales, the loss of her time and services, and the destruction of appellees' baggage, were proximately caused by the negligence of appellant, and that by reason thereof appellees have been damaged to the extent found by the jury.

Conclusions of Law.-1. It is complained that "the court erred in overruling defendant's exception to that part of plaintiff's petition claiming loss of baggage, because the value claimed is greatly in excess of what would be customary, fair and reasonable in respect to travelers' baggage, and because the number of articles claimed as baggage is grossly unreasonable in amount and in excess of what is usually carried by travelers upon a journey.

It can not be determined from this assignment, nor from the proposition and statement under it, what items claimed by appellees as baggage should, under appellant's contention, have been excluded. The court did sustain the exception to some of the items; for instance, "specimens of gold quartz, package of legal documents, insurance papers, mining stocks, inventories, will, report of estate of deceased, family pictures, marriage certificate, etc., solid silverware and old coins.". As the items to which the exception was not sustained are not referred to either in the assignment, proposition, or statement under it, it is not incumbent upon us to enumerate them. They seem to us, however, to only include such articles of personal convenience or necessity as are usually carried by passengers for their personal use. A woman's jewelry and every article pertaining to her wardrobe that may be necessary or convenient to her traveling, is regarded in law as baggage. In the absence of legislation limiting the responsibility of carriers, it can not be assumed that the general law prescribes any definite fixed limit to the value of baggage beyond which the carrier is not liable. Hutch on Carr., sec. 681a. What is a reasonable quantity of baggage for which a carrier should be held liable under the circumstances, is a question of fact for the jury. Hutch. on Carr., sec. 688; Jones v. Priester, 1 White & W., secs. 613, 614.

In order to fix the liability upon a common carrier for the loss of its