seignory and in the services; and hence the distinction, that when the tenant purchases the manor, the tenancy is extinguished in the manor; while the services are extinguished in the land when the tenant of the land accepts a release of the services.

The authorities collected to illustrate the leading propositions under this division are stated in the margin. (a)

22dly, As to Persons who claim by Descent.

By means of merger, as applicable to estates, and by means of extinguishment as applicable to tenure, to services, and to equities, &c. the course of descent may be varied.

1st, As to estates. A possessio fratris may be acquired so as to make the sister heir by the union, and consequent merger, of the freehold with the inheritance. Also a man may have several estates descendible in a different manner; and by reason of merger, the course of descent may be changed as to all these estates, except that

(a) 6 Mod. 67. 3 Peere Wms. 9. Andrews, 91. Vin. Abr. Merger, 361. 363, $64. Vern. 458. 393. Cro. Eliz. 160. 360. Carter, 23. Com. Dig. Copyhold, P. E. F. 6. 2 Rep. 17. 2 Vern. 243. 2 Ves. J. 524.

in which the merger shall take place; for example, a person may have an estate for a life or for several lives, and that estate may be descendible or rather transmissible, to the heirs of the first purchaser of that estate, and his mother or some other ancestor, may have been the first purchaser: he may at the same time have an estate-tail, of which he himself or some ancestor may have been the donee, and he may at the same time have the reversion or remainder in fee, descendible in a particular manner. The last estate may have been of his own purchase, and consequently be descendible to all his heirs, without any exception or exclusion, beginning with his paternal heirs.

The estate for life, or the estate-tail, when converted into a base fee, may merge, or the estate-tail may be enlarged into a fee-simple by means of a common recovery; and, as a consequence, the reversion or remainder may be barred, and in effect cease to constitute any part of the ownership.

As to the estate for life, after it shall be merged, the ownership will be governed by the course of descent of the estate in which the merger shall take place. For example, when a man has an estate to him and his heirs for three lives, and that estaté is descendible to his heirs ex parte paternâ,

and becomes merged in an estate descendible to the heirs ex parte maternâ, the maternal heirs will be intitled to the possession, as well during the lives, as after the period originally appointed for the commencement in possession of the reversion or remainder.

So if the estate for lives had been descendible to the heirs ex parte maternâ, and that estate had merged in an estate of inheritance, descendible to the heirs er parte paterná, the maternal heirs would have been excluded even during the

lives.

So on the renewal of a lease of an estate for lives, descendible to the heirs ex parte materna, the estate taken under a new lease would be descendible to the heirs of the lessee in the new lease, on the ground that such lessee is the first purchaser.

But suppose a trustee to have the legal estate, in trust for a person and his heirs, who derives his title by descent ex parte maternâ, and the lease to be renewed in the name of the trustee in trust for the same person and his heirs, there are strong grounds for contending that the new estate obtained under the tenant right of renewal, would be descendible to the same heirs as were entitled under the original trust. The principle to be extracted from Fenwick v.

Mitford, and Earl Bedford's case, (a) principle adopted by courts of law from courts of equity ;) and as to uses enforced on courts of law, by the statute of uses, and the cases which preserve the equity of redemption to the heirs who would have succeeded to the estate if it had not been mortgaged, afford a strong argument that a court of equity would preserve the trust in the line of descent, from the person who was the first purchaser of the original estate in the trust. No decision, however, has been found on this subject.

2dly, As to estates-tail. When the ownership under the estate-tail shall merge in, or as in the case of Symonds v. Cudmore, shall be united to and blended with the remainder or reversion in fee, the owner of the remainder or reversion in fee, will, for the purposes of descent, be treated as a purchasing ancestor, and consequently the descent will be to the paternal heirs, unless the maternal ancestors were the first purchasers of the ownership, conferred by the remainder or reversion.

But when a person is tenant in tail by purchase, and suffers a common recovery, and thereby enlarges, or converts, his estate-tail into a fee-simple, the estate in

(a) 1 Leo. 182. Popham, 3. Moor, 718.

fee, thus acquired, will be descendible to his heirs general, on the ground that he was the first purchaser. On the other hand, if a maternal ancestor had been the first purchaser, the descent would have been in the line of the heirs of that ancestor. The distinctions and the authorities on this point are stated in the 1st Vol. p. 198.

But in those cases in which the ownership under the estate-tail merges in the remainder or reversion in fee, the heirs of the first purchaser of this remainder or reversion will be preferred, or as the case may require, will exclude all other heirs.

As to Extinguishment.

It has already been shewn, that on the union of the trust with the legal estate, and the consequent extinguishment of the equitable estate in the legal ownership, the descent will be governed by the legal ownership, as in the instance of Goodright on the demise of (a) Alston v. Wells and others.

So that on the union of the equitable interest with the legal estate, the equitable interest will be extinguished, and the title

(a) Dougl. 772. 3 Ves. J. 339.