10th, Who have interests by executory devise, or by executory bequest.

11th, Who have estates on condition.

12th, Who are releasees, &c. to uses.
13th, Who have estates tail.

14th, Who have estates in right of their wives, and also of themselves.

15th, Who have estates as executors or administrators, and also in their own right. 16th, Who have several estates;—one in their individual capacity: another in their corporate capacity.

17th, Who have titles by curtesy.

18th, Who have titles to dower.

19th, Who have estates to be enlarged on condition.

20th, Who have estates to be enlarged.

1st, By confirmation.

2d, By release.

21st, Who are copyholders.

22d, Who claim by descent.

23d. Who are in ventre sa mere.

24th, Who have collateral interests or

derivative estates.

25th, Who have equitable estates.

26th, Who are creditors.

27th, Who have equitable interests.

28th, Who have legal, and equitable interests united.

29th, Who have a prior title, and who are interested in, or may be affected by, the consequences of a merger.

And lastly, And generally persons who have collateral claims upon, or interests derived out of both, or either of the estates which are united and under this head the acceleration of the estate in reversion or remainder as a consequence of the merger may be considered.

:

CHAP. VIII.

That there must be two Estates in the same Person.

FIRST, To call the doctrine of merger into effect, there must of necessity, and at least, be two estates. On this head the law is positive; indeed it is demonstrably clear, that unless there are two estates, in the same person in the same land, there is not any estate in that person to merge, or occasion a merger. A mere right or title will not suffice. (a) Therefore, where tenant in tail discontinued, by granting an estate for life, and died without issue, in the life-time of the tenant for life, and the tenant for life surrendered or granted his estate, to the person intitled under the remainder expectant on the estate tail, the estate for life, and consequently the new reversion expectant thereon still continued: for the remainder-man

(a) Pauling and Hardy, Skin. 3. 62. Com. Dig. Surr.

was not remitted, and till remitted, he had not any estate in which the tenancy for life could merge.

The estate of the tenant for life, and the right of the remainder-man, depended on distinct titles. The right of the tenant in tail arose from the original gift, and from an estate which was discontinued and turned to a right. The estate of the tenant for life was derived out of the tortious fee acquired by the discontinuance. The reversion in fee expectant on the estate for life, was in the heir or assignee of the lessor of that estate, and such heir or assignee was the only person capable of a surrender, or in whose estate the tenancy for life could merge. No act of the tenant for life, excepting a tortious alienation divesting the estate, and creating a new and wrongful title, could prejudice the owner of that reversion. To defeat the estate for life, and the wrongful reversion expectant on that estate, the remainder-man must prosecute a real action. By these means alone can he restore himself to the seisin under his original title. No conveyance by the tenant for life, or entry, can avail the rightful owner of the estate-tail, to the extent of recovering his rightful ownership. Disseisin after disseisin, may be committed; but till there shall be a recovery in a real action on the footing

of the old intail, or a remitter by act of law to that intail, the old intail will be dormant. It follows, under a title thus circumstanced, that while the discontinuance remains in force, the owner under the intail, cannot confirm the title of the tenant for life, by suffering a common recovery brought against the donee in tail, as tenant of the freehold, because he is not seised of an estate tail in posession. That a recovery may operate, the tenant in tail must be vouched, and for that purpose the freehold must be conveyed to some other that the writ of entry may person, be sued against that person, and that he may vouch the tenant in tail and the donee vouch over or the writ of entry may be brought immediately against the tenant for life, and he may vouch the donee in tail in remainder, and thus the right under the intail, and under all remainders, which were expectant on the same, may be barred. (b)

(b) Taltarum's Case, 12 Ed. 4. 14. 19. Lincoln Coll. Case, 3 Rep. 58. Peck v. Channell, Cro. Eliz. 827. Preston's Conveyancing, I Vol. 123.