other reason peculiar to estates of freehold, shall the instrument be also void as to the time of the year, though there be an express limitation of that time? And yet that the term should not pass under these circumstances, is a necessary consequence of admitting that the several periods, of the life, and the year, are constituent parts of one entire estate.

The observations on this case are not, by any means, inconsistent with the opinion of chief justice Bridgman. The two cases are essentially different. In the case before that judge, both interests were of a chattel quality. In the case under consideration, one estate is freehold, the other chattel; interests SO dissimilar, communicating qualities so totally different, that union between them, as parts of an entire estate, seems incompatible.

In reference to the rule in Shelley's case it may be observed, that, when the limitations to the ancestor and the heirs are immediate, or eventually become so, by the determination or failure of intermediate estates, the several interests imported by these limitations, will consolidate, and, by merger, become one intire estate, giving one undivided time of continuance. When other estates are limited intermediately, the limitation to the heirs, will, during the existence of

these estates, give to the ancestor an estate in remainder, to take effect in possession, according to the order in which it is limited, in subordination to, and after the determination of the intermediate estates by which it is preceded, excepting only those instances which are the same in principle, or in circumstances, as the case of Lewis Bowles. (k) In that case all the remainders limited mediately between several gifts, one to a man and his wife for their lives, the other to their heirs of their bodies, were contingent; and it was held that an estate-tail did execute in the husband and wife, so as to entitle them to be deemed tenants of an estate-tail in possession but sub modo: : so that, on the vesting of the contingent interests, the husband and wife should be tenants for their lives with a remote remainder in tail.

Even though the several limitations had been so made as to be operative, without the aid of the rule in Shelley's case; for example, by a remainder to the donee and his heirs or the heirs of his body, the like temporary union and consolidation would have taken place, so as to open and let in the contingent remainders, when and if they should become capable of effect.

(k) 11 Rep. 80.

These are instances of merger which are conditional and not absolute. The cases of Lewis Bowles, () and Hooker v. Hooker, (m) and Cordal's case, (n) afford the material authorities, and they are relevant to the doctrine of merger as it affects contingent remainders, dower, curtesy, &c.

That the Accession of a third or intermediate Estate may be the Cause of Merger, as between two or more other Estates.

The law of merger may operate between three or more estates, as well as between two estates.-A third estate may be, and frequently is, the means of the union of two estates, and the merger of one of them, when they would otherwise be kept apart and remain distinct. This observation will become intelligible, by supposing A. to be tenant for life, with remainder to B. for life, with remainder to A. in fee or by supposing B. to be tenant for life, with remainder to A. for life, with remainder to B. in fee.

In the former case, the intermediate estate

of B. will prevent the union of the several estates in A. and in the latter instance, the estates of B. are kept distinct by the estate of A.

This position will be proved by Bates's case, (o) and the case of Duncomb and Duncomb. (p) From the doctrine established by these cases, and to be stated in considering the effect of merger in reference to titles by curtesy and dower, it will be evident, that the right of dower or of curtesy may depend on the application of the law of merger. But with a view to the remarks to be made, on introducing the several cases of Bates, and Duncomb v. Duncomb, it is observable that, cæteris paribus, if in the first instance B. had conveyed his estate for life to A. and in the second instance had conveyed his several estates for life and in fee to A. the three estates would have united and become one entire interest. In each of these cases, the impediment to merger, arise from the intermediate estate, will be and was removed when that estate shall be annihilated by merger. These instances then prove that as to this point, it is immaterial whether the person who has the second or intermediate estate, acquires the first and third estates, or

(0) Salk. Lord Rayı. 326.

(p) 2 Lev. 437.

whether the owner of the first and third estates, becomes tenant of the second or intermediate estate. And of the circuitous mode in which merger takes place in those instances, some notice will be taken, in considering the other heads of division. The observations to be introduced under these divisions will also illustrate these cases.

That the several Estates must vest in the same Person.

Another circumstance to be noticed under this division is, that the several estates must meet, that is, vest in the same person. Several estates, in distinct persons, will remain several and distinct interests. union of two or more estates in the same individual, or in two or more persons seized jointly, is the cause of merger.

The

That the two Estates must be in the same Lands; or in the same part of the same Lands.

These positions require very little explanation. The examples for their illustration, will be easily collected from the subsequent divisions.-The two estates must be in the same lands; or when the lands are held by several persons in undivided parts, then in the same parts of these lands. Several estates in distinct parts