ling candour comminations against a cherished doctrine. To be saddled, however, with the adhesion to gratuitous absurdities, just in order that the critic may claim for himself the merit of undeceiving us, is what the very gentlest repudiate. Mere policy should have spared us such an announcement as the following, occurring in the very first page of the preface.

"That the barbarous nations which overthrew the Roman empire in the fifth century, and which are denominated by the historians of the middle ages as the Northern Hive, came from Scandinavia, and that Scandinavia was situated in the north of Europe, and limited to the modern kingdoms of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.”

Thus, then, the Ostrogoths of Theodoric, the Visogoths of Alaric, the Mæsogoths of Ulphlas, the Vandals of Genseric, the Franks of Clovis, did not come from Sweden. Who thought they did? We have no sympathy with battles against men of straw, and no interest in the discoveries of mares'-nests. Insufficient information concerning the latest data and the newest hypotheses is a lighter fault than blunders upon matters of current belief; it being less discreditable to overlook the latest details in a special department, than to attribute hallucinations to the learned world in general. The former we readily excuse. Philology moves quickly, and speaks in a variety of tongues. To keep pace with its progress depends upon the accidental appliances of books and opportunity, as much as upon the essential elements of sense, learning, and industry. Still there are questions, where the possession of a certain amount of preliminary learning is not only an advantage, but a condition. The statements of Mr. Welsford concerning the Celts is of this sort. The details of Pritchard, Bopp, Pictet, and Garnett, have placed them in a definite and recognized position. Measured by its mass only, the evidence upon the point is equal to the whole of Mr. Welsford's volume. Now how is this dealt with? either in its principles or in its details? Far from it. nized. It is practically treated as nothing at all. be set aside by Mr. Welsford's counter-statement.

Is it invalidated, It is barely recogIt is supposed to

Now, if we ask what is involved in this counter-statement, we shall have a good measure of philological reasoning, that either is or ought to be forthcoming in its support. It involves

1. The ethnographical position of the Cynetae, Thracians, and Scythians of Herodotus.

2. The identity of the Thracians and Scythians.

3. The descent of the present Germans from these last-named races. 4. The belief that a connection between the German of the nineteenth century and the German of the Germania of Tacitus is a vulgar

error.

5. The essential identity of the Gauls and Germans, both being Celts.

6. The original descent of all these nations from parts of Asia where at present languages not even of the Indo-European tribe are spoken, i. e. from the parts north of the Caspian.

This is not a tithe of the assumptions, each of which is against the current opinion of the learned world; and, consequently, a paradox. Now the doctrines of Pritchard, Bopp, Pictet, and Garnett (to go no farther into the list of ethnographical philologists) were not paradoxes. Yet they were considered to require not only some, but much proof, and that of the common-sense, straight-forward kind.

Measure against this the evidence for Mr. Welsford's paradoxes. Abundant it certainly is, but not either common-sense or straight-forward. Still it is abundant in amount, and in kind like the following

extract.

P. 173. "Italia, from Italus. Aristotle, in his Politics, says, that Italus changed the name of Enotria into Italy; and, in the same passage, mentions the Chaonians as an Œnotrian tribe, which are so many confirmations of the etymologies which precede and follow.

"Aith (Hebrew), Time; Hit (Arabic), Time; Ail (Hebrew) God; us, Latin termination.

"Italus, Saturn, Chronos, or the god Time, or the god of Time and Italians, those who worshipped Saturn under that name, or were conceived to have possessed the country from time immemorial."

With proof like this, abundance is poverty. Yet the extract was made at random, being the one upon which we opened the book; while its merits are rather above than below the average. What they and their like prove, is a question of little importance. It were curious, however, to determine what they would not prove.

Partially, they justify the style of the book. We described it as containing arguments the most extraneous. It is fair, however, to add, that upon mature deliberations, the interwoven doctrines of the Malthusian theory, and the Irish Church, as connected therewith, are of equal validity as evidence, and of parallel value as illustrations, with the proper and peculiar etymologies.

The influence of the book is seen at once. It leaves opinions just where they were before. Its artistic value is a matter of calculation. It is worse or better than the chef-d'œuvres of General Vallancy and his imitators, just in proportion as it has more or fewer etymologies.

R. G. L.

A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
Philosophy. By G. H. Lewes.

Nos. 45 and 46.

Series 1st. Ancient Knight's Weekly Volumes,

HERE is one of the Curiosities of Literature; a History of Greek Philosophy, from Thales to Proclus, in some four hundred duodecimo pages. No mere "sketch," be it observed; no, we have the author's own word that it is no such paltry thing: his work is "complete," that is, it has "an organic completeness." We know not with what to parallel this extraordinary feat. The Iliad in a nut-shell was a mere wonder of penmanship. Cornelius Nepos, indeed, wrote the history of the world from the creation in three books,

Doctis, Juppiter! et laboriosis

But Mr. Lewes's work is neither learned nor laborious. We say this, again, on his own authority. He tells us that he is "neither a speculative nor erudite historian;" that he "makes no pretensions to the character of a savant;" and that his book has been compiled on the sic vos non vobis principle, by "liberally availing himself of the industry of others." We hardly know which to admire most; the naïve modesty of the avowal, or the cool assurance of the attempt. In a literary sense, Mr. Lewes is un vrai chevalier d'industrie. Like that dashing order of speculators, he looks upon any stock of his own as an incumbrance rather than otherwise; and with him learning and dulness are convertible terms. Thus Ritter is said to be "the Brucker of the 19th century; not quite so learned and not quite so dull." Yet, inconsistently enough, he would fain hint that he is not so superficial as he seems; and tells us that "it is some consolation to know that all who are competent to judge will not judge by appearances." The "appearances" are, that Mr. L. has undertaken a history of Greek Philosophy without knowing any thing of Greek, nor of philosophy. Whether he should be judged by these "appearances we must leave the reader to determine from a few random specimens. And first for his Greek.

"

In the life of Xenophanes (Vol. 1. p. 77) a passage in Diogenes Laertius is thus translated: “ 'Xenophanes wrote two thousand verses on the foundation of Colophon, and on an Italian colony sent to Elea.” We had always thought that Elea was in Italy, and fancy that we are borne out by the text: ἐποίησε δὲ—καὶ τὸν εἰς Ἐλέαν τῆς Ἰταλίας ȧñoɩɩμóν (Lib. 9, 2, 3). It would be just as correct to talk of a Spanish colony sent to Gibraltar. In p. 183, foll. Mr. Lewes favours the world with a translation from Plato's Symposium, cap. 32; and as he had previously declined to alter Taylor's version of another passage

from that author, lest he should be held responsible for the whole, we were naturally on the very tip-toe of expectation. Guess, then, at our bewilderment on perusing what follows: "For Marsyas, and whoever now pipes the music that he taught, for that music which is of heaven, and described as being taught by Marsyas, enchants men through the power of the mouth.” To solve the puzzle we turned to the original, and found that Mr. L. had only perpetrated the trifling blunder of converting Olympus, the flute-player, into heaven itself! and that all Plato meant to say was, that "Marsyas enchanted mankind by his skill in playing upon the flute, as, indeed, whoever now performs his music does; that part of it, I mean, which Olympus used to play under the tuition of Marsyas." In quoting a passage from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Mr. L. begins his sentence with the particle yáp (Vol. 1. p. 223). Anthropomorphism is constantly spelt anthromorphism. Had we the space we might extend this list ad libitum; but the preceding specimens are, we suspect, enough. There is, however, in the second volume (p. 118) so gross a blunder that we cannot pass it over in silence, though, with all the proofs of Mr. Lewes's felicity in that way before us, we are half willing to believe that it must have arisen from some accident to the types. In the list of Aristotle's Categories, every one is translated wrongly. Thus ovoía is quantity, róσov, quality, and so forth.

Mr. Lewes's Philosophy is on a par with his Greek. In his Introduction (p. 17) the law of attraction is thus lucidly and elegantly expressed: “Attraction is the square of the distance." But why should so great a thinker" as Mr. L. be expected to trouble himself with so dry and vulgar a thing as proportion, or to care whether it be direct or inverse? What would be the precise effect of his new law of nature we are not prepared to say. As it is not the existing law, however, it is to be feared that those sober and orderly bodies, the planets, would "shoot madly from their spheres," and that "chaos would come again." Mars might be in collision with Venus; Mercury, after laying Jupiter by the heels, might run off with Saturn's ring. What would become of that lonely individual, the man in the moon? No more full moons, half moons, nor even quarters. As for our own nice little ball-but we cannot bear to think of it.

Mr. Lewes is equally strong in Metaphysics. Let us take a specimen from the life of Zeno of Elea. In Aristotle's Physics (Lib. 6, 9) are given four arguments of Zeno against the possibility of motion: of which we need here consider only three. It is necessary to premise that they are founded on the assumed divisibility of space and time; and which, if once allowed, must be a divisibility ad infinitum. The first problem is, that (on such an assumption) a body in motion could

never reach the end of its journey, because it must first pass the middle point. But if space be infinitely divisible, how can it ever reach that point? The second is the famous Achilles problem. Achilles, the swiftest of foot, could never overtake the slowest animal, say a tortoise, because he must first reach the point which the tortoise has left. But whilst Achilles was running a hundred feet, the tortoise might run ten, and so on ad infinitum. It is evident that these two problems rest on precisely the same ground, and differ only in their enunciation; the first taking half a given space, and the second a different quantity. The third problem is, that if time, one of the elements of motion, consists of instants, the flying arrow is at rest, since at every instant it is in a space equal to itself, and cannot, therefore, be at once in that space and out of it. This problem, therefore, like the preceding, is founded on the divisibility of time, though it does not contemplate its infinite divisibility. Victor Cousin, in his life of Zeno, in the Biographie Universelle, lately republished, with other pieces, at Brussels, under the title of Nouveaux Fragmens Philosophiques, has very ably shewn from the Parmenides of Plato that these arguments of Zeno's are only a part of his peculiar system of Dialectics. He never intended to maintain them seriously; but, though naught in themselves, they are good by way of reductio ad absurdum of the tenet of the Ionian school respecting the divisibility of the universe. Mr. Lewes has such a natural genius for contradictions, that it is impossible to make out whether he adopts M. Cousin's view or not. He admits (p. 96) that Zeno's method of Dialectics was that of reductio ad absurdum, and that "we must not seek in his arguments for any thing beyond the mere exercise of dialectical subtlety." Yet only four pages further on he tells us that "the other arguments of Zeno against the possibility of motion (and he maintained four, the third of which we have above explained) are given by Aristotle; but they seem more like the exercises of dialectical subtlety than the real arguments of an earnest man!" How can one deal with so slippery a philosopher? Yet stayhe here tells us that he has "explained" something, viz. Zeno's third problem. In this he holds that Zeno was in earnest, and that his argument is founded in truth. “In each individual point of space," says he, "the object is at rest; the sum total of a number of these states of rest is called motion!" "The fallacy is in the supposition. that motion is a thing, whereas, as Zeno clearly saw, it is only a condition. In a falling stone there is not the 'stone' and a thing called 'motion,' otherwise there would be also another thing called 'rest.'

In the second edition of his book-if it should ever be forthcomingwe trust that Mr. Lewes will favour the world with the names of