9 donian phalanx and the Thessalian cavalry were victorious in a terrible battle in 352 over the mercenaries of Phocia and Pherae. Onomarchus fell: a few fugitives escaped in the Athenian ships cruising on the coast of Magnesia. The tyrants Lycophron and Pitholaus quitted the town of Pherae, which Philip left free but he quartered a Macedonian garrison in its harbour Pagasae, to the relief of which an Athenian expedition once more came too late1. He also continued to occupy Magnesia, partly in order to prevent the Athenians from landing, and on his own account to reach out a helping hand from thence to the Euboeans against Athens: in any case to secure for himself the important alliance with the Thessalian confederation 17. Thus at three points, at Amphipolis, on the Thermaic Gulf (Methone), and at Pagasae, had Philip's power reached the sea, of which the Athenians had hitherto been undisputed masters. No doubt the seafight against Alexander of Pherae had already, in 361, proved troublesome to the Athenians. Now Macedonian privateers were harassing the Athenian islands, Lemnus and Imbrus, seizing at Geraestus on the southern promontory of Euboea many a corn-ship destined for Athens, and even venturing as far as the coast of Attica at Marathon 18. But when in the autumn of 352, Philip in person made an excursion southward from Thessaly to force his way into Hellas and annihilate the enfeebled Phocians, the Athenians called out all their resources. A powerful fleet and a 16 Ol. i. 9. 13. 22. Phil. i. 35. 17 Ol. i. 13. 22. ii. 7. 18 Phil. i. 34. citizen-army were speedily equipped, with which Nausicles secured on the sea side the narrow pass of Thermopylae occupied by the Phocians 19. Philip re- 10 treated, but immediately marched off in the direction of Thrace, where the Athenians had but just established themselves in the Chersonese which had been ceded to them five years before: colonists having been sent to Sestus from Athens, when that town, which had revolted from Athens, probably in the Social War, was stormed by Chares in 353. Philip now interfered in the disputes of the Thracian chieftains, which he settled as he pleased 20, in alliance with Perinthus and Byzantium compelled king Cersobleptes to send his son as a hostage to Macedonia, and laid siege to Heraeum Teichus near Perinthus. The rapid advances of Philip had not only caused alarm at Athens, but had made the Olynthians also so anxious, that they again drew closer to the Athenians, and in the first instance perhaps concluded a peace with them". Accordingly Philip attacked the Olynthians 22 before he had well recovered from a severe illness which had attacked him at Heraeum Teichus 23. The difficulty seems however to have been settled for the time; perhaps Philip was managing matters, as Demosthenes said not long after, τὰ μὲν εἴκων τὰ δ ̓ ameλŵr, and he seems to have succeeded in quieting the Olynthians 25, and first of all to have thwarted attempts at closer approximation to Athens. Athens 19 Phil. i. 17. de fals. leg. 84, 21 Ol. iii. 7. c. Aristocr. 109. 23 Ol. i. 13. iii. 4. Phil. i. 11. 25 de Chers. 59. Phil. iii. 11. 20 Ol. i. 13. 24 Ol. i. 3. c. Aristocr. 8. stood alone and discouraged, when Demosthenes with his first Philippic" oration took up the battle against Philip. 11 II. Demosthenes's entrance into political life. 354-351. When Demosthenes, at the age of about 30, entered on a statesman's career, the respect for and power of the Athenians in Greece had sunk to a low ebb. Moreover they were at variance with the Persian king Ochus, especially since he had by threats compelled Athens to make peace with her revolted allies. When therefore news arrived of enormous preparations which Ochus was making against Egypt and Phoenicia, many anticipated a new Persian expedition against Greece; the orators' tribune overflowed with warlike ardour and allusions to Salamis; 27 and men were busy calling on all Greece to rise 27, were eager to declare war against Persia, while Greece was more than ever divided and Athens destitute of 96 money and allies. At this time the young Demosthenes was the first and almost only orator who, in the oration Tepi ovμμopiŵv (354, B.C.), while he recommended prudent preparations and proposed a new division of classes to facilitate them, counselled that Athens should with full preparation wait for the 26 Delivered in the Archonship of Aristodemus, Olymp. 107. 1. B.C. 352-1. Dionys. Halicarn. Epist. ad Ammaeum, c. 4. 27 Epist. [Philipp.] 6. 28 de Rhod. lib. 6. attack, which in fact was never made. In Demosthenes's opinion the preparations should have been made to meet the real enemy: who was, as he clearly indicated, king Philip". Meanwhile the Phocian 12 war had broken out in Greece, and occupied the Thebans to such an extent as enabled the Lacedaemonians to hope for the recovery of their lost supremacy at least in the Peloponnese. As Messene was allied to Athens by defensive treaty 30, they as sailed Megalopolis the new capital of Arcadia. Both Megalopolitans and Spartans applied to Athens. Here for some years there had been two parties following the leading statesmen, the one of which sought the welfare of Athens in connexion with Thebes, the other with Sparta. The head of the latter, Callistratus, was expelled from Athens in 361 on a charge of high treason, and returning without leave was put to death. At the head of the Boeotian party stood the old Aristophon the Azenian, a man who boasted of having been prosecuted seventy-five times under the Graphe Paranomon without being once condemned. He had himself joined the general Chares in prosecuting the other generals, Timotheus and Iphicrates. Statesman and general, in the good times of Athens united in one person, were in the fourth century completely distinct, as war was carried on mainly by means of mercenaries: accordingly an intimate connexion between a statesman and a general was useful and even necessary. On the On the present 29 de symmor. 11. 41. de Rhod. lib. 6. 24. 80 pro Megalop. 9. 31 Ol. ii. 29. de Chers. 30. Aeschin. c. Ctes. 7. 13 occasion the statesmen of the one party declared for an alliance with Megalopolis, and so indirectly with Thebes, the others for supporting Sparta, who for her part promised to recover Oropus for the Athenians. Again Demosthenes, in the oration ὑπὲρ ΜεγαλοπολιTv, (beginning of 352,) prudently took the middle course the interests of Athens required that neither Thebes nor Sparta should be predominant in Greece, Athens therefore, as the disinterested guardian of Greek freedom, without breaking with Sparta, should protect the Arcadians, if the latter renounced their alliance with Thebes.-As Athens did not protect Megalopolis, and Thebes was only once, at the end of the summer of 352, in a position to give assistance, the enemies of Sparta in the Peloponnese turned their attention to king Philip of Macedon.-With equal clearness Demosthenes explained, in 352 in the ora tion κατὰ ̓Αριστοκράτους, in a state prosecution, that the advantage of Athens forbade her favouring any of the different Thracian chieftains exclusively, because by the division of their power her own possession of the Chersonese was best insured 39. At the end of this oration he bitterly criticized the negligence of the citizens, with regard to the administration of government at the time. It was conducted chiefly by Eubulus the Anaphlystian, at whose instigation especially the peace with the allies was brought about. As the head of the peace-at-anyprice party he soon became the most influential Athenian statesman and the most dangerous opponent of 32 Introd. supra, § 10. 33 c. Aristocr. 204. 206. 207. 209. |