If we take the expedition to Pylae, for instance, to consist of 50 ships of war, and reckon the support of 50 ships of burden as equivalent to that of 25 ships of war, the fleet cost in pay and maintenance-money alone 100 minae a day, and the army which accompanied it, 4000 oλîraι and 400 cavalry, 35 minae a day. Accordingly if the expedition lasted three months, the treasury had to meet an extraordinary 18 expenditure of 200 talents. It was necessary therefore to economize in time of peace: it was also possible. For the ordinary expenditures of the state, on ship-building and on cavalry, the salaries of the lower officials, those of the council, of the popular assembly, and of the courts of justice, lastly the outlays for the de fals. leg. 84. 50 49 supr. 9. 50 Phil. i. 35. The Greater Panathenaea were celebrated at the end of Hecatombaeon (before the middle of August) in every third year of the Olympiad, the lesser Panathenaea in the same month every year; the conduct of the numerous contests, musical and gymnastic, was entrusted to ten Athlothetae: at the close came the general festal procession to the temple of Athene. In it appeared nearly all citizens capable of bearing arms (Thuc. vi. 56 and 58), and the Knights were conspicuous, in this as in all other processions (Phil. i. 26), under their ἵππαρχοι and φύλαρχοι; and in the time of Demosthenes officers of infantry, the Tagiapxo, were also present. The other festivals, and the Panathenaea as far as related to sacrifice, were conducted by the superintendents of sacrifices iepotocol, who were, according to Aristotle in Etym. Magn. 468. 56, kλnpwtoi ἄρχοντες, δέκα τὸν ἀριθμόν, οἳ τά τε μαντεύματα ἱεροθυτοῦσι, κἄν τι καλλιερῆσαι δέῃ καλλιεροῦσι μετὰ τῶν μαντέων, καὶ θυσίας τὰς νομιζομένας ἐπιτελοῦσι καὶ τὰς πεντετηρίδας ἁπάσας διοικοῦσι λǹ Пava@ŋvaiwv.-Of the four festivals of Dionysus, which occurred in winter and spring, the last, the ueyára numerous regular state-festivals (iepà dnμoteλî), were amply covered by the revenues: in quiet times there were even surpluses. Such sums were very considerable in the earlier period when respectable amounts of tribute came in from the allies. Such surpluses according to the old laws had to be stored for a warfund (σrpatiotiká): but Pericles had already taken from this treasure the Theoricon or Show-fund introduced by him, which was distributed among the poorer citizens generally for seats in the theatre at the festivals with which theatrical exhibitions were connected. These distributions recommenced with the restoration of the democracy in 403, and were extended to an increasing number of festivals and enlarged in amount. At length a special treasuryboard was formed for this purpose, the ten superintendents of the Theoricon (oi èπì тậ bewρikộ), and these were ultimately at the instigation of Eubulus entrusted with a control over the whole financial administration. These superintendents were appointed by popular election: consequently Eubulus, as he was constantly reelected, was during a long period a member of this board and naturally the leading member. He satisfied the demands of the almost insatiable people, who even in war-time could not bear to dispense with the Ocwpikóv1. The natural consequence was that for every extraordinary undertaking it became necessary to levy the detested proor doтiká (Phil. i. 35), was celebrated by musical and dramatic exhibitions during a period of five days at the end of March. 51 Justin. 6. 9. 19 perty-tax (elo popá) 5o. But there was yet another circumstance which crippled the energy of Athenian warfare. When we consider that in the abovementioned expedition to Pylae 8800 men were engaged on land, for nearly every heavy-armed soldier and horseman had one attendant with him, and perhaps 15,000 men at sea, we see that, in a total population of Attica of some 230,000 men, including probably 20,000 citizens, 10,000 metoeci and 120,000 slaves excluded from military service, we have here an enormous fraction of the entire population, and one which could not possibly be levied in modern times. The urgent necessity of levying mercenaries (évo) in frequent and protracted wars arose from this disproportion, quite irrespective of the fact that the Athenian manufacturers and merchants shrank from the inevitable loss of business as well as the bodily fatigue, while the poorer classes found the pay for attendance in the assembly and on juries together with the show-fund sufficient for existence 53. The state had practically no control over these 'enemies of all the world,' as Isocrates called them even if it kept to its obligation, which was rarely the case, and paid their wages punctually: the most it could do was to call its generals to account. To the mercenaries, as to the Lanzknechts of the sixteenth century, the highest offices were open. Distinguished leaders of mercenaries, like Charidemus of Oreus 55, 52 Ol. i. 20. ii. 31. iii. 19. Phil. i. 7. Aristocr. 61. 55 Ol. iii. 5. 54 53 Ol. iii. 33. de Chers. 24. C. obtained Athenian citizenship and the rank of general. While therefore on the one side many circum- 20 stances contributed to damp the military ardour of the Athenians and cripple the energy of their warfare, and on the other side the tactics and strategy of the Hellenes remained essentially unaltered", they had to encounter, in the king of the rough and youthful Macedonians, not merely an enterprising conqueror, but the creator of a new military system. The phalanx was formed by calling out all free but not noble Macedonians. This was done, not in the case of every campaign, but still often enough" for it to acquire a considerable amount of practice in warfare. But the war-loving young men of rank Philip gathered permanently about himself, and formed of them and of the numerous foreigners who hastened to join him, the corps of the raîpoi (mounted guards, those of the highest rank), the vаσπioтаí (esquires on foot), and the Elérαipo. This creation of a standing force had, it is true, a precedent in the powerful body-guard of Dionysius and in the army of Jason of Pherae, but Philip was the first to bring it to complete efficiency. Demosthenes must have recognized and often laid emphasis on the advantage of this revolution in the conduct of war. As early as his first Philippic" he proposed a corresponding counter-armament: a proposal to the necessity for 56 Phil. iii. 48. 58 57 Ol. ii. 16. 58 Ol. ii. 17. Schol. to Dem. p. 23. 2. Harpocration s. v. πεζέταιροι. 59 Phil. i. 21. iii. 49. Xen. Hieron. c. 10. which nothing contributed so much as the depression in that Hellenic spirit which had been wont to make a warrior of every citizen. Besides this the famous Thessalian cavalry was at Philip's command, and all Greece supplied mercenaries to the king who could pay. Thus Philip had the means as well as the will, instantly and at every season of the year, to concentrate troops on any point. And as the walls of so many Greek towns stood in his way, he paid special attention to the perfection of siege-implements (un χανήματα "). 21 IV. A short sketch of the history of Oratory1. Eloquence began to be a subject of instruction at Athens in the time of the Peloponnesian war, when Gorgias of Leontini charmed the Athenians with his artistic declamations. The secret of this art consisted in the study which was now first intentionally given to the outward form. It was as if a new world had been discovered, and men eagerly sought instruction from the sophists in all the elements both of knowledge and of speech. They studied the sound and accent of syllables, the etymology and synonymy of words, poetical epithets and metaphors, the position of the separate clauses, and the harmony of sentences. 60 Including катаπé\тαι, which shot arrows and torches, and Aloßóλo. Cf. Phil. iii. 17. 61 See Mueller and Donaldson, Hist. of Greek Literature, Vol. II., Jebb's Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus, and, in German, the works of Blass, Volkmann, and Westermann. |