64 SPANISH AFFAIRS. CH. II. Such a after the termination of the existing war. compact was sufficiently formidable to all the powers of Europe; but it contained one provision, the aim of which could not be misunderstood. Spain was not to be obliged to aid France by arms, except in case of invasion, or her being engaged in war with a maritime power. Pitt has been censured, as if his intolerable arrogance had revolted the French Government, and driven them to seek a new alliance. No doubt the tone of the great minister's diplomacy was haughty and uncompromising, like that which he assumed in the senate, in the council, and sometimes even in the closet of royalty itself. His peremptory demands might have precipitated, they certainly did not suggest those engagements, into which the Court of France now entered. The Family Compact was simply the consummation of that policy which France had steadily pursued for a long series of years, and which this country had resisted with arms more than half a century before. The futility of that resistance had been acknowledged by a peace, which Pitt had declared should not be his model for the treaty which he was prepared to negotiate. policy. Still it must be admitted, that except by war no Our Spanish attempt had ever been made by this country to avert the alliance between France and Spain. Five years before, Sir Benjamin Keene, the able and experienced ambassador at Madrid, had reported to Pitt the extreme irritation of that proud and sensitive Court at the ill-treatment she had received from England. And it is certain that many of her complaints were well founded. They referred chiefly to violations of her flag during the war with France, and for which England did not afford prompt reparation: to breaches of her fiscal laws by British traders, in carrying on a contraband traffic with the colonies, 1761. POLICY OF PITT. 65 and which England took no pains to repress. The Spanish Government had also preferred a claim founded on an article in the treaty of Utrecht, to fish on the banks of Newfoundland; and long conferences had taken place both at London and Madrid upon this point, but evidently with little care on the part of the former Court to bring it to a determination. Yet all these matters were capable of ready adjustment; and without regard to motives of particular policy, should have been fairly entertained by virtue of those broad rules of right and justice, which are as obligatory on governments as they are on individuals. But the resentment of Spain was no longer formidable; and, according to a state-morality, sometimes as short-sighted, as it is always ignoble, her remonstrances were therefore disregarded. Rigorous policy of Pitt. Having made his decision, Pitt took prompt measures for the renewal of hostilities. He dismissed the French and reenvoy, called Mr. Hans Stanley. He then assembled the Council, and urged an immediate declaration of war against Spain. But the reluctant and hesitating support which he had received from his colleagues ever since the commencement of the new reign, now became open opposition. They saw only the boldness of his policy; and boldness ever appears temerity in the eyes of ordinary men. It was possible, they urged, that Spain might yet be conciliated, and detached from her new alliance. Bristol believed that her intentions were pacific. Such is the tone which weaker minds assume when they dare not look inevitable danger in the face. It Iwas in vain that Pitt endeavoured to convince the Butes and the Newcastles. His brother-in-law, Lord Temple, alone supported him, and accordingly he closed the deliberations of the third council, which had assembled to debate his proposition, by announcing in his lofty style, that he held himself accountable 66 REVIEW OF PITT'S POLICY. CH. II. to the people who had called him to power, and that he would not be responsible for measures which he could no longer control. Retirement of A few days afterwards, Pitt resigned the seals of office. Thus, after a duration of four years, was terminated the most splendid and successful administration that had ever directed the fortunes of Great Britain. I say the administration was at an end; for though Temple was the only minister who accompanied the Secretary in his retirement, the whole genius and policy of the Government began and ended with Pitt. All the other members of the Cabinet were merely officers of state, who were required to concern themselves only with the routine business of their respective departments. If Pitt condescended to acquaint his colleagues with his measures after they had been matured and decided upon, it was as much as he did, or as they expected. But after all, did the policy of the great statesman confer any substantial benefit upon his country? For that is the question which the historian, far removed from contemporary passion and prejudice, must consider and endeavour to determine. policy. The public life of Pitt extended to nearly half a Review of Pitt's century; but the eventful part of it was crowded into these four years. All the rest, though containing some noble and splendid passages, was disfigured by faction, by pride, and during some part clouded by mental aberration. But if Chatham's conduct, previous to 1756, was deeply marked with the traits of overbearing ambition, it is assuredly not chargeable with any of the difficulties in which the country was involved at that period. While the Duke of Newcastle was intent only on the maintenance of mere political ascendancy; while the other members of the Government, with limited power and responsibility, were chiefly bent on personal aggrandisement, the interests of 1761. VENALITY OF PARLIAMENT. 67 the nation, little regarded or understood, were treated as subservient to these selfish objects. The consequence was, that the Government lost all vigour and respect both at home and abroad. Indignant at seeing his country thus sacrificed, Pitt declared that he, and he alone, was able to save her. His remedy was war. And it is plain there was no other remedy. Loyalty, the ruling sentiment of those times, had for upwards of seventy years remained in a state of suspended animation. This alone would have sufficed to deprive public spirit of all energy; but, in addition, the upper classes had become so enervated by a long course of corrupt and feeble government, that the distant menace of a French invasion, instead of, as in better days, inspiring a genuine spirit of resistance, became a subject of exaggerated terror and alarm. Pitt had endeavoured to rouse Parliament to a sense of duty; but eloquence, the like of which had not been heard since the days of Greece, was in vain lavished on a packed and venal assembly. Some faint echoes of this patriotic oratory reached many who were not unworthy of the name of Englishmen, and, propagated by report, caused thousands to fix their affections on that Great Commoner, who they fondly hoped was destined to become the saviour of his country. Peace is a great, but not an inestimable, blessing; and when war is the only alternative to a state of national prostration, it is readily to be preferred. Nay, even an appeal to the old animosity between England and her great neighbour was better than the demoralising rule of Newcastle and his Parliaments. But, apart from these higher considerations, this country could not then, at least, safely permit her great rival to attain a military preponderance. Moreover, it was evident that England must submit to the dictation of France, and surrender a portion of her foreign dominions, 68 PITT'S CONSISTENCY. CH. II. unless she was prepared to vindicate her rights and her honour by the sword. Pitt. . The principal scene of war had been determined War policy of by the enemy. It was in the new world that France strove for mastery with her old rival. We have seen how Pitt provided for the conflict in America, and the great results of his wise and energetic measures. He formed, at the same time, extensive schemes for harassing the enemy at sea, on his own soil, and on the continent of Europe. The expeditions to Rochefort and St. Malo have been censured, as if their object had been incommensurate with their vast expense; but, in fact, these adventures formed part of an extensive scheme of operations, the principle of which was to distract the attention and divide the resources of the enemy. Nor was Pitt to be deterred by any idle charges of inconsistency from availing himself of every means for the successful prosecution of the war. His early parliamentary fame had been chiefly acquired by denunciations against the mode of carrying on war by subsidising petty military states; but the practice so reprobated was a gross abuse of a system which, under appropriate circumstances, might be highly recommended to a war minister. For England to take into her pay a petty chieftain, who might or might not bring into the field his contingent of allappointed troops *-was one thing: to aid a great military monarch, of consummate ability, and already in the field at the head of a splendid army-was another. There could be no just comparison between the waste of a bundred thousand pounds upon the Elector of Hesse, and the grant of half a million to the King of Prussia. The Great Commoner had well and wisely denounced Hanoverian wars for the sake of Hanover; but when England was to be * Pelham to Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 25, 1748.-Coxe's Pelham. |