The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 272
... point of view of explicit negotiation may affect the character of the tacit game ; similarly , preplay com ... Nash and Harsanyi solutions ) depend on a clearly recognized zero point that is , on an unambiguous outcome that reigns in the ...
... point of view of explicit negotiation may affect the character of the tacit game ; similarly , preplay com ... Nash and Harsanyi solutions ) depend on a clearly recognized zero point that is , on an unambiguous outcome that reigns in the ...
Page 287
... Nash point " as the rational outcome of an explicit bargaining game.19 Consider now some variants of this game . 19 The solution proposed by J. F. Nash for bargaining games in which both players have perfect knowledge of their own and ...
... Nash point " as the rational outcome of an explicit bargaining game.19 Consider now some variants of this game . 19 The solution proposed by J. F. Nash for bargaining games in which both players have perfect knowledge of their own and ...
Page 289
... Nash point ) ; or some especially suggestive form that seems to point towards a particular point ; or unless there is an impurity ( such as a dot on the boundary , from a printer's error , or a single point whose coordinates are whole ...
... Nash point ) ; or some especially suggestive form that seems to point towards a particular point ; or unless there is an impurity ( such as a dot on the boundary , from a printer's error , or a single point whose coordinates are whole ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game