The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 18
... advantage to be rational , particularly if the fact of being rational or irrational cannot be concealed . It is not invari- ably an advantage , in the face of a threat , to have a communica- tion system in good order , to have complete ...
... advantage to be rational , particularly if the fact of being rational or irrational cannot be concealed . It is not invari- ably an advantage , in the face of a threat , to have a communica- tion system in good order , to have complete ...
Page 22
... advantage to be more intelligent or more skilled in debate , or to have more financial resources , more physical ... advantages in bargaining situations ; they often have a contrary value . The sophisticated negotiator may find it ...
... advantage to be more intelligent or more skilled in debate , or to have more financial resources , more physical ... advantages in bargaining situations ; they often have a contrary value . The sophisticated negotiator may find it ...
Page 233
... advantage in jumping the gun and little reason to fear that the other would try it . The special significance of surprise attack thus lies in the pos- sible vulnerability of retaliatory forces . If these forces were them- selves ...
... advantage in jumping the gun and little reason to fear that the other would try it . The special significance of surprise attack thus lies in the pos- sible vulnerability of retaliatory forces . If these forces were them- selves ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game