The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 91
... become occupied ex- clusively by Negroes , the " inevitability " is a feature of con- vergent expectation . What is most directly perceived as inevitable is not the final result but the expectation of it , which , in turn , makes the ...
... become occupied ex- clusively by Negroes , the " inevitability " is a feature of con- vergent expectation . What is most directly perceived as inevitable is not the final result but the expectation of it , which , in turn , makes the ...
Page 243
... become suffi- ciently accurate , it may become almost physically impossible to protect one's own retaliatory forces by the sheer provision of cement , or , if not impossible , exceedingly costly . Mobility and concealment may then have ...
... become suffi- ciently accurate , it may become almost physically impossible to protect one's own retaliatory forces by the sheer provision of cement , or , if not impossible , exceedingly costly . Mobility and concealment may then have ...
Page 302
... become more serious , and the coordi- nation aspect of the game may become even more relevant to the rationale of a " solution . " It is probably in the realm of more - than- two - person games that coordination theory is most relevant ...
... become more serious , and the coordi- nation aspect of the game may become even more relevant to the rationale of a " solution . " It is probably in the realm of more - than- two - person games that coordination theory is most relevant ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game