## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page 50

He must threaten aB if North chooses a ; and he must promise “ not AB ” if North

chooses A . The threat alone will not induce North to avoid a ; aB is

AB for North , and AB is what he gets with A if East is free to choose B . East must

...

He must threaten aB if North chooses a ; and he must promise “ not AB ” if North

chooses A . The threat alone will not induce North to avoid a ; aB is

**better**thanAB for North , and AB is what he gets with A if East is free to choose B . East must

...

Page 155

A row is dominated by another row if every payoff to Row in the dominating row is

at least as good as the corresponding payoff in the dominated row and at least

one payoff is

...

A row is dominated by another row if every payoff to Row in the dominating row is

at least as good as the corresponding payoff in the dominated row and at least

one payoff is

**better**. Applying this criterion , the first row is dominated by the third...

Page 164

But , if they can , they can do something that no purely formal game theory can

take into account ; they can do

predict . And , if they can do

But , if they can , they can do something that no purely formal game theory can

take into account ; they can do

**better**than a purely deductive game theory wouldpredict . And , if they can do

**better**— if they can rise above the limitations of a ...### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield