The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 179
... cell . Again , Column himself may have arranged a prior commitment through his own choice of II , and failed to communicate it accurately to Row in time for Row to take this into account , or Column may have suffered a disability ...
... cell . Again , Column himself may have arranged a prior commitment through his own choice of II , and failed to communicate it accurately to Row in time for Row to take this into account , or Column may have suffered a disability ...
Page 185
... cell differs from zero , say o.5 or -0.5 , the for- mula for optimum value of differs somewhat . ) If Row's payoff in the lower left cell were − 1 , no commitment with a greater than 50 per cent chance of ii would serve . And if that ...
... cell differs from zero , say o.5 or -0.5 , the for- mula for optimum value of differs somewhat . ) If Row's payoff in the lower left cell were − 1 , no commitment with a greater than 50 per cent chance of ii would serve . And if that ...
Page 212
... cell in the matrix stays as it was . The lower right cell has its pay - offs recomputed , as a weighted average of the four cells . For , if both players choose the strategy of no - attack , there is a probability equal to ( 1 P. ) ( 1P ...
... cell in the matrix stays as it was . The lower right cell has its pay - offs recomputed , as a weighted average of the four cells . For , if both players choose the strategy of no - attack , there is a probability equal to ( 1 P. ) ( 1P ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game