The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 100
... clue in the event that it appears to discriminate against him . They must find their clues where they can . ( If the map they are using hap- pens , for example , to contain an embarrassing richness of clues , making it difficult to ...
... clue in the event that it appears to discriminate against him . They must find their clues where they can . ( If the map they are using hap- pens , for example , to contain an embarrassing richness of clues , making it difficult to ...
Page 295
... clues " under discussion in this paper would then appear to be so much free communication to be taken advan- tage of ... clue must not be too hard to find nor too easy . ( One must at least be able to recognize that he should have got it ...
... clues " under discussion in this paper would then appear to be so much free communication to be taken advan- tage of ... clue must not be too hard to find nor too easy . ( One must at least be able to recognize that he should have got it ...
Page 300
... clues are equally plausible in reverse , we are back to confusion . Only a discriminatory clue can point to a concerted choice , deny- ing the discrimination is denying the premise that a clue can be found and acted on jointly to ...
... clues are equally plausible in reverse , we are back to confusion . Only a discriminatory clue can point to a concerted choice , deny- ing the discrimination is denying the premise that a clue can be found and acted on jointly to ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game