The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 7
... consider whether too great a capac- ity to strike him by surprise may induce him to strike first to avoid being disarmed by a first strike from us . And recently , in connection with the so - called " measures to safeguard against sur ...
... consider whether too great a capac- ity to strike him by surprise may induce him to strike first to avoid being disarmed by a first strike from us . And recently , in connection with the so - called " measures to safeguard against sur ...
Page 98
... consider the question of what price players would pay for a bit of coordinating information , and what different information patterns yield what chances of coordinating , to find ourselves in the middle of Marschak's theory of teams ...
... consider the question of what price players would pay for a bit of coordinating information , and what different information patterns yield what chances of coordinating , to find ourselves in the middle of Marschak's theory of teams ...
Page 211
... consider whether the other player's likelihood of attack is serious ; he must also consider that the other player is reciprocally worried . Even a player whose own probability of " irrational " attack is known to be zero must consider ...
... consider whether the other player's likelihood of attack is serious ; he must also consider that the other player is reciprocally worried . Even a player whose own probability of " irrational " attack is known to be zero must consider ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game