The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 163
... decision process either introspectively or by an axio- matic method . There is no way to build a model for the inter- action of two or more decision units , with the behavior and ex- pectations of those decision units being derived by ...
... decision process either introspectively or by an axio- matic method . There is no way to build a model for the inter- action of two or more decision units , with the behavior and ex- pectations of those decision units being derived by ...
Page 202
... decision system , especially in crises . This is so for a number of reasons , one of which is that in anything but a com- pletely centralized dictatorship a number of persons participate in a decision , and they do not have identical ...
... decision system , especially in crises . This is so for a number of reasons , one of which is that in anything but a com- pletely centralized dictatorship a number of persons participate in a decision , and they do not have identical ...
Page 220
Thomas C. Schelling. Of course , individual and group decisions may be different in this regard . We could think of a collective decision by vote , with different members having different value systems and hence dif- ferent thresholds of ...
Thomas C. Schelling. Of course , individual and group decisions may be different in this regard . We could think of a collective decision by vote , with different members having different value systems and hence dif- ferent thresholds of ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game