The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 19
... examples involve some denial of the value of skill , resourcefulness , rationality , knowledge , control , or ... example , T. C. Schelling , " American Foreign Assistance , " World Politics ( July 1955 ) , pp . 614-15 . cerns the ...
... examples involve some denial of the value of skill , resourcefulness , rationality , knowledge , control , or ... example , T. C. Schelling , " American Foreign Assistance , " World Politics ( July 1955 ) , pp . 614-15 . cerns the ...
Page 67
... example , there seems to be a strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity . A trivial illustra- tion is the tendency for the outcomes to be expressed in " round numbers " ; the salesman who works out the arithmetic for his " rock ...
... example , there seems to be a strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity . A trivial illustra- tion is the tendency for the outcomes to be expressed in " round numbers " ; the salesman who works out the arithmetic for his " rock ...
Page 272
... example , consider the following variant of the cooperative game . Instead of saying that the players may divide a set of rewards if they can reach agreement on an exhaustive division , let us say that the players may divide a set of ...
... example , consider the following variant of the cooperative game . Instead of saying that the players may divide a set of rewards if they can reach agreement on an exhaustive division , let us say that the players may divide a set of ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game