The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 83
Thomas C. Schelling. 4 TOWARD A THEORY OF INTERDEPENDENT DECISION - On the strategy of pure conflict the zero - sum games game theory has yielded important insight and advice . But on the strategy of action where conflict is mixed with ...
Thomas C. Schelling. 4 TOWARD A THEORY OF INTERDEPENDENT DECISION - On the strategy of pure conflict the zero - sum games game theory has yielded important insight and advice . But on the strategy of action where conflict is mixed with ...
Page 119
... game theory . Yet formal game theory has contributed little to the clari- fication of these ideas . The author suggests that nonzero - sum game theory may have missed its most promising field by being pitched at too abstract a level of ...
... game theory . Yet formal game theory has contributed little to the clari- fication of these ideas . The author suggests that nonzero - sum game theory may have missed its most promising field by being pitched at too abstract a level of ...
Page 164
... complete a pattern of which a fragment has been displayed not unlike the process involved in the experiments of the Gestalt psycholo- Again it should be emphasized that the reason why this 164 A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY.
... complete a pattern of which a fragment has been displayed not unlike the process involved in the experiments of the Gestalt psycholo- Again it should be emphasized that the reason why this 164 A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY.
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game