The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 19
... give them complete flexibility and authority - a principle commonly voiced by negotiators themselves is by no means as self - evident as its proponents suggest ; the power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest in- ability to make ...
... give them complete flexibility and authority - a principle commonly voiced by negotiators themselves is by no means as self - evident as its proponents suggest ; the power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest in- ability to make ...
Page 69
... give prominence to some particular outcome that would be favorable . The outcome may not be so much con- spicuously fair or conspicuously in balance with estimated bar- gaining powers as just plain " conspicuous . " This conclusion may ...
... give prominence to some particular outcome that would be favorable . The outcome may not be so much con- spicuously fair or conspicuously in balance with estimated bar- gaining powers as just plain " conspicuous . " This conclusion may ...
Page 149
... give the man a ticket . If the motorist avoids looking at the policeman , cannot see the directions , and ignores the direc- tions that he does not see , taking a right of way that he does not deserve , he may be considered only stupid ...
... give the man a ticket . If the motorist avoids looking at the policeman , cannot see the directions , and ignores the direc- tions that he does not see , taking a right of way that he does not deserve , he may be considered only stupid ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game