The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 12
... interest in avoiding collision and a conflict of interest over who shall go first and who shall slam on his brakes and let the other through . Collision being about as mutual as anything can be , and often the only thing that one can ...
... interest in avoiding collision and a conflict of interest over who shall go first and who shall slam on his brakes and let the other through . Collision being about as mutual as anything can be , and often the only thing that one can ...
Page 88
... interest game by some or all of the points on a positively inclined line . In the mixed game , or bargaining situation , at least one pair of points would denote a negative slope and at least one pair a positive slope.1 * If the nature ...
... interest game by some or all of the points on a positively inclined line . In the mixed game , or bargaining situation , at least one pair of points would denote a negative slope and at least one pair a positive slope.1 * If the nature ...
Page 140
... interest in an object . A nice example occurs in Shakespeare's Measure for Measure . Angelo , acting in place of the Duke , has a prisoner whom he pro- poses to kill . He could torture him , but he has no incentive to . The victim has a ...
... interest in an object . A nice example occurs in Shakespeare's Measure for Measure . Angelo , acting in place of the Duke , has a prisoner whom he pro- poses to kill . He could torture him , but he has no incentive to . The victim has a ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game