The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 108
... least select psychological organizations which occur under simple conditions and can then predict that they must possess regularity , sym- metry , simplicity . This conclusion is based on the principle of isomorphism , according to ...
... least select psychological organizations which occur under simple conditions and can then predict that they must possess regularity , sym- metry , simplicity . This conclusion is based on the principle of isomorphism , according to ...
Page 155
... least as good as the corre- sponding payoff in the dominated row and at least one payoff is better . Applying this criterion , the first row is dominated by the third , and we strike it out . ( The argument might be that Row can safely ...
... least as good as the corre- sponding payoff in the dominated row and at least one payoff is better . Applying this criterion , the first row is dominated by the third , and we strike it out . ( The argument might be that Row can safely ...
Page 265
... least on the first occa- sion when nuclear weapons are used in limited war - the enemy too will really be engaged in at least two different kinds of limited- war activity at the same time . One will be the limited struggle over the ...
... least on the first occa- sion when nuclear weapons are used in limited war - the enemy too will really be engaged in at least two different kinds of limited- war activity at the same time . One will be the limited struggle over the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game