The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 19
... means of proving which way he voted . Being stripped of his power to prove how he voted , he is stripped of his power to be intimidated . Powerless to prove whether or not he com- plied with a threat , he knows - and so do those who ...
... means of proving which way he voted . Being stripped of his power to prove how he voted , he is stripped of his power to be intimidated . Powerless to prove whether or not he com- plied with a threat , he knows - and so do those who ...
Page 122
... means for incurring an irrevocable commitment - In the real estate example of Von Neumann and Morgenstern referred to earlier ( p . 116 ) buyer B ( whose top price is 15 ) might raise the limit on what he can extract from buyer C ...
... means for incurring an irrevocable commitment - In the real estate example of Von Neumann and Morgenstern referred to earlier ( p . 116 ) buyer B ( whose top price is 15 ) might raise the limit on what he can extract from buyer C ...
Page 142
... means of achieving unilateral rather than bi- lateral communication with its debtors and of being therefore unavailable to hear pleas or threats from the debtors . Providing ammunition to South Korean troops or giving them access to ...
... means of achieving unilateral rather than bi- lateral communication with its debtors and of being therefore unavailable to hear pleas or threats from the debtors . Providing ammunition to South Korean troops or giving them access to ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game