The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 212
... pair of decisions , not a pair of probabilities about behavior . - - We work this problem by recomputing the pay - offs in the original matrix , using the two parameters representing the proba- bility of " irrational " attack . The ...
... pair of decisions , not a pair of probabilities about behavior . - - We work this problem by recomputing the pay - offs in the original matrix , using the two parameters representing the proba- bility of " irrational " attack . The ...
Page 222
... pair of values for B and R that will minimize his expected losses , that is , maximize the expected value of the game for him . Letting V , denote the ex- pected value of the game for R , the warning - system problem for R is to choose ...
... pair of values for B and R that will minimize his expected losses , that is , maximize the expected value of the game for him . Letting V , denote the ex- pected value of the game for R , the warning - system problem for R is to choose ...
Page 291
... pair among the jointly admissible strategy pairs . ( 2 ) All jointly admissible equi- librium pairs are both interchangeable and equivalent . ” 2 1 " Noncooperative " is the traditional name for the game without overt com- munication ...
... pair among the jointly admissible strategy pairs . ( 2 ) All jointly admissible equi- librium pairs are both interchangeable and equivalent . ” 2 1 " Noncooperative " is the traditional name for the game without overt com- munication ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game