The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 46
Page 69
... perhaps the logic of tacit bargaining even provides a basis for believing it to be correct . The fundamental problem in tacit bargaining is that of coordina- tion ; we should inquire , then , what has to be coordinated in ex- Perhaps ...
... perhaps the logic of tacit bargaining even provides a basis for believing it to be correct . The fundamental problem in tacit bargaining is that of coordina- tion ; we should inquire , then , what has to be coordinated in ex- Perhaps ...
Page 109
... perhaps some regular course , perhaps a random course . Let this machine scan ; let the players watch it scan , watch their own and each other's meters , and watch each other's faces if they wish to . Finally , we go through with the ...
... perhaps some regular course , perhaps a random course . Let this machine scan ; let the players watch it scan , watch their own and each other's meters , and watch each other's faces if they wish to . Finally , we go through with the ...
Page 238
... perhaps should not even wish that we alone could have the " invulnerable " nuclear - weapon submarine ; if in fact we have either no intention or no political capacity for a first strike , it would usually be helpful if the enemy were ...
... perhaps should not even wish that we alone could have the " invulnerable " nuclear - weapon submarine ; if in fact we have either no intention or no political capacity for a first strike , it would usually be helpful if the enemy were ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game