The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 152
... play ii to column I and i to column II . Including the possibility of commitment , he now has first the choice of ... play ii no matter what ; he can commit himself to ii and play i no matter what ; he can commit himself to ii and play i ...
... play ii to column I and i to column II . Including the possibility of commitment , he now has first the choice of ... play ii no matter what ; he can commit himself to ii and play i no matter what ; he can commit himself to ii and play i ...
Page 164
... play that achieves it is through the choices they actually make as the play proceeds . This " communication " stage - and any later stage when one player may depart from the tacitly agreed pattern to cheat a little and have to be ...
... play that achieves it is through the choices they actually make as the play proceeds . This " communication " stage - and any later stage when one player may depart from the tacitly agreed pattern to cheat a little and have to be ...
Page 175
... play a central role . It may be no exaggeration to say that the potentialities of randomized behavior account for most of the interest in game theory during the past one and one- half decades.1 The essence of randomization in a two ...
... play a central role . It may be no exaggeration to say that the potentialities of randomized behavior account for most of the interest in game theory during the past one and one- half decades.1 The essence of randomization in a two ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game