The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 4
... reach . If our interest is the study of actual behavior , the results we reach under this constraint may prove to be either a good approximation of reality or a caricature . Any abstraction runs a risk of this sort , and we have to be ...
... reach . If our interest is the study of actual behavior , the results we reach under this constraint may prove to be either a good approximation of reality or a caricature . Any abstraction runs a risk of this sort , and we have to be ...
Page 4
... reach . If our interest is the study of actual behavior , the results we reach under this constraint may prove to be either a good approximation of reality or a caricature . Any abstraction runs a risk of this sort , and we have to be ...
... reach . If our interest is the study of actual behavior , the results we reach under this constraint may prove to be either a good approximation of reality or a caricature . Any abstraction runs a risk of this sort , and we have to be ...
Page 271
... reach overt agreement by the time the final bell rings or forego the rewards altogether . It is that they must reach overt agreement by a particular ( and well - identified ) penultimate moment - when the " warning bell " rings — or ...
... reach overt agreement by the time the final bell rings or forego the rewards altogether . It is that they must reach overt agreement by a particular ( and well - identified ) penultimate moment - when the " warning bell " rings — or ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game