The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 183
... RISK OF INADVERTENT FULFILLMENT There is another " cost " element that can motivate a reduced threat . This is the risk that one will fulfill the threat inadver- tently , even if the adversary does comply with it ( or would have ...
... RISK OF INADVERTENT FULFILLMENT There is another " cost " element that can motivate a reduced threat . This is the risk that one will fulfill the threat inadver- tently , even if the adversary does comply with it ( or would have ...
Page 191
... risk of general war.1 Here again is a threat that all - out war may occur , not that it certainly will occur , if the other party engages in certain actions . Again , whether it does or does not occur is not a matter alto- gether ...
... risk of general war.1 Here again is a threat that all - out war may occur , not that it certainly will occur , if the other party engages in certain actions . Again , whether it does or does not occur is not a matter alto- gether ...
Page 199
... risk by acting or to withdraw to meet our objectives . This is not the only interpretation of such action , of ... risk of slipping , the slope gets steeper and the risk of slipping greater as one moves toward the chasm . But the slope ...
... risk by acting or to withdraw to meet our objectives . This is not the only interpretation of such action , of ... risk of slipping , the slope gets steeper and the risk of slipping greater as one moves toward the chasm . But the slope ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game