The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 67
Page 78
... side . ) The technical side of this principle would be identification of who would send and receive messages , upon what authority , over what facilities , using what intermediaries if intermediaries were used , and who stood in line to ...
... side . ) The technical side of this principle would be identification of who would send and receive messages , upon what authority , over what facilities , using what intermediaries if intermediaries were used , and who stood in line to ...
Page 234
... side's capacity to retaliate massively , in the interest of mutual deterrence , and do it as a step toward eliminating the threat of massive retaliation from a tense and troubled world ? - Or should we instead recognize measures to ...
... side's capacity to retaliate massively , in the interest of mutual deterrence , and do it as a step toward eliminating the threat of massive retaliation from a tense and troubled world ? - Or should we instead recognize measures to ...
Page 241
... side's retaliatory forces if used first . Perhaps most weapons fall in this category if reasonable precautions are taken for their pro- tection . So we cannot make a nice distinction between first - strike and second - strike weapons ...
... side's retaliatory forces if used first . Perhaps most weapons fall in this category if reasonable precautions are taken for their pro- tection . So we cannot make a nice distinction between first - strike and second - strike weapons ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game