The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 91
... tacit , compromise may be impossible . People are at the mercy of a faulty communication system that makes it easy to " agree " ( tacitly ) to move but impossible to agree to stay . Quota systems in housing developments , schools , and ...
... tacit , compromise may be impossible . People are at the mercy of a faulty communication system that makes it easy to " agree " ( tacitly ) to move but impossible to agree to stay . Quota systems in housing developments , schools , and ...
Page 271
... tacit variant of the same game . - Each player must be assumed to know this and may , if he wishes , by simply avoiding overt agreement , elect to play the tacit game instead . So , if we assume ( for the moment ) that the tacit game ...
... tacit variant of the same game . - Each player must be assumed to know this and may , if he wishes , by simply avoiding overt agreement , elect to play the tacit game instead . So , if we assume ( for the moment ) that the tacit game ...
Page 275
... tacit - solution ; and so on . This game ( the " tacit supergame " consisting of all strategies for playing the one - minute game ) is then the game ; and it has , if we wish to accept it , its own " solution in the strict sense " which ...
... tacit - solution ; and so on . This game ( the " tacit supergame " consisting of all strategies for playing the one - minute game ) is then the game ; and it has , if we wish to accept it , its own " solution in the strict sense " which ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game