The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 27
... tactic , although an observer can sel- dom distinguish with confidence the consciously logical , the in- tuitive , or the inadvertent use of a visible tactic . First , it has not been uncommon for union officials to stir up excitement ...
... tactic , although an observer can sel- dom distinguish with confidence the consciously logical , the in- tuitive , or the inadvertent use of a visible tactic . First , it has not been uncommon for union officials to stir up excitement ...
Page 123
... tactic can be used by a person against himself when he wants , for example , to go on a diet but does not trust himself . " He announces his intention , or accepts a wager that he will not break his diet , so that later he will not be ...
... tactic can be used by a person against himself when he wants , for example , to go on a diet but does not trust himself . " He announces his intention , or accepts a wager that he will not break his diet , so that later he will not be ...
Page 137
... tactic to employ and an interesting one to study is the problem of finding a means to commitment , the available " penalty " to invoke against one's own nonperformance . There is consequently a related set of tactics that consists of ...
... tactic to employ and an interesting one to study is the problem of finding a means to commitment , the available " penalty " to invoke against one's own nonperformance . There is consequently a related set of tactics that consists of ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game