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that case the lessee admitted the lessor's power to make the lease presently, as much as in the other : then if the union and accession of the two estates were the cause of the merger, the quantum of the thing granted would be the measure of that merger; by consequence the first lease here would be extinguished, but for a moiety of the lands. Secondly, that it was not extinguished for any part, for the term was saved within the letter, or at least within the equity of the statute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10. § 3. ; for the intent of the saving therein was to preserve the balance between the cestui que use and his feoffees, according to the rule of equity, by which they were governed before. Now suppose that Fountain had a lease for 99 years before this statute, and that Cook had desired him to accept a feoffiment to his use; without doubt the Chancery would not have compelled him to assign, till the 99 years term expired and the same right seemed now to be preserved by the saving; for the words were general: "All that shall be seised to any use," not all that shall be seised by feoffinent or fine: so that the seisin to use was the only thing the statute regarded, not by what sort of conveyance: that lease and release was become a common conveyance; and the lease Vide Tit.32. being expressly said to be, to enable the lessee to c.11. accept a release to other uses, should not be construed to any other intent, or to be to his own use, otherwise than to enable him to accept such release: then if it should be admitted that the lease for 99 years were extinguished by the lease for a year, yet by the release it was revived; for being but one conveyance, it was within the equity of the statute: the case of Ferrers v. Fermor was stronger, and yet it ante, § 45. was resolved there, that though the bargain and sale

had destroyed the term for a time, yet by the rebecause then but one conit was revived;

covery

veyance ab initio ; so here.

No judgement appears to have been given; but Lord C. B. Gilbert says it seemed reasonable that the lease for 99 years should not be merged, or at least but for a moiety; and even in that case, equity would set up the moiety, or the whole term again.

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9. Conveyances derived from the 47. Nor which is inconsistent with

Statute of Uses.

16. Whether the Statute extends

to Devises to Uses.

20. Resulting Uses..

36. Uses by Implication.

39. No Use results but to the

Owner of the Estate.

the Estate limited.

51. Nor on the Grant of an Es

tate Tail, for Life, or Years.

55. Nor on a Devise.

56. What Use results to a Tenant

in Tail.

WHE

SECTION 1.

of the Sta

HEN the statute of uses first became a subject Construction of discussion in the courts of law, it was held tute. by the Judges, that no uses should be executed by 1 Rep. 129 b. the statute, which were limited against the rules of the common law; for it appeared by the preamble, that it was the intent of the makers of the act to restore the ancient law; and to extirpate and extinguish such subtle practised feoffments, fines, recoveries, abuses, and errors, tending to the subversion of the good and ancient common law of the land. So that it was plain this act was never intended to execute any use which was limited against the rules of the common law; the object of the act was to extinguish and extirpate, not the feoffment, fine, or

1 Rep. 87 b. Tit. 32. c. 19.

1 Atk. 591.

Of contingent Uses.

ante, c. 2. § 28.

recovery; for these were laudable and good conveyances of lands and tenements, by the common law, as in effect recited in the beginning of the preamble; but those uses which were abuses and errors, therefore mischievous, because they were against the rules of the common law: the statute was a law of restitution, namely, to restore the good ancient common law, which was in a manner subverted by abusive and erroneous uses, not to give more privilege to the execution of uses, than to estates which were executed by the ancient common law.

2. The courts have so far adhered to this construction of the statute, that the same technical words of limitation are now required in the creation of estates through the medium of uses, as in the creation of estates at common law. But, in many other instances, this doctrine was departed from, and advantage was taken of an expression in the statute of uses, in order to support several of those limitations which had been allowed by the Court of Chancery, in declarations of uses, when they were distinct from the legal estate.

3. The statute of uses enacts, that the estate of the feoffees to uses, shall be in the cestuis que use "after such quality, manner, form, and condition, as they had before, in or to the use, confidence, or trust that was in them." Now, the Court of Chancery having permitted a limitation of a use in fee, or in tail, to arise in futuro, without any preceding estate to support it; and also that a use might change from one person to another, by matter ex post facto, though the first use were limited in fee; the courts of law in process of time admitted of limitations of this kind, in conveyances to uses; and held, that in such cases, the statute would transfer the possession

to the cestui que use, after such quality, form, and condition, as he had the use.-An account of the nature of these limitations will be given in Title XVI. Remainder.

on the Exe

4. By the rules of the common law, no restriction Uses arising or qualification could be annexed to a conveyance of cution of lands, except a condition. In consequence of this Powers. principle, a fine or feoffment, with a power of revo- 1 Inst. 237 a. cation annexed to it, was void at common law; because the fine or feoffment transferred the whole property and right of disposal, to the cognizee or feoffee; therefore the power of revocation was repugnant to the force of the preceding words. Besides the admission of such a clause would have introduced a double power, vested in different persons, over the same thing, which was contrary to the rules of the common law.

§ 30.

5. We have however seen, that before the statute ante, c. 2. of uses, if a feoffment was made to uses, the feoffor might reserve a power, either to himself or to some other person, to revoke the uses declared on the feoffment; and to appoint the feoffees to stand seised to other uses. For the principle on which uses were originally founded being, that the feoffee to uses was bound in conscience to pursue the directions of the feoffor, this obligation was equally binding; whether the agreement was, that the feoffor should receive the rents and profits himself, or some stranger; or whether they were to be paid in such manner as the feoffor, or any other person, to whom he delegated his power, should at any future time appoint.

6. The statute of uses vests the legal estate in the cestui que use, after such quality, manner, and form as he had in the use: from which the courts conclu

ded, that in all conveyances to uses, a power might 1 Inst. 237 a.

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