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DISCOURSE XVIII.

HUMAN LIBERTY, WHAT; AND HOW TO BE OBTAINED.

JOHN VIII. 31, 32.

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If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed. And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. OUR Saviour here calls such as believe in his word, and always continue steadfast in that belief, his real disciples; who, in consequence of their faith, steadily adhered to, have his promise, that they shall know the truth,' the great truth, that is, the true religion; and that this truth' so known, 'shall make them free.' The Jews, who heard him, looking on themselves as free already, took this amiss, and said, "We be Abraham's children, and were never in bondage to any man; how sayest thou then, Ye shall be made free? Jesus answered them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whosoever ommitteth sin is the servant of sin;' by which he delicately intimates, that, although they were not servants to any particular man, yet they were the slaves of sin; and promises, that the truths of his word shall deliver them from this worst sort of bondage, by reforming their future lives, and discharging them from the punishment of past sins.

Here it is to be observed in general, that liberty is connected with truth, and slavery with error, in the very nature of things. He who knows the truth in any branch of knowledge, knows how to direct and govern himself in that respect, and therefore is so far free; whereas he who is ignorant of it, or what is worse, who holds errors opposite to it, must, in every thought or action relative to that part of knowledge, either think and act absurdly, or be led and governed by others, which is so far an instance of servitude, as it implies subjection and dependance. If a close observer of things will be at the pains to trace this doctrine upward, he will find every being possessed of so much liberty, or self-government, as he is possessed of wisdom, till he arrives at that Being, who is infinitely free, because he is infinitely wise. And if he pursues the same doctrine down

ward, he will find every being so far necessarily subject, that is, either governed or enslaved, as he hath less reason and wisdom, till he comes to the fool and madman, who are wholly deprived of liberty. Hence it appears, that liberty, and even power, are the prerogative of wisdom; and subjection, nay, slavery, are the consequence of folly. It sometimes happens indeed, that in the communities of this world wisdom must truckle to folly; but this is nevertheless against the nature of things, and falls out only either by accident, or by the curse of God, who sets a fool to rule over such as are wiser than himself, for the punishment of a guilty nation.

It is evident, that our Saviour, in the passage from whence my text is taken, sets forth virtue or goodness as freedom, and vice as slavery; assigning to the former, as its principle, the knowledge of true religion; and to the latter, as its cause and source, the ignorance of that religion. It is also evident, that he points to his word, as the treasury from whence this knowledge is to be drawn. Hence it follows, that faith and freedom, that true Christianity and true liberty, are but different names for the same thing.

The libertine finds it hard to digest this doctrine. To believe in mysteries, to submit to positive institutions, and to regulate his life by an expectation of rewards and punishments, appear to him as instances of a too mean compliance in us; and the expectation of such compliance, as a proof of a too arbitrary will in its Author. Now, this proceeds from his entertaining a wrong notion both of human nature, and of human liberty.

In the first place, He does not consider, that man is, not only by his original nature, a subordinate and dependant, but also by his present nature, a corrupt and vicious creature; and that, while common sense vouches for the truth of the former observation, universal experience forces us to confess that of the latter.

Neither does he, in the second place, consider, as he ought to do, that a being, so subordinate, must be governed; nor that a being, so corrupt, requires correction; or, if he should admit the necessity both of government and correction, yet, having too slight notions of our dependance and corruption, and too airy an idea of liberty, he thinks he

ought neither to be governed nor corrected by such a faith, nor by such maxims as those of Christianity. He therefore pleads for an unlimited liberty of thinking, and for a less limited liberty of acting, than it is fit to give him.

Perhaps we shall do some service to him, or at least to others, not altogether so overweening, if we, with a just eye to human nature, state the right notion of liberty, in respect both to thought and action; and afterward shew, that Christianity, truly such, tends directly, and more powerfully than any thing else, to promote and preserve this liberty.

When we speak of liberty, as a thing we either wish for, or would keep, we mean by it something that is good, nay, highly conducive to our own happiness. Liberty, therefore, of thought, must be the power or faculty of thinking in such a manner as may make us truly wise. Whatsoever helps us to do this, promotes the liberty; and whatsoever hinders us to do it, causes or increases the slavery of our minds. So likewise liberty of acting must be the power or privilege of carrying into execution that wisdom we have acquired by liberty of thinking, or, in other words, of acting in such a manner as may conduce to our real happiness. Whatsoever helps us to do this, befriends our liberty; whatsoever hinders, enslaves us.

These positions are, and for ever will be, true; although, in order to think wisely, we should be confined to a particular way of thinking; and, in order to act rightly, should be obliged to act by certain rules; nay, although that way of thinking should not square in all things with our previous judgment, nor those rules of action with our humour and inclination; because, of ourselves, we are neither so wise, nor so well inclined, as to need no direction. Who are we? Are we not, in respect to knowledge, 'born as the wild ass's colt,' that is, totally ignorant? And when afterward we set ourselves to the acquisition of religious knowledge, are we not liable to infinite errors, and those of the grossest kinds? Do we not, therefore, stand in need of a teacher? Again, are we not subordinate beings? Are we not corrupt and sinful creatures? And do we not therefore stand in need of a governor ?

Now, if God shall offer himself to be our teacher, surely the matter of his instructions must be true wisdom, and con

sequently conducive to our real liberty, although, in some instances, it should be mysterious. To believe it, therefore, on his word, can be no infringement on our liberty of thinking. And farther, if God shall vouchsafe to be our governor, his laws must undoubtedly be the best rules of action, the most conformable to true wisdom, the most productive of our real happiness, and consequently of our,liberty, as well when they oppose, as when they fall in with our inclinations. True religion consists, no doubt, in the knowledge of God and his will, and also of such helps and motives to obedience in us, as he shall judge expedient. Now, as he is incomprehensible, the knowledge of him must be in some degree mysterious. And, as we are extremely inattentive to our duty, and perversely wicked, the institution of positive duties, and the proposal of future rewards and punishments, may be highly conducive, may be necessary, to our reformation. Who is to judge in this case? The infinitely wise Teacher, and the unerring Governor? Or the foolish disciple, the refractory subject?

The truth is, man, ignorant and ill-disposed, must be both taught and governed. He is not to stomach it, if, at the best, he was made for subjection as well as the angels; and if, now he is become corrupt and wicked, he is put under such rules as are morally coercive. His liberty at first was but that of a subject and dependant; but since he is turned a rebel, must be reduced to narrower bounds. With the liberty these allow him he must be content, until submission and obedience have fitted him for larger limits. If, dissatisfied with these, he seeks for greater liberty before he is reclaimed to a greater degree of virtue, let him know that he cannot elope from the service of his natural Lord, but into a licentious kind of slavery to things that have no right to rule over him, wherein he will have no other liberty, but to be wicked and miserable.

A being destitute of reason is fit only for absolute subjection and total restraint. But a being, not only foolish, but perversely wicked, is the proper subject of severity and correction, as well as of restraint; and if found incorrigible, must either be destroyed, or put under an endless incapacity of doing mischief. Although, in civil society, the madman, the robber, and the cut-throat, object to these

rules, and plead for immunity; yet the wisdom of all lawgivers in this world adheres invariably to them, and makes the objection of such men one reason for its so doing. Yet this is so far from being an encroachment on civil liberty, that without it, no shadow of such liberty can be secured to men of better minds, nor any prospect of reformation provided for the yet dissolute and lawless part of mankind. Now, why shall that be objected to in God's kingdom, which is found so necessary in all other kingdoms? Or, in what respect does the expectation of punishments and rewards abridge our liberty more in his community than in any other? Hath he not made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel?' Hath he not set before him good and evil, life and death,' and left it to himself to choose? What greater liberty would he desire than this? Would he have leave to choose the evil of sin, without the evil of punishment? If this is the liberty he aims at, the laws neither of God nor man will allow it. But if in his nature there should be an unhappy disposition to choose the evil, he ought not surely to think it an infringement of his liberty, if God, by the aids of religion, should balance that disposition, and qualify him for a free and rational choice.

On the whole, then, who is free? Not he who can think of every thing just as he pleases; not he whose thoughts move like the wind, without any path or track; not he who, against the sense and reason of all other men, and the very nature of things, can take light or darkness, truth or falsehood, right or wrong, indifferently for each other; not the sceptic, to whom nothing is either self-evident or conclusive; not the brute, disguised in the figure of a man, whose affections and appetites go foremost, and force his head to follow. Neither is he free, who is subject to no laws of God or man, but is driven at random, as whim or passion dictate, into endless inconsistencies and excesses, in almost all the transactions of his life. If irregularity or vice are proofs of freedom, the madman and the murderer must be more at liberty than other men. He only is free, who, having wisely united into one his real interest or chief good, and his pleasure, is enabled, by the assistance of true religion, to pursue that steadily, in spite of all obstructions. This man is happy, both in pursuits and events; because success attends the

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