not as we have seen, immediate and direct.(1) We have, in the first place, the power of checking or delaying the succession of ideas. This power is always found to exist, when the direction of the mind towards a particular subject is attended with a feeling of desire or interest. We are not, indeed, enabled by our power in this respect either directly to call up or to banish any one or any number of our thoughts. But the consequence is, a variety of trains of thought are suggested, which would not have been suggested, had it not been for the circumstance of the original train being delayed. Thus, in the course of our mental associations, the na me of Sir Isaac Newton occurs ;-we experience a strong emotion of interest; aided by this interest, we check the current of our thoughts at that name, and we feel and are conscious, that we have within us the ability to do so. While we delay upon it, a variety of series of ideas occurs. At one moment we think of eminent mathematicians and astronomers, for he himself was one; at another, we think of those cotemporaries, who were his particular friends, whatever their rank in science, because they lived at the same time; a moment after, our minds dwell upon some striking incidents in his life or some marked features in his social or intellectual character;—and again, we may be led to think, almost in the same instant, of some proposition or demonstration, which had once exercised his patience and skill. In consequence of delaying a few moments on the name or rather on the general idea of the man, these different trains of thought are presented; and we can evidently fix our minds upon one of these subjects if we choose, or have a desire to, and dismiss the others. This is one way, in which by choice or volition we are able to exercise a considerable indirect power over our associations.

(2) We acquire, in the second place, great power over our associations by HABIT; and as no man ordinarily forms such habit without choosing to form it, we have here another instance of the indirect power of volition. By the term Habit, when it is applied to our mental opera

tions, we mean in particular that facility or readiness, which they acquire by being frequently repeated. The consequence of repetition or frequent practice is, that certain associations are soon very much strengthened, or that a facility in them is acquired.

Striking instances of the effect of repetition have been given in the course of this chapter, although it might perhaps be said in respect to these,that they were forced upon us by our particular situation, rather than brought about by positive desire or choice. But there are other instances, to which this remark is not equally applicable. It is a well known fact, that almost any person may become a punster or rhymer by taking the pains to form a habit, that is, by increasing the facility of certain associations by frequent repetition. By punning we understand the power of readily summoning up, on a particular occasion, a number of words different from each other in meaning, but resembling each other more or less in sound.That facility of association, which is acquired by frequent repetition and which is commonly expressed by the word HABIT, (as when we say of a person that he has formed a habit of expression,) is the great secret of fluency in extemporaneous speaking. The extemporaneous speaker must, indeed, have ideas; no modification of association whatever can supply the place of them. But his ability to arrange them in some suitable order and to express them in words without previous care and effort, is the result, in a great measure, of habits of association flowing from his own choice and determination.-(See Stewart's Elements, Vol. I. CH. VI. PT. 2 ; Historical Dissertation, Pr. I. §. 1. cH. 2; Brown's Lectures, XLI, XLII, XLIX. &c.)

CHAPTER ELEVENTH.

COMPLEX NOTIONS OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN.

§. 215. Of simplicity and complexness of mental states in general.

BEFORE leaving that portion of our knowledge, which has an external origin, it is necessary to examine it in relation to the principle or law of Simplicity and Complexness, which was formerly considered. We find on examination, that our mental states do not possess the same value, but oftentimes one is virtually equal to many others; and hence we are able to resolve the whole mass of them into the two general classes of Simple and Complex. It may seem surprising, that one mental state, which has a perfect unity and simplicity in itself, should still embrace two, three, or any number of others; but such is undoubtedly the fact. Let us fix our attention upon whatever complex notion or feeling we please to, and we shall find it susceptible of being examined under this view; we may consider it in its whole or in its parts, in its comprehen

sion or its elements.

And it may be added here, that in a practical point of view, the ability to do this, and the habit of doing it are of much importance. In early life, and in all the stages of education, the practice of mental analysis, in its application to particular thoughts and feelings, should undoubt

edly be kept up. It will in the end aid much in clearness of perception, and in the training up of a prompt and accurate judgment, if no word, expressive of a complex mental state, is permitted to be used without a proper understanding of what is involved in it.-Looking therefore at those sensations and notions, which the mind has access to through the direct medium of the senses, we find them either SIMPLE OF COMPLEX. There is not a single feeling, not a single idea, which is not comprehended in this arrangement, and does not belong to one of these two classes.

§. 216. Instances of simple ideas from the senses.

It is proper, before looking at those notions which are complex, to refer to some of those which are simple; as even the brief consideration of the latter will help to throw light on the former.-Among the simple ideas, (sensations perhaps is here the more appropriate term,) which we become possessed of by means of the senses, are all the varieties of colour, as red, white, yellow, green, &c., received by the sense of sight. Under the head of simple notions are to be included also the original intimations of the touch, as resistance, extension, hardness, and softness, &c. The character of simplicity is to be ascribed in like manner to the original sensations of sound, received by the sense of hearing; and to those of the smell and the taste.

These elementary notions are conformed to the general view, which has been given in a former chapter of our uncompounded feelings, viz, They are not capable of a separation into parts and of being resolved into other elements, and as a consequence of this are not susceptible of being made clearer by definition. Nevertheless they are not obscure and mysterious, and can well do without any laboured exposition. They are just what nature made and designed them to be, distinct and definite, as a general statement, both in themselves, and to men's comprehension of them.

When we make this statement, with the limitation of its being true and applicable in general, we have reforence to

those cases, where one sensation borders upon and runs into another, and where the human mind undoubtedly finds its apprehension of them somewhat indistinct. There are many simple sensations, answering to this description, to which we give no names; the prominent diversities only are marked in that way, to the neglect of those, which approximate, and partially mingle in with other diversities.

§. 217. Of objects contemplated as wholes.

But what we term our simple notions are representative only of the parts of objects. In point of fact,however, those external objects, which come under our notice, are presented to us as wholes, and as such, (whatever may have been the original process leading to that result,) we very early contemplate them.-Take for instance a LOADSTONE. In their ordinary and common thoughts upon it, men undoubtedly contemplate it as a whole; the state of mind, which has reference to it, embraces it as such. This complex notion, like all others which are complex, is virtually equal to a number of others of a more elementary character.

Hence, when we are called upon to give an account of the loadstone, we can return no other answer than by an enumeration of its elements. It is something, which has weight, colour, hardness, friability, power to draw iron, and whatever else we discover in it.

We use the term GOLD. This is a complex term, and implies a complexity in the corresponding mental state. But if we use the word gold, pr any other synonymous word, in the hearing of a man who has neither seen that substance, nor had it explained to him, he will not understand what is meant to be conveyed. We must enter into an analysis; and show, that it is a combination of the qualities of yellowness, great weight, fusibility, ductility, &c. We look upward to the sun in the heavens. But what should we know of that great aggregate, if we could not contemplate it in the elements of form and extension, of brightness and heat, of roundness and regularity of motion? All the ideas, therefore, which we form of external objects considered as wholes, are complex; and all such complex notions are composed of those which are simple.

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