6. 218. Complex notions preceded by simple ones.

It would seem from what has been thus far stated, that there is in the class of mental states now under consideration an internal or mental complexity, corresponding to the complexity in the external object. But it is not to be thought, that we arrive at this ultimate complexity of mental state by a single act, by an undivided and inseparable movement of the mind, although, such is the rapidity of the process, it may in some cases seem to be so. On the contrary, every simple idea, involved in, and forming a part of the compound, so far as we have any distinct conception of the compounded idea, passes under a rapid review, and the complex state of the mind is the result of this rapid review. We cannot, for instance, have the complex notion of a man, of iron, of loadstone, of a tree, &c. without having first, at some time, subjected each simple element, of which such objects are made up, to a separate examination.

This glance of the mind at the various simple notions is performed indeed with such extreme quickness, (at least generally so,) that the successive steps of it are not recollected; but this, when we consider the rapidity of the mind's operations in other instances, is no sufficient objection to the statement, which has been made.

The process in the formation of complex ideas goes on from step to step, from one simple or elementary part to another, but when the examination is completed, the ultimate state of the mind, which the completion of the process implies, is not to be considered as in any degree wanting in unity or oneness. It is, in itself considered, as much one and indivisible as any one of those states of mind which we know to be simple.

§. 219. Imperfections of our complex notions of external objects.

Although the mind of man is to be regarded, in the great ordering and constitution of things, as in some important sense the representative of the material universe,

it must still be acknowledged to be a very imperfect one. It is as true in nature, as it is in religion, that we know only in part. Men have no doubt been always advancing in knowledge, but when we compare our present acquisitions with our former ignorance, we may well anticipate, that the progress of the future will lay the foundation of another comparison, not so flattering to the present generation. This view will not only apply to knowledge in the mass; but will hold good, on a smaller scale, of every complex notion which we form.-Take for instance the complex idea of Gold. The thought is understood to be the representative of the thing. But is it in this case a true one? If we should admit it to be so as far as it goes, still it is evidently not a full or perfect one; nor can we regard it as such without suffering ourselves to be led into errour. In the complicated notion, to which men agree in giving that name, we combine the simple idea of yellowness, weight, hardness, malleability, and perhaps others; but it is only reasonable to suppose, that no person combines, in his conception of it, all its properties.

Can any man

Philosophy may boast of her achievements; but na ture has not revealed all her secrets yet. Can any man explain the mode of the connection between mind and matter? That is a secret not yet cleared up. assert positively what that cohesion or attraction is, which holds together the parts of gold, iron, and other material bodies? That is a subject also, on which nature has reserved to herself something further to say. One body impinging upon another puts it in motion; and in our wisdom we give it a name; we call it motion by impulse. But can any man tell, what motion is? Still more can he point out, how motion passes from one body to another when the particles of those bodies come in contact: if indeed there can be any actual contact?--Such are the doubts, that press upon us, wherever we turn our eyes. But this is not said to discourage inquiry. The first step in laying a good and broad foundation is to be fully sensible of our ignorance, and of the mind's limits.

§. 220. Of what are to be understood by chimerical ideas.

Mr. Locke somewhere speaks of certain notions, which the mind is capable of framing and to which it ascribes an external and material existence, as CHIMERICAL, in opposition to those which are real. Although the consideration of the notions thus designated may be deemed more important in a practical, than a purely philosophical point of view, the subject is evidently deserving some attention. When an idea is a real or well-founded one, it has something precisely corresponding to it in nature, at least so far as it is understood to be representative of any thing. But when the mind so brings together and combines its perceptions as to form something of which nature presents no corresponding reality then such notion or feeling is spoken of as chimerical. If, for instance, a person were known to have an idea of a body, yellow, or of some other colour, malleable, fixed, possessing in a word all the qualities of iron or of gold with this difference only, of its being lighter than water, it would be what we term a chimerical idea. That is; it would have nothing corresponding to it in the nature of things.—And a similar remark will apply to a multitude of other instances, which are to be found every where in the religious mythology, and the early traditions of nations. There is the CENTAUR, a fabulous animal, partly man and partly horse; the DRAGON, an immense serpent, furnished with wings, and capable of making its way through the atmosphere by their aid; the HYPOGRIFF, an imaginary steed, having the power also of performing ærial journeys; saying nothing of magical swords, enchanted castles and islands, &c.

Such chimeras, framed in the days of ignorance, have been too numerous; and not unfrequently the belief in them has been fostered and transmitted in the riper ages of the human understanding. Happily for us, on whom, in the language of Scripture, the ends of the world. have come, in the abundance and operation of real causes, we are not obliged to resort to imaginary ones. There are grand agencies at work in nature, of which the mind

of man in its childhood never conceived. There are not only causes enough, but their agency is sufficiently striking to gratify all our wonder, without violating the strictness of truth, or overstepping the bounds of reality.

§. 221. Of the introduction of such notions in early life.

The views of the last section are of some practical consequence in training up the young mind. If causes exist in the soul itself, which, under an unwise direction, will result in false or chimerical notions, we may find here a practical rule in Education. The mind in early life should be carefully trained up to the knowledge of things as they are; and not to an aquaintance with mere suppositions, or with things as they are not. While the young mind by the mere aid of that instrumentality, which the author of nature has furnished, is constantly storing up important thoughts, it also receives false ideas from vari ous sources. These erroneous intimations are not necessarily to be attributed to the imperfection of the senses, or to any thing originally in the constitution. There is no lack of sources of errour, without casting such imputations on the original tendencies of the mind. While nature at a very early period is rapidly carrying on the process of mental developement and instruction, too frequently her suggestions, instead of being aided, are counteracted or misrepresented by parents or domestics.

In support of this remark, it is merely requisite to refer to the numerous false notions, which children are led to entertain in respect to the existence of ghosts and other imaginary beings. It cannot be pretended, that such notions are the result of the mental powers in their legitimate exercise; on the contrary they are engrafted upon them by an extraneous and evil agency,which thus, either thoughtlessly or maliciously, perverts the commendable fears, and hopes, and devotional impulses of the soul. It is true undoubtedly, that many systems of superstition, many mythological codes of the most venerable antiquity, and with them their thousand chimeras, have passed

away. But all is not yet gone ; spectres and aerial visitants, and enchantments still haunt the nursery. But there is certainly no want of true and important notions, which can be made an excuse for the introduction of such absurd and unfounded ones; and it ought to be made a great object to keep the mind as free from them as possible.

The greater heed is to be given to this direction, because permanently evil consequences are found to result from the neglect of it. We have the experience and testimony of many judicious persons, that the introduction of ideas of ghosts, &c. in early life ever afterwards renders one incapable of enduring darkness or solitude without great disquietude..