feel; in other words the soul finds knowledge in itself, which neither sight, nor touch, nor hearing, nor any other sense, nor any outward forms of matter could give However interesting and fruitful may have been the train of investigation, which has already been before us, it is to be remembered, that we have hitherto seen the mind unfolding its susceptibilities only in connection with external impressions on the senses. A new view is to be taken of it. "The natural progress of all true learning, (says the author of Hermes,) is from sense to intellect." Beginning with the senses, and first considering the sensations and ideas which we there receive, we are next to enter more exclusively into the mind itself, and shall there discover a new and prolific source of knowledge. And in thus doing, it is a satisfaction to know, that we are treading essentially in the steps of Mr. Locke, whose general doctrine undoubt edly is, that a part of our ideas only may be traced to the senses, and that the origin of others is to be sought whol ly in the intellect itself. §. 254. Declaration of Mr. Locke, that the soul has knowl edge in itself. After alluding to the senses as one great source of knowledge, "the other fountain, (says Locke,) from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without, and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds, which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings ideas as distinct, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself. And though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with ExTERNAL objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called INTERNAL SENSE. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this Reflection; the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself.” It is perhaps necessary to remark here, that we introduce this passage from Mr. Locke, merely in support of the general doctrine, without wishing to intimate a full approbation of the manner, in which he has applied it in its details. What we say now concerns the general question; and in reference to that question, the passage just referred to is undoubtedly weighty in itself, as well as in consequence of the great fame and acknowledged discernment of its author. It would seem to be the doctrine of Mr. Locke, that our knowledge begins with sensation; that impressions, made on the bodily system, are the first occasions of bringing the mind into action, so far as we can judge. Nor is it necessary to make any objection to this view; it is very reasonable, and pains have already been taken to show, that it is clearly worthy of the utmost regard. But it does not follow from this, (and the passage just quoted shows, that Mr. Locke did not suppose it thus to follow,) that the sensation is the only source of knowledge. There is undeniably something distinct from sensation; thoughts, which have an interiour origin, and cannot be represented by any thing external; principles, so far from being directly dependent on sensation, that they control, compare, appreciate, judge of it. §. 255. Opinions of Dr. Cudworth on the general subject of internal knowledge. We may properly introduce here a quotation or two from another great authority, nearly contemporaneous with Mr. Locke, that of Dr. Cudworth, a name which is acknowledged to rank deservedly high among those, which are most closely associated with exalted wisdom and virtue. Let us however be again reminded, that our whole object here is to establish the general position, that there is knowledge of a purely internal, as well as of an external origin; and that, therefore, a reference to writers for that purpose does not necessarily involve an approbation of, or a responsibility for their opinions any farther than they relate to the particular object in view.The posthumous work, from which these extracts are made, is understood to have been written in reply to Mr. Hobbes, who held the opinion, that all our thoughts of whatever kind are only either direct, or transformed and modified And therefore the statements made in it, being called forth under such circumstances, must be supposed to have been carefully meditated, and on that ground, among others, are entitled to much weight. sensations. * "That oftentimes, says Cudworth, there is more taken notice of and perceived by the mind, both in the sensible objects themselves, and by occasion of them, than was impressed from them, or passively received by sense; which therefore must needs proceed from some inward active principle in that which perceives, I shall make it further appear by some other instances. "For, first, let a brute and a man at the same time be made spectators of one and the same artificial state, picture, or landskip; here the brute will passively receive all that is impressed from the outward object upon sense by local motion, as well as the man, all the several colours and figures of it; and yet the man will presently perceive something in this statue or picture, which the brute takes no notice of at all, viz. beauty, and pulchritude, and symmetry, besides the liveliness of the effigies and pourtraiture. The eye of the brute being every jot as good a glass or mirror, and perhaps endued with a more perspicacious sense or power of passive perception, than that of aman. "Or again, let both a man and a brute at the same time hear the same musical airs, the brute will only be sensible of noise and sounds; but the man will also perceive harmony in them, and be very much delighted with it; nay, even enthusiastically transported by it. Wherefore the brute perceiving all the sounds, as well as the man, but nothing of the harmony, the difference must needs arise *Immutable Morality, Book IV, Chap. II. §. 14. from some inward active principle or anticipation in the man, which the brute hath not." §. 255. Further remarks of the same writer on this subject. "But I shall yet further illustrate this business, (says this eloquent writer near the conclusion of the same chapter,) that the mind may actively comprehend more in the outward objects of sense, and by occasion of them, than is passively received and impressed from them, by another instance. Suppose a learned written or printed volume held before the eye of a brute-creature or illiterate person; either of them will passively receive all that is impressed upon sense from those delineations; to whom there will be nothing but several scrawls or lines of ink drawn upon white paper. But if a man, that hath inward anticipations of learning in him, look upon them he will immediately have another comprehension of them than that of sense, and a strange scene of thoughts presently represented to his mind from them; he will see heaven, carth, sun, moon and stars, comets, meteors, elements, in those inky delineations; he will read profound theorems of philosophy, geometry, astronomy in them, learn a great deal of new knowledge from them that he never understood before, and thereby justly admire the wisdom of the composer of them. Not that all this was passively stamped upon his soul by sense from those. characters; (for sense, as I said before, can perceive nothing here but inky scrawls and the intelligent reader will many times correct his copy, finding erratas in it ;) but because his mind was before furnished with certain inward anticipations, that such characters signify the elements of certain sounds, those sounds certain notions or cogitations of the mind; and because he hath an active power of exciting any such cogitations within himself, he reads in those sensible delineations, the passive stamps or prints of another man's wisdom or knowledge upon them, and also learns knowledge and instruction from them, not as infused into his mind from those sensible characters, but by reason of those hints and significations thereby proposed to it, accidentally kindled, awakened and excited in it: for all, but the phantasms of black inky strokes and figures, arises from the inward activity of his own mind. Wherefore this instance in itself shews, how the activity of the mind may comprehend more in and from sensible objects, than is passively imprinted by them upon sense.” §. 257. Knowledge begins in the senses, but has internal accessions. In order to have a clear understanding of the particular topic before us, let us briefly advert to certain general views already more or less attended to, having a conection with it. In making the human soul a subject of inquiry, it is an obvious consideration, that a distinction may be drawn between the soul contemplated in itself, and its acts, or states, or the knowledge which it possesses. The inquiry, therefore naturally arises, Under what circumstances the acquisition of knowledge begins? Now this is the very question, which has already been considered; nor can it be deemed necessary to repeat here the considerations, which have been brought up in reference to it. It is enough to express our continued reliance on the general experience and testimony of mankind, so far as it is possible to ascertain them on a subject of so much difficulty, that the beginnings of thought and feeling and knowledge are immediately subsequent to certain affections of those bodily organs, which we call the SENSES. In other words, were it not for impressions on the senses, which may be traced to objects external to them, our mental capabilities, whatever they may be, would have remained folded up in all probability, and have never been redeemed from a state of fruitless inaction. Hence the process, which is implied in the perception of external things, or what is commonly termed by Mr. Locke sensation, may justly be considered the occasion or the introductory step to all our knowledge. But it does not follow from this, nor is it by any means true, that the whole amount of it in its ultimate progress is to be ascribed directly to the same source. All that can be said with |