representation, as might be expected, if its origin had been external instead of internal. It is true, we apply langnage to time, which would imply, if strictly interpreted, that it has extension or length. We speak of a long, or short time, &c. But this is owing partly to certain casual associations, and partly to the imperfection of language, and not to any thing in the nature of time itself.

III,—Time, as it exists in our mental apprehension and in its relation to the intellect, is inseparable from events. Whatever event has taken place, whether it be the desolation of a province by an earthquake, or the fighting of a battle, or the forming of a political constitution, or whatever else, although we are ignorant of the hour, the day, or the month, we cannot possibly conceive of them, independently of time. This is a fixed, immutable, and ultimate condition of all our perceptions, so far as they regard

events.

IV,—Time, in its specific and appropriate nature, is indestructible, while the human soul remains the same it now does. It is not within the limits of human capability to contemplate events as the Supreme Being does, at once and simultaneously; but it can be done in succession alone; nor have we reason to suppose that it will ever be otherwise. It is true, the Angel shall at last appear, standing on the land and the sca, and shall swear, that time shall be no longer; yet the time, which the angel of the Apocalypse is destined thus to abolish, is only that, which is measured by these stars, this moon, and the revolutions of this earth. As long as the human soul exists, in whatever part of the universe, there must at least be, not only duration, but duration as existing in succession, unless the nature of the soul be fundamentally changed.

§. 265. The idea of space not of external origin.

Another of those notions, the origin of which we propose to consider under the head of Suggestion, is the idea. of SPACE. Perhaps it will be asked, why we have disregarded in this instance the authority and example of Mr. Locke, who has ranked it with the notions of Exter

nal origin, or in his own phraseology, with those which come into the mind by the way of sensation. And certainly it might be expected, that we should assent to that ancient arrangement, if it could be definitely shown to us, which of the senses it is to be ascribed to. But it is obvious, that this cannot easily be done.

If it were of external origin, if it could properly be said to come into the mind by the way of sensation, we should be able to make such a reference of it. But let us inquire. It will evidently not be pretended, that the notion of space is to be ascribed to the senses of taste, of smell, or of hearing. And can it be ascribed to the sense of touch? Is it a matter of feeling? A single consideration will suggest a satisfactory answer. It will certainly be acknowl edged that we can have no knowledge by the sense of touch, (with the single exception perhaps of the ideas of heat and cold, which are sometimes ascribed to it,) of any thing which does not present some resistance. The degree of resistance may greatly vary, but there will be always some. But no one will undertake to say, that resistance is a quality of space, or enters in any way into his notion of it

Nor are there less obvious objections to regarding it as a direct object of sight. The sense of sight gives us no direct knowledge of any thing but of colours; all other visual perceptions are original in the sense of touch,and are made the property of the sight by transference. No one certainly ever speaks of space as red, or white, or of any other colour, or conceives of it as such.

There is another consideration, adverse to ascribing the idea of space to the senses, applicable equally to the sight and the touch. Every thing coming within the cognizance of those two senses, (with the exception already alluded to,) has form, limits, bounds, place, &c. But the idea, to which we are now attending, is utterly exclusive of every thing of this nature; it is not susceptible of circumscription and figure. So far from it, when we escape beyond the succession of circumscribed and insulated objects, we have but just entered within its empire. If we let the

mind range forth beyond the forms immediately surrounding us, beyond the world itself, beyond all the systems of worlds in the universe; if we stand in our conception on the verge of the remotest star and look downward and upward; it is then the idea of space rushes upon the mind with a power before unknown. These considerations clearly lead to the conclusion, that the notion of space is not susceptible of being ascribed directly to sensation in any of its forms, and is not, in the proper sense of the terms, of external origin. It may perhaps be maintained, that we shall find an adequate account of its origin, if we combine the aid of abstraction with sensation. It is admitted, that by the sense of touch we have a knowledge of the extension of bodies, which includes, when it is contemplated under different views, length, breadth, height &c. But still it does not appear, how abstraction, applied to extension, or any thing included in extension, can give us space. It is evident, that the abstract notion, which we form of the length of a body, is different from the one in question. And if we abstract height or breadth, these also come short of giving us space. If we could abstract height, length, and breadth at once, and then combine them together, we should not even then have space, but on the contrary a solid body.

§. 267. The idea of space has its origin in suggestion.

What then shall we say of the origin of the notion of space? When pressed on this point, we have but one answer to give; it is the natural offspring of the mind; it is a creation of the soul, wholly inseparable from its elementary constitution and action; an intimation, coming from an interiour and original impulse. The opinion of Cousin, (not to mention that of others of like import,) closely approximates to this statement.

After criticising upon Locke, as Mr. Stewart had done before him, and asserting the futility of pretending to derive this notion directly from the senses, he adds

45

as follows; "Au contraire, l'ideè d'espace nous est donneé, á l'occasion de l' ideé de corps, par la penseè, l'entendement, l' es prit, la raison, enfin par une puissance autre que la sensation.”*

It remains to be added, that, while we cannot directly refer the notion in question to the senses, we cannot even state with certainty any particular occasion on which it arises, for we have the notion at a period further back than we can remember. On this point, however, it is undoubtedly true, that we may advance opinions more or less probable. It is, for instance, a supposition not altogether worthless, that motion may have been the original occasion of the rise of this idea. At an early period we moved the hand, either to grasp something removed at a little distance, or in the mere playful exercise of the mus cles, or perhaps we transferred the whole body from one position to another; and it is at least no impossibility, that on such an occasion the idea of space may have been called forth in the soul.

It is cer

But there is another supposition, still more entitled to notice, the one referred to in the above quotation from Cousin. Our acquaintance with external bodies, by means of the senses, may have been the occasion of its rise, although the senses themselves are not its direct source. tain, that we cannot contemplate any body whatever, an apple, a rose, a tree, a house, without always finding the idea of space a ready and necessary concomitant. We cannot conceive of a body, which is no where. So that we may at least date the origin of the idea of space as early as our acquaintance with any external body whatever. In other words it is a gift of the mind, made simultaneously with its earliest external perceptions.

§. 208. Characteristic marks of the notion of space.

What has been said has prepared the way for the better understanding of the characteristic marks of space, as it exists in the mind's view of it. Of these marks there are four, which will help to distinguish it.

"L'Histoire de la Philosophie, Tome II, Dix-septieme Leçon.

I,-Like duration or time, space is not capable of being visibly represented. The remarks, which have already been made, clearly evince this. Nothing can be visibly represented, which does not come within the direct range and cognizance of the senses, as space does not.

II,-It has no form nor limits. This might perhaps be considered as naturally resulting from the characterstic first mentioned. And besides we may safely appeal here to general experience, and assert without hesitation, that no man limits space in his conception of it, nor is it even in his power so to do.

III,It is absolute and necessary. We speak of a thing as absolute, which is not dependent on another, and is unalterable. This is not the case with any thing whatever, which we become acquainted with by means of the direct agency of the senses. All such bodies are constantly changing, and there is no difficulty in the supposition, that they may all be struck out of existence. But it is impossible for us to associate the idea of non-existence with space. It is unalterably the same. But there is evidently nothing unalterable, which is not naturally and necessarily so. It is on this ground therefore, that we assign to space the characteristic of being absolute and necessary.

IV, A fourth characteristic is, that it is the condition of the existence of all bodies; that is to say, it is impossible for us to conceive of a body without associating the notion of space with it. We are so constituted, that what we understand by space is utterly inseparable from every thing outward, which has outlines and form. So that we may truly say of space, that it is the condition of the existence of all bodies, at least relatively to ourselves. And hence, as it is internally conceived of, it becomes a great law of the mind, modifying and limiting all its outward perceptions. (See §. §. 57, 8.)

§. 269. Of the origin of the idea of power.

Under the head of Suggestion the idea of POWER propperly belongs. Every man has this notion; every one feels