operation of the mind, whatever it may be; and (3) a relative perception of possession, appropriation, or belonging to. For instance, a person says, I AM CONSCIOUS OF LOVE, OR OF ANGER, OR OF PENITENCE. Here the idea of SELF or of personal existence is expressed by the pronoun I; there is a different mental state and expressed by its appropriate term, that of the affection of ANGER,&c; the phrase, CONSCIOUS OF, expresses the feeling of relation, which instantaneously and necessarily recognizes the passion of anger as the attribute or property of the subject of the proposition. And in this case, as in all others where we apply the term under consideration, consciousness does not properly extend to any thing, which has an existence, extraneous to the conscious subject or soul itself:

§. 272. Objections to Locke's Essay concerning Human

Understanding.

It is proper to remark here, that the term REFLECTION, as used by Mr.Locke in his book on Human Understanding, has been generally understood, (whether justly or not,) as synonymous with Consciousness, as here explained. That writer held, as is well known, that the origin of human knowledge is two-fold, External and Internal; attributing all external knowledge to sensation, and all internal knowledge to reflection. Supposing therefore, that he meant by the term REFLECTION, what is meant at the present day by CONSCIOUSNESS, his commentators and critics. have found a difficulty in explaining the origin of those notions among others, which were ascribed in the last chapter to suggestion. Writers, who are in general professed followers of Mr. Locke, and of whose candour it would be highly uncharitable to doubt, appear to agree in opinion, that his valuable Essay is defective in this respect. And it can hardly be doubted, that this is a point, in which it is chiefly assailable, viz, in maintaining the doctrine, that all our internal knowledge is from reflection, understanding the term as synonymous with consciousness. A few quotations will help to show the opinions of res pectable writers on this subject.

Dr. REID, in his Third Essay on the intellectual Pow

ers, has this passage. "Mr.Locke says,that by reflection he would be understood to mean the notice,which the mind takes of its operations and of the manner of them. This, I think, we commonly call Consciousness; from which indeed we derive all the notions we have of the operations of our own minds; and he often speaks of the operations of our own minds, as the only objects of reflection.-When reflection is taken in this confined sense, to say, that all our ideas are ideas either of sensation or reflection, is to say that every thing we can conceive is either some object of sense or some operation of our own minds, which is far from being true."

Dr. Price, in his Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, remarks as follows. "Sensation and reflection have been commonly reckoned the sources of all our ideas; and Mr. Locke has taken no small pains to prove this. How much soever, on the whole, I admire his excellent Essay, I cannot think him sufficiently clear or explicit on this head. It is hard to determine exactly what he meant by sensation and reflection. If by the former we understand the effects arising from impressions made on our minds by external objects, and by the latter, the notice the mind takes of its own operations; it will be impossible to derive some of the most important of our ideas from them."

§. 273. Opinions of Mr. Stewart on this subject.

Mr. Stewart in the course of the First of his Philosophical Essays, which is entitled, ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, shows at some length, that we cannot explain the origin of the notions of self, of personal identity, causation, time, number, &c.,on the dectrine of Mr. Locke, as it is generally understood; and that they must be regarded as necessarily arising in the human understanding in the exercise of its different faculties. Speaking on the subject of Mr. Locke's plan in his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, (Chap. I; §, 4,) he remarks as follows, "These two sources, according to him, furnish us with all our simple ideas, and the only power which the mind possesses over them, is to perform certain operations, in the way of composition, abstraction,

generalization, &c. on the materials, which it thus collects in the course of its experience. The laudable desire of Mr. Locke, to introduce precision and perspicuity into metaphysical speculations, and his anxiety to guard against errour in general, naturally prepossessed him in favour of a doctrine, which, when compared with those of his predecessors, was intelligible and simple, and which by suggesting a method, apparently easy and palpable, of analyzing our knowledge into its elementary principles, seemed to furnish an antidote against those prejudices, which had been favored by the hypothesis of innate ideas. It is now a considerable time since this fundamental principle of Mr. Locke's system began to lose its authority in England."

In these passages, (and others of a like purport might easily be brought together, if it were deemed necessary,) we see more fully the reason, why it was thought requisite to assign some of those elementary ideas, which come under the general head of Internal Origin, to SUGGESTION. They evidently cannot be assigned to consciousness, without introducing perplexity and confusion into this latter subject. But having attended to those notions, (comparatively few in number but very important,) which are furnished us by an original or primitive intimation of our nature, CONSCIOUSNESS, considered as a new and distinct source of internal knowledge, naturally has the next claim on our notice. It is on these grounds, that the subject occupies its present place.

§. 274. Instances of notions originating from consciousness.

It would be no easy task to point out the numerous notions, coming within the range and cognizance of consciousness; nor is there any special reason, why this should be attempted. A few instances will suffice to show, how fruitful a source of experience and of knowledge this is.

1,-All the forms and shades of belief are matters of consciousness. We are so constituted, that the mind necessarily yields its assent, in a greater or less degree, when evidence is presented. These degrees of assent are exceeding ly various and multiplied, although only a few of them

are expressed by select and appropriate names; nor does it appear to be necessary for the ends of society, or for any other purpose, that it should be otherwise. Some of them are as follows; doubting, assenting, presumption, believing, probability, high probability, certainty, &c.

II,The names of all intellectual powers and operations are expressive of the subjects of our consciousness. Among others, the terms, thinking, attending, remembering, comparing, judging, abstracting, reasoning, imagining, &c.

III,-Consciousness includes likewise all our emotions, (every thing coming within the range of the SENTIENT part of our nature,) as the emotions of the beautiful, the grand, the sublime, the ludicrous; the feelings of pleasure and pain, of desire and aversion; of hope and joy, of despondency and sadness, and a multitude of others.

IV,-Here also originates our acquaintance with the complex emotions or passions. A man bestows a benefit upon us, and we are conscious of a new complex feeling, which we call GRATITUDE. Another person does us an injury, and we are conscious of another and distinct feeling, which we call ANGER. In other words, we feel, we know, that the passion exists, and that it belongs to ourselves; and it is the same of distrust, jealousy, peevishness, hatred, revenge, friendship, sympathy, love, &c.

V-All the moral and religious emotions and affections belong here; such as approval, disapproval, remorse, humility, repentance, religious faith, forgiveness, benevolence, the sense of dependence, adoration.When we consider, that the mind is constantly in action, that, in all our intercourse with our fellow-beings, friends, family, countrymen, and enemies, new and exceedingly diversified feelings are called forth, that every new scene in nature, and every new combination of events have their ap. propriate results in the mind, it will be readily conjectured, that this enumeration might be carried to a much greater extent. What has been said will serve to indicate some of the prominent sources for self-inquiry on this subject.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

RELATIVE SUGGESTION.

§. 275. Of the susceptibility of perceiving or feeling rela

tions.

It is not inconsistent with the usage of our language to say, that the mind brings its thoughts together, and places them side by side, and compares them. Such are nearly the expressions of Mr. Locke, who speaks of the mind's bringing one thing to and setting it by another, and carrying its view from one to the other. And such is the imperfect nature of all arbitrary signs, that this phraseology will probably continue to be employed, although without some attention it will be likely to lead into errour. Such expressions are evidently of material origin, and cannot be rightly interpreted without taking that circumstance into consideration. When it is said that our thoughts are brought together, that they are placed side by side and the like, probably nothing more can be meant than this, that they are immediately successive to each other. And when it is further said, that we compare them, the meaning is, that we perceive or feel their relation to each other in certain respects.

The mind, therefore, has an original susceptibility or power, answering to this result; which is sometimes known as its power of RELATIVE SUGGESTION, and at other times, the same thing is expressed by the term JUDGMENT,