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subsequent in point of time to moral emotions; and cannot possibly exist, unless preceded by them. The statement is susceptible of illustration in this way. Some complicated state of things, involving moral considerations, is presented before us; we inquire and examine into it; emotions of approval or disapproval then arise. And this is all that takes place, if we ourselves have, in no way whatever, any direct and active concern, either present or future. But if it be otherwise, the moral emotions are immediately succeeded by a distinct and imperative feeling, the sentiment of obligation, which binds us, as if it were the voice of God speaking in the soul, to act or not to act, to do or not to do, to favour or to oppose. How cominon a thing it is for a person to say, that he feels no moral obligation to do a thing, because he does not approve it; or on the contrary, that, approving any proposed cours, he feels under obligation to pursue it; language, which undoubtedly means something, and which implies a distinction between the mere moral emotion and the feeling of obligation; and which tends to prove the prevalence of the common belief, that obligation is subsequent to, and dependent on approval or disapproval On looking at the subject in these points of view, we cannot come to the conclusion to rank feelings of obligation with moral emotions, or with any other emotions; but are induced to assign them a distinct place. But it is not surprising on the whole, that moral emotions are often confounded with them, when we consider the invariable connection between the two just spoken of, and when also we consider the imperfection of language, which not unfrequently applies the same terins to both classes of mental states.

§. 452. Feelings of obligation differ from desires.

For the reasons which have now been stated, feelings of obligation are not classed with Emotions. We are next asked perhaps, why they are not classed under the general head of Desires. And in answering this question, we say in the FIRST place,that consciousness clearly points

out a difference. It is believed, that few matters come within the reach and cognizance of consciousness, which can be more readily decided upon, than the difference between our desires and our feelings of obligation. We admit, that, in the particular of their fixedness or permanency and also of their relation to the future, the latter closely approach to the characteristics of the former; and yet a little internal examination will detect a distinction between them, which is marked and lasting.

(2) We may not only consult our own consciousness in this matter, but may derive information from a notice of the outward conduct of men. In speaking of men's conduct, we not unfrequently make a distinction; and we attribute it sometimes to the mere influence of their desires or wishes, and at other times to the predominance of a sense of duty, which is only another name for a sentiment or impulse within, which is morally obligatory. But there would evidently be no propriety in this distinction, if desire and feelings of duty were the same thing; and it would certainly be premature and unjust to charge men with universally, making such a distinction, when there are no grounds for it.

§. 453. Further considerations on this subject.

(3) If there is not a fixed, permanent, and radical distinction between desires and feelings of obligation, then there is an utter failure of any basis of morality, either in fact or in theory. It will readily be conceded, that morality implies a will, a power of choice and determination. But the conscience does not reach the Will directly. Those emotions of moral approval or disapproval, which are properly ascribed to Conscience, operate on the will through feelings of obligation; that is, they are always succeeded by the latter feelings, before men are led to action. All other emotions operate through the Desires. So that the will, in making up its determinations, takes immediate cognizance of only two classes of inental states, viz. Desires and Feelings of obligation. But brute animals have all the desires, that men have; we

mean all those modifications of feeling, which have been classed under that general head, viz. instincts, appetites, propensities, the various forms of affection, as hatred,love, the parental affection, &c. But still, being evidently destitute of all feelings of obligation, we never speak or think of them as possessing a moral character. We never applaud them for doing their duty, nor punish them for neglecting its performance. Our treatment of them proceeds on altogether different principles. And it would be the same with men, if they were wholly destitute of feelings of moral obligation, and had no motives of action but the various forms of desire. They could never, in that case, be considered morally accountable. They would be without reward, when they went right; and without rebuke, when they went wrong.

CHAPTER SECOND.

ORIGIN OF FEELINGS OF OBLIGATION.

§. 454. Feelings of obligation not founded primarily on law or command.

IN what has been said so far, we have attempted to establish, in the first place, that there is such a thing as the feeling of obligation; and in the second place, to show, so far as it can be done by words, what its nature is. Another inquiry proposes itself, viz, What is the origin or foundation of the feeling of obligation? What is its basis? On what occasion does it necessarily arise?

In pursuing this inquiry, the first remark to be made is, that the feeling of obligation is not founded primarily and originally on Law; that is, on any thing commanded or ordered. In other words, the mere direction or or dering by any Being, however powerful he may be, does not of itself constitute right, and of course does not necessarily furnish a basis for the feeling of obligation, on the part of those, to whom such direction or order is given. Men live constantly under the operation and influence of law in some shape or other; and of law too, which is effective and irresistible. But does any one feel, or any one suppose, that law and right are necessarily synonymous ? Take the simplest possible case. The commands of parents are a law to children and youth; but in some cases undoubtedly these children and

youth feel with very good reason, that the commands of their parents are not right but wrong, and when they obey under such circumstances, they do it, not from a conviction of obligation or duty, but from an apprehension of the consequences of disobedience.

Again, the laws of the land are a rule of action; the subjects of a civil government do not ordinarily deem it expedient to resist them; and yet how often in conversation they pronounce one law to be just, & another unjust, one to be right, and another to be wrong. A man would be considered exceedingly and even foolishly charitable, who should pronounce every enactment of the civil government just and righteous, mercly because it happened to be an enactment, a peremptory order, or law. If the mere power to command and control necessarily lays a foundation of the obligation to obey, it would be impossible to justify resistance to any civil government, however tyrannical and cruel it might be.

And we might extend these views, (and we would hope without incurring the charge of irreverence,) even to the Divine Law. While we most readily admit, that the Divine Law is perfectly right and good, we do not hesitate to deny, that this moral perfection is based on the mere fact, that the Divine Law proceeds from a being, who commands what he pleases, and can enforce his commands. It certainly cannot require much reflection to understand the inadmissibility of such a view. It is admitted, that God is just aud right in his commands, but if his character should change and he should become fierce and cruel, the mere fact of his commanding a cruel action could never secure a cheerful obedience from men, while they remain the same as at present. There would evidently be a violent opposition and conflict between his commands and the suggestions of our moral nature. Today God commands us to relieve the poor and suffering, and we feel it to be right; to-morrow he changes his character, and commands us to afflict the afflicted, and to pluck the bread from the hungry; but if man felt the moral correctness of the other, as he would do, he could