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of his "concern of the caufe of virtue, and the "intereft of practical religion!" I do not, in deed, build my reafoning wholly on the cafe of perfecution; neither doth the apoftle himfelf, as will afterwards appear: However, I do not exclude it. On the contrary, refer to it frequent, ly, and should have dwelt more largely upon it, but that the other confiderations I fuggeft, were more aplicable to the character of the perfon deceafed; which was (as I have already faid) the point from whence I chiefly took my view in this argument.

Fourthly, Even when I do not fuppofe good men to be under a state of perfecution, yet ftill I fuppofe them to live in a state of mortification and felf-denial; to be under a perpetual conflict with their bodily appetites and inclinations, and struggling to get the mastery over them. I fuppofe them oblidged, "by their principles, not to tafte "fo freely of the pleafures of life" (the innocent pleafures of life; for fuch I manifeftly mean) "as "other men dot; but to fit as loofe from them, " and be as moderate in the ufe of them, as they "cant; not only to forbear t of: gratifications "which are forbidden by the rui s o religion; but 66 even to reftrain themselves, in unforbidden in"ftances t." And whenever they tafte even the allowable pleasures of fenfe, I fuppofe them to be "under fuch checks from reafon and reflexion, as, by representing perpetually to their mind the "meannefs of all thefe fenfual graticfiations, do, in great measure, blunt the edge of their keen

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L. P 3.

↑ Ser. p. 7.

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"eft defires, and pall all their enjoyments." And have I not reafon therefore to say, that "good and pious perfons, by the nature and "tendency of their principles, (as they are most "expofed to the troubles and ill accidents of lifet, fo) are the greatest strangers to the pleafures "and advantages of it?' And would not these be great and needlefs abatements of their happinefs, if it were confined within the compafs of this life only? But furely it doth not from hence follow, have I once fuggefted, much less affirmed, "That the practife of vice doth in its own nature "tend to make men more happy, in all states of "this life, than the practice of virtue ." This is an affertion by which the great author of our nature, and enactor of the law of good and evil, is highly difhonoured and blafphemed; and which cannot by any one, who hath the leaft fenfe of religion, be repeated, without being abhorred.

That virtue and vice do in their own natures tend to make thofe men happy, or miferable, who feverally practise them, is a propofition of undoubted (and, I am fure, by me undifputed) truth; as far as it relates to moral virtue or vice, properly fo called; that is, to those measures of duty, whiah natural reafon, unenlightened by revelation, prefcribes: For as to thofe rules of evangelical perfection, in which we Chriftians are obliged to excel; they are (fome of them) of fo exalted a nature, fo contrary to flesh and blood, and fo far above our ordinary capacities and powers, that, if there were no other life than this,

• p.8. preceding † Sect. p. 12. ‡ p. 8. 2. || Let. p. 32.

I fee not how our happiness could generally be faid to confift in the practice of them. And therefore, when God made them matter of strict duty to us; he at the fame time animated us to obedience (not only by affuring us of the extraordinary affiftance of his good Spirit, but) by a clear discovery of a future ftate of rewards and punishments; whereas the 7ews, who had the promifes of this life only, had alfo, in proportion to those promifes, a lower and lefs excellent fcheme of duty proposed to them.

And here alfo this author is altogether filent; for he takes no notice of thefe improvements made by the gospel in the meafures of our duty; but he fuppofes every where the Chriftian and Heathen morality to be in all refpects the fame : and that the innocent pleasures of life (which must be allowed to have fome share in perfecting human happinefs) are no more affected and retrenched by the one, than the other. He fuppofes all the inftances of abftinence, mortification, and felf-denial, which the gospel enjoins, to be included within those rules of virtue, which the light of nature teaches us to follow; and upon this foundation proceeds to represent me as affirming, that "the beft of men are rendered "more miferable than the wicked, by the prac"tice of virtue" whereas, in truth 1 only maintain, that the best Christians (who are unquestionably the best of men) are, by their obfervance of fome gofpel-precepts, rendered (more mifereable, or, which is all one) less happy, than

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they would otherwife be, if they were released from thofe obligations. And, confequently, were there no hope of a life after this, they, who are not tied up to those severities, would have a manifeft advantage over thofe who are.

I inftance indeed in some acts of virtue common to heathens and Christians; but I fuppofe them to be performed by Christians after (a Chriftian, that is, after) a more fublime and excellent manner than ever they were among the heathens; and even, when they do not differ in kind, from moral virtués, ftrictly fo ftiled, yet to differ in the degrees of perfection with which they are attended.

This distinction between a state of virtue and a ftate of mortification, between moral goodness and evangelical perfection, and the greater reftraints (in point of worldly pleasures and advan tages) which are laid upon men by the former of these than by the latter, ought the rather to have been obferved and owned by the Letter-writer, because in the

Fifth Place, I pretend not to compare the happinefs of men and beafts, good men and bad, any further than it refults from worldly pleafures and advantages, and the objects of fenfe that furround us. For thefe are my words: "Were there "no other life but this, men would really be "more miferable than beafts, and the best men

would be often the moft miferable. I mean, "as far as happiness, or mifery, are to be measu "red from pleafing or painful fenfations." This

VOL. II.

See p. 4.

is the reftriction which I more exprefly and for mally infist on, than any other. At the very opening of the argument it occurs; nor do 1, in the profecution of it, ufe any one inftance, or illuftration, but what relates to fuch pleafing and painful fenfations, or to those delightful and uneafy reflexions of mind, which are, fome way or other, confequent upon them. And if, in these refpects (and further I do not go *) the happinefs of beafts exceeds that of men, and the happiness of the wicked that of the virtuous, it will not weaken what I have urged, to fhew, that, in other refpects (fuch as the Letter-writer largely displays) the advantage may lie on the contrary fide; becaufe, were it fo, yet this advantage would not be fufficient to turn the fcale, according to my fupfition: which is, that without "the hope of another life, pleafing and painful "fenfations" (taken together with those inward reflexions which are naturally confequent upon them) "might be efteemed the true meafure of "happiness and mifery +."

On this fuppofition (which I had not then time to explain and prove) all my reafonings proceed; and cannot therefore be affected by any objections, which are fo far from being built on the fame bottom, that they are defigned to overthrow it. Whether this fuppofition be true or falfe, may be a new matter of difpute: But if it be true, the argument I raise from thence is certainly true, and the objections of the Letter-writer are as certainly vain and impertinent; being leveiled rather

• See p. 4. 5.

See p. 4.

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