at which his ten grave obfervations chiefly aim: not to prove the doctrine itself falfe, but my defence of it weak and improper. And therefore he propofes every one of them with fome phrafes of admiration, which may be worthy of the curious reader's perufal." It hath (he fays) a very 'ftrange appearance, and is a very strange way of proceeding, L. p. 22. It is likewife as unac'countable, p. 23.-3. It is again wonderful, p. 24.-4. It is wonderful ftrange, p. 26. it is very strange, p, 27.-5. On the other hand, it is equally ftrange, ibid.-6. It is likewife unaccountable, p. 28.-7. It is extremely unaccountable, p. 33.-8. It looks very strange and 'unaccountable, p. 41.-9. It is likewife very unaccountable, ibid.-10. Laft of all, he cannot but think it very ftrange,' p. 43.-Now all thefe exclamations of ftrange! wonderful! unaccountable! (managed with fo happy a variety of expreffion) have plainly a personal view; and fo have the reflexions themselves, which are ushered by them, being intended rather to disparage me, than difprove my doctrine; and indeed, to difprove the one, only by difparaging the other. How this is confiftant with his folemn affurances, of being acted" by no other principle but a defire that the truth may be known in fo important a matter," p. 44. I do not apprehend; and must have leave to tell this exclaimer, in my turn, that, if that were his real aim, "his manner of proceeding is very ftrange, wonderful, and unaccountable." What tendency hath it towards a difcovery of "truth in this important matter,' to spend two pages (L. p. 11, 12, 13.) in proving, h 2 that that, when I call the text "a conceffion of the apoftle," I speak improperly? Sure the fortunes of Greece do not depend upon fuch criticisms as thefe! the merits of our difpute are no ways concerned in my ufe of an improper expreffion! which, after all, is not fo improper, it feems, but that the Letter-writer himfelf vouchfafes to employ it in the very fame fenfe, and upon the very fame occafion, a very few pages afterwards; where, having produced what he calls my explication of the text, he adds, "This is in truth a conceffion," L. p. 17. And if it be, fo alfo is the text itself, in that fenfe at least wherein I underftand it. But let this (and fome other fuch material re¬ marks) pafs-If there be any thing in his ten obfervations which deferves a reply, it is what he hath urged in the fourth of them; which feems indeed to be directly levelled against the truth of my doctrine. And because it contains in it the fum of what he hath elsewhere loosely scattered to the fame purpofe, and will give me an opportunity of propofing at one view, and briefly vindicating, what I take to be the very truth in this important matter, it fhall therefore be particuJarly confidered. He there obferves, that, "The chief hap inefs of any being, in whatfoever "ftate it is, or of whatfoever duration its ife is, "muft refult from the most excellent parts of its "conftitution; that the happiness of a being, made "capable of imitating God, though for never fo "fhort a time, muft confift in that imita"tion; that virtue is the imitation of God, and "therefore must be the happiness of man: That the " the chief happiness of a reasonable creature must confift in living as reafon directs, whether he lives one day, or to eternity, whether he lives in this "ftate only, or in another afterwards; whether "he hath inclinations to the contrary or not, "provided they be fuch as may be conquered. "For neither can the time of his duration, nor "the tendency of fuch inclinations, alter any "thing in this matter, unlefs to make virtue more “difficult, which doth not deftroy the excellency of "it, and prefent happiness refulting from it, but "enhance and improve it. Befides on the other "hand, the practice of vice, though it be with "the inclination, yet is against reafon and consci"ence." (L. p. 26 27.) These are his words; to which I reply 1. That if this argument proves any thing, it proves too much; even that a man may be happy under the greatest bodily pains and the most grievous perfecutions. For it is certain, that, notwithstanding such pains and perfecutions, he may ftill preferve his virtue: and if the practice of virtue be the happiness of man (happiness itself, as he elsewhere fpeaks L. p. 23.) then thofe pains and perfecutions, not robbing him of his virtue, would not rob him of his happiness. This is too romantick and abfurd a doctrine to deferve a ferious confutation: And therefore I fhall difmifs it with the words of archbishop 7illotion; "Though "fome men have been fo phantaftically obtin te "as, against the reafon and common fenfe of "mankind, to maintain this paradox, That a wife "man may be as happy upon the rack, or in "Phalaris his bull, as in the greatest ease and "freedom from pain that can be imagined; Yet " nature cries fhame of this hypocrify; and there are none of those wise men, they spake of, who "were ever fuch tools as to try the experiment." 2. If we confider the being of man as circumfcribed within the bounds of this life, I deny that "his chief happiness results from the most excel"lent part of his constitution" (as those words are intended to exclude all regard for the pleafures of the body): For it refults, not from any one part, but from the whole. The chief happiness of a creature, compofed of body and foul, and defigned for this life only is, to be as happy as it can be, during this life, both in body and foul: And the more and greater pleasure of both kinds it enjoys (which can be rendered confiftent with each other) the more entire and perfect is its happiness. I grant indeed, 3. That "the chief happiness of a reasonable "creature must consist in living as reafon directs, "whether he lives one day, or to eternity." But had we no hope in another life, the directions of reafon for our conduct in this, would not be the fame, as they are now. Reafon would then direct us to do every thing in which we delighted; to deny ourselves no pleafures, which inclination, cuftom, or opinion prompted us to take; fo it did not otherwife interfere with our ease, with our health, our reputation, and convenience; that is, fo men judged upon the whole, that it would conduce more to their happiness to indulge themfelves in fuch or fuch pleasures, than to forbear them. them. And how falfly the greatest part of mankind would, through the corupt tendency of their nature and the perpetual folicitations of the objects of fenfe, judge in fuch a case, I need not say. And whenever they judged wrong, there would be no fure way of fetting them right; that is, of arguing them out of their tafte and experience, to which they would always retreat and appeal, as to the fure teft and measure of happiness. The reftraints of confcience, in fuch a ftate, would no ways check men in their purfuits: For confcience being nothing but the judgment which a man paffeth on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of his own actions, and that being to be measured from the fubferviency of thofe actions to his prefent happiness; whatever appeared to him, upon the best judgment he could frame, neceffary to his prefent happiness, would appear highly reafonable; and his confcience would be fo far from blaming, that it would approve his purfuit of it; nay, it would blame him for not pursuing it. And therefore, 4. To tell mankind, in fuch a ftate as this, that their supreme felicity " confifted in the imi tation of God, would be to talk to them in a language which they would not relish, or underftand. For how thould a poor imperfect creature, compofed of body as well as fpirit, and defigned for this material world only, think itself obliged, or any ways able, to imitate an eternal, infinite. pure and perfect mind? or place its happiness in copying excellencies, which human life is too fhort, and human nature too weak, to reach ? How fhould a foul, made to inhabit flesh and blood, |