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blood, and to perifh together with it, judge it reasonable, or poffible, to live above the defires and infirmities of flesh and blood? How fhould one part of the man be induced to neglect and forget the other, in order to arrive at a divine perfection and refemblance, which (not hoping to reach) it would fcarce think itfelf defigned to purfue? No, the rule of imitating God can never be fuccefsfully propofed to men, but upon Chris ftian principles, fuch as thefe; that this world is a place not of reft and happiness, but of difcipline and trial; where we are to be trained up for ano ther and more perfect ftate, and to qualify our felves for the divine enjoyments of it by refifting and fubduing our bodily appetites and inclinations; a ftate, into which flesh and blood fhall not enter where our prefent ftruggles fhall be rewarded with complete conquefts, and our imitation of God end in the undisturbed fruition of him to all eternity. Upon these principles indeed it is highly reasona ble to inimitate God: but if we are defigned to live only in these bodies, and in this world, what fhould hinder us from endeavouring to make the beft of both? and from coming to the conclufion mentioned (and not difapproved) by the apoftle 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die?"

5. I deny not, after all but that, even in fuch a ftate as this, the pleafures of virtue would be fuperior to thofe of vice, and justly preferable, upon the comparifon; the pleafures, I mean. of a mattire and confirmed habit of virtue, not of the lower and imperfect degrees of it. Such an habit, once acquired would indeed afford the profeffors of it greater fatisfactions than any the wicked and

licentious

But how few

licentious did, or could enjoy. would judge this rightly of virtue at a diftance? How much fewer would be at the pains of acquiring fuch an habit, and of conquering all the reluctances and difficulties that lie in the way towards it? And, till that were done, the strict practice of virtue would be entirely pleafing to be fure, no part of the picafure of it would confift in the ftruggle itfelf; and therefore I am much at a lofs to know what the Letter-writer meant by the following affertion, that the difficulty of' [ataining and practifing] virtue doth not destroy the prefent happinefs refulting from it, but enhance and improve it.' This I take to be a stoical rant, without any foundation in the nature of man, or the reafon of things. For no practice whatsoever can be attended with prefent happiness, any farther than it is easy and delightful to the doer; and what is difficult to be done, cannot be eafy and delightful while it is doing.-Unlefs when those difficulties are loft and swallowed up in the sweet hope of a better state, which we are fure of attaining by the means of them. Where once fuch a perfuafion as this is well fixed, I grant it will smooth all the roughness of the way that leads to happiness, and render all the conflicts we maintain with our lufts and paffions pleafing; but furely, without the hopes of fuch a ftate, the mère prospect of the pleasures, which virtue in this life may yield, would fcarce make the ftruggle itself delightful to thofe who were ftrangers to fuck pleasures.

Thus far, in anfwer to his fourth remark, which contains the grounds of his doctrine, and offers at fomewhat towards the disproof of mine. VOL II.

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As to the reft of his obfervations on my manner of proceeding in the prefent argument, were it worth while to reduce them from their prefent confufion into fome order, they might be ranged and confidered under three heads; my omiffions, my inconfiftencies, and the ill confequences of my doctrine. My omiflions are confeffed, for I did not write a treatife, but a few pages on the subject; which I handled with particular views, and pretended not to exhaust. Whether any of the reasonings by me employed are inconfiftent with each other, I fecurely leave to the judgment of the reader, who hath now, toward the latter end of this volume, the argumentative part of that fermon before him, verbatim, as it was first printed. But the ill confequences of my doctrine, which he objects, deferve to be a little confidered.

My doctrine is, as I have endeavoured to fhew, the very fame with that of St. Paul; and if this hath been made out, the fame ill confequences are equally chargeable upon both, and he too may be faid to have made conceffions to the cause of vice, by allowing that, if the dead rise not,' the inference would be juft, 'Let us eat and drink, 'for to-morrow we die.' All that needs be done toward justifying the apoftle (and myself, by his means) is, to open the defign and manner of his reafoning. He is there making ufe of that fort of argument, which, in order to prove a doctrine true, fuppofes the contrary doctrine to be true; and then fhews, what abfurdities follow, upon fuch a fuppofition: And the greater thofe abfurdities are, the more ftrongly do they evince the falfity

falfity of that fuppofition from whence they flow, and, confequently, the truth of the doctrine fet afide by that fuppofition. Thus, in the present cafe, the more abfurd it is to affirm, that beafts have the advantage of men, and bad men of good, in point of happiness; or that a fenfual life may be preferred to a fevere and rigid virtue; the more clearly doth the folly and falihood of that fuppofition appear, which is the parent of these wild abfurdities, viz. that we have hope in this life only; and the falfhood of that fuppofition being proved, proves the truth of the contrary doctrine, which was defigned to be established. Now these very abfurdities are, by the Letter-writer, reprefented as 'conceffions to the caufe of vice,' when indeed they are employed by me, and do in themselves tend, to confirm the truth of a capital article in religion, upon which (as I verily think) the whole cause of virtue depends. It may fuffice to have given this fhort but full' anfwer to all the ill confequences he hath vainly endeavoured to faften on my doctrine; and which are in truth fo far from being ill-confequences of my doctrine, that they are confequences only of that falfe fuppofition which I advanced in order to difprove it, and, by that means, to prove the truth of my doctrine. If the Letter-writer was fincere in this part of his charge, he must be contented to bear the reproach of understanding nothing of logick, or good fenfe;' (L. p. 16.) an imputation, which find he looks upon as carrying a greater abfurdity in it, than even any thing 1 have faid in my Sermon!

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I doubt, whether he can as easily get rid of the

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ill confequences of his doctrine, which manifeftly tends to fhew, That there is no need of a future ftate, to fet right the unequal diftribution of happinefs in this life. And if once this be allowed, we give up the very beft argument for such a state, with which mere reafon furnishes us. And of what ufe that conceffion can be to the caufe of virtue, this pretended patron of it will be pleafed to tell us. Had he fubftituted any other argument for a future ftate, in the room of this he thus endeavours to weaken; had he once, throughout his pamphlet, directed, and plainly affirmed, that any convincing evidence of fuch a ftate was to be had from reafon alone, or that even the bitter fufferings of good men were fufficient to prove it; his conduct would have been fo much the more excufable: But he hath offered at nothing of this kind.

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Once indeed (in a very odd and wary manner) he fays, I have heard the fufferings and afflic"tions of many good men here below, made an "6 argument that in another ftate, all the virtuous "fhall have the outward as well as inward tokens

of God's favour" (L. p. 32.) But we are left at a lofs to know, whether he approves the argument he thus beard; whether he thinks it a good argument for a future ftate, as well as a proof of what fhall happen in fuch a ftate, if such a state there fhould be: He fays not, whether a futurę ftate be, in his opinion, neceffary, in order to a manifestation of these cutward tekens of God's favur; or whether the inward tokens of it, bestowed in this life, may not fuffice to all the purpofes of virtue.

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