muscles only through the nerves. Though it were granted, then, that every phenomenon has an efficient, and not merely a phenomenal cause, and that volition, in the case of the peculiar phenomena which are known to be produced by it, is that efficient cause: are we therefore to say, with these writers, that since we know of no other efficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence, there is no other, and volition is the direct cause of all phenomena? A more outrageous stretch of inference could hardly be made. Because among the infinite variety of the phenomena of nature there is one, namely, a particular mode of action of certain nerves, which has for its cause, and as we are now supposing for its efficient cause, a state of our mind; and because this is the only efficient cause of which we are conscious, being the only one of which in the nature of the case we can be conscious, since it is the only one which exists within ourselves; does this justify us in concluding that all other phenomena must have the same kind of efficient cause with that one eminently special, narrow, and peculiarly human or animal phenomenon? . The supporters of

the Volition Theory ask us to infer that volition causes every thing, for no reason except that it causes one particular thing; although that one phenomenon, far from being a type of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws bearing scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whether of inorganic or of organic nature.”. Vol. I. pp. 370-372.

We presume Mr. Mill will admit, as a sound logical maxim, what Sir William Hamilton calls the Law of Parsimony,entiæ non multiplicandæ sunt præter necessitatem,— no more causes must be assigned than what are absolutely necessary to account for the phenomena. We are now entitled to assume that the Volition Theory is proved, Mr. Mill himself taking it for granted (for the moment) in the preceding extract. The reasoning, then, runs thus: - Numberless changes are constantly taking place in matter, which are to be accounted for, as every phenomenon must have a cause; the material body cannot change itself, for we know that matter is utterly lifeless and inert, incapable of effecting change either in itself or in any thing else; a large class of these changes take place in our own bodies, and are immediately known to be effected by the direct agency of the human will, which is the only agency within our sphere of immediate knowledge that is capable of exerting any sort of power or force; we know, also, (not im

mediately, indeed, but from abundant evidence,) that another Will exists in nature, which is omnipresent and omnipotent; -when, therefore, we ascribe all the changes in matter which are not produced by ourselves to the omnipresent action of the Divine Mind, we assign them to the only known Cause in the universe which is capable.of producing them, and to a Cause perfectly similar in kind (though infinitely disparate in degree) to the human will, which we know to be a source of power, and the efficient cause of a vast number of changes that are effected every moment in our own bodies. Or the argument may be more briefly stated thus: - Volition is the only known power in the universe; changes in matter are the phenomena to be accounted for; and as many such changes are confessedly produced by human volition, the residue of them must be attributed to some other Will, which, by its omnipresence and omnipotence, is capable of producing them.

This reasoning may not be satisfactory to Mr. Mill, as it establishes a doctrine which he is unwilling to admit; but we contend that it is eminently logical, and in proof of our assertion we once more cite against him his own System of Logic. The kind of reasoning here employed is what he calls the method of "induction by simple enumeration,” — a law being assumed to hold good in all cases, because it has been found to hold good in many cases, and not one instance has been found to the contrary. It is certainly curious to find Mr. Mill, in the following passage, asserting that this process is entirely valid and legitimate in reference to the law of universal causation itself, the very instance to which we are here applying it.*

"Induction by simple enumeration, or, in other words, generalization of an observed fact from the mere absence of any known instance to the contrary, is by no means the illicit logical process in all cases which it is in most. It is delusive and insufficient exactly in proportion as the subject-matter of the observation is special and limited in extent. As the sphere widens, this unscientific method becomes less and less liable

* We are obliged here to quote the first edition of Mill's Logic; for in this third edition, the passage is so much modified and enlarged that it is not so well adapted for our purpose. Substantially the same doctrine is still expressed in it; but the author seems to have been half conscious that he was here contradicting himself, and he has labored hard, though in vain, to remove the difficulty.

to mislead; and the most universal class of truths, the law of causation, for instance, and the principles of number and of geometry, are duly and satisfactorily proved by that method alone, nor are they susceptible of any other proof." -Book IV. Ch. XXI. § 2.

The case we are now considering is one of universal generalization; it embraces all the phenomena of the material universe, every change in which requires a cause. Human bodies, of course, are a part of this universe, as much so as the ground these bodies tread upon, or the air they breathe. All the voluntary movements of these bodies, which are repeated and varied till their number exceeds all calculation, are known to proceed from the will as their efficient cause; and the will is the only known instance of efficient causation in the universe. The law of " induction by simple enumeration," then, is strictly applicable in this case; and the conclusion to which it leads us is, that all other physical events - from the quivering of an aspen-leaf up to the flight of the planets in their courses - are also attributable to Will, and that Will must be one proportioned in power and comprehensiveness to the variety and grandeur of its effects. That this Will belongs to a Being differing from all those whose existence is made known to us by the testimony of the senses, is not a circumstance which vitiates the argument, for the reasoning is addressed only to the Theist. The muscular movements of different individuals are ascribed respectively to the volitions of those individuals. The will has efficient causative agency as such, and not because it is the will of one man or another, not because it is human or divine.

We have elsewhere stated this reasoning in a more popular form, and will quote the passage:—

"We recognize the presence of God in nature in precisely the same manner in which we come to know that any intelligent, though finite being, exists besides ourselves. The outward form, surely, is nothing; a statue or an automaton may be moulded into a perfect external likeness of a man. But the actions of the living man show that he is animated by a spirit kindred to our own, by something distinct from the mere framework of bones and muscles which he inhabits, and which we distinguish as clearly from the person within as we do our own bodies from ourselves. I am conscious of power dependent on my will, and I

perceive the effects produced on matter by the exertion of that will. I perceive, also, perfectly similar effects, which I can attribute only to my brother man, and I infer, therefore, that he exists, and that his will is equally active in producing those effects. I do not imagine that his limbs move themselves, but that he moves them; I do not think that his eye turns towards me of its own accord with a glance of affection, or that his hand comes to meet mine in a friendly grasp from an energy that is inherent in that hand alone. In like manner, then, I say, if His sun rolls over my head and warms me, if His wind cools and refreshes me, if His voice speaks to me,—whether in the thunder at midnight, or in the whispers of the forest, or but in the rustling of a leaf, -if His seasons still come round to me in their grateful vicissitude, and, wherever I look in outward nature, I behold constant action, change, and joy, I do not suppose that brute and senseless matter causes all this by its inherent power, whether original or derived, but that the spirit, the Person, within, controls, vivifies, and produces all.

'These, as they change, Almighty Father, these

Are but the varied God. The rolling year

Is full of thee.""

-Lowell Lectures on the Application of Metaphysical and Ethical Science, pp. 135, 136.

We had purposed to make some further observations on Mr. Mill's argument against the freedom of the will, and on a few other points in his doctrine of causation as contrasted with the Volition Theory. But this article has already exceeded the limits proper for the discussion of so abstruse a subject, and we forbear. We are willing to allow the brief statement that has been given of the nature and the consequences of his system to stand in juxtaposition and contrast with the opposite theory which he has so vehemently assailed. They are not merely the extremes of opinion on this difficult question; they are, also, the only logical and consistent views of it which can be taken, all intermediate doctrines being imperfect and inconsequent. He who rejects either of them cannot consistently stop short of embracing the other to its full extent. Even so acute a philosopher and logician as Mr. Mill has failed, as we have seen, to reconcile his rejection of all free causation in the universe with any doctrine that stops short of the gloomiest extreme of Fatalism. On the other hand, his objections to the theory that volition is the only efficient cause either of

mental or of material phenomena are so feeble, that they tend rather to increase than diminish our confidence in it. The position that has not even been shaken by the assaults of so able an opponent must be in itself impregnable. We have criticized his arguments with freedom, but with no abatement of respect for one who occupies deservedly so high a rank among the English thinkers of the present day.

ART. V.-1. LOUIS XVII.: sa Vie, son Agonie, sa Mort; Captivité de la Famille Royale au Temple; Ouvrage enrichi d'Autographes, de Portraits, et de Plans. Par M. A. DE BEAUCHESNE. Paris: Plon frères, Editeurs. 1852. 2 vols.

8vo.

2. Filia Dolorosa: Memoirs of MARIE THÉRÈSE CHARLOTTE, Duchess of Angoulême, the Last of the Dauphines. By MRS. ROMER, Author of "A Pilgrimage to the Temples and Tombs of Egypt," etc. London: Richard Bentley. 1852. 2 vols. 8vo.

3. An Abridged Account of the Misfortunes of the Dauphin, followed by some Documents in Support of the Facts related by the Prince; with a Supplement. Translated from the French, by the HON. and REV. C. G. PERCIVAL, Rector of Calverton, Bucks. London: James Fraser. 1838. 8vo. pp. 714.

THE titles of these books will inevitably remind our readers of the ingenious article some time since printed in Putnam's Magazine, in support of the pretensions of the Rev. Eleazer Williams to be the veritable son of the unfortunate Louis XVI., and the present legitimate heir to the crown of France. Shortly after perusing the article in question, M. de Beauchesne's volumes reached us from Paris, and it was our intention to devote an earlier number of this Review to a thorough examination of the subject. But the announcement of a more elaborate treatise by the Rev. Mr. Hanson, the most earnest and able of Mr. Williams's advocates, was a sufficient