Several critical expositors of the New Testament have sought to escape the conclusion which such a phraseology appears to convey, by adopting a different translation of the original: as, for example, by substituting for the phrase "that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet," the words "so that that which was spoken by the prophet was fulfilled."* But there are passages in the Scriptures, apparently conveying the same import, and consequently offering the same difficulty, which admit of no such verbal alteration for example, St. John cites the prophecy of Esaias as the reason, it would seem, why the Jews could not believe the declarations of our Saviour: "Therefore they could not believe because that Esaias said again." The refinement then upon the original is of small value in the exposition of these parts of Scripture.

* Matt. xxvii. 35, ἵνα πληρωθῇ τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ προphrov "Iva, it is said, is not here a causal conjunction, but points to the event merely, without conveying the idea of a design in bringing it out.

† John xii. 39. Διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἠδύναντο πιστεύειν, ὅτι πάλιν εἶπεν Ἡσαΐας It must be manifest from these words, that ἵνα ὁ λόγος Ἡσαΐου τοῦ προφήτου πληρωθῇ, in the preceding verse, is correctly rendered in our translation -"that the saying of Esaias the prophet might be fulfilled."

We apprehend, however, that with regard to these, as well as some other passages in the sacred writings, we need not be driven to resort to questionable expedients of verbal criticism, if we sufficiently consider the innumerable modes of speaking, customary at all times, which are the result of merely accidental or arbitrary combinations of ideas; and which cannot therefore be understood to assert what the words themselves would literally signify. The affirmation of St. John"Therefore they could not believe because that Esaias said"—must appear, we conceive, on examination, to be one of these modes of speaking. It is certainly not uncommon to affirm of any event contemplated as future, that it can or cannot happen, for no other reason than that some individual, presumed to be of superior knowledge and sagacity, has pronounced an unhesitating judgment that it will or will not happen. If a surgeon, for example, were to assert, without hesitation and in absolute terms, that a particular operation proposed for the cure of a disease would prove fatal-a surgeon, in whose knowledge of the structure of the human frame, and of the peculiar constitution of the patient, we' had been induced to place unlimited confi

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dence-it is not improbable that we should express our opinion of his judgment and foresight in such terms as the following :—“ The patient must sink under the operation, if it "be performed upon him; he cannot survive "it—the surgeon has said that it will termi“nate fatally.” In other words, we should testify our confidence in the intelligence of the surgeon in language which, if literally understood, would convey the idea that his prediction of the fatal issue of the operation would be the cause of it-that the operation could not be otherwise than fatal because he had predicted it would be so: whereas we should virtually declare our conviction that it was impossible that he could be mistaken in his judgment. It were easy to multiply instances indeed we are continually hearing from others, if not ourselves accustomed to make, the most positive and unqualified assertions-whether with respect to the possibility of things future, or the reality of things past—which, in the minds of the speakers themselves, rest on no other foundation than their strong conviction of the extensive knowledge, or unerring judgment, of some particular individual. Of course such assertions can be properly understood to express nothing more

than that strong conviction. It were beside our purpose to assign the origin of this custom of speech, even were it not easily perceivable. We have merely to direct attention to the general fact that, in proportion as persons are habituated to take their views and expectations from the judgment of others-in proportion as they are unable or careless to ground them on the results of their own investigations, they are accustomed to quote and urge the judgment of another, who may happen to have stepped into the vacant seat of authority; as though in alleging his affirmation, they were assigning the cause for any fact which they may assert-as though they were explaining any proposition which they may advance-as though his affirmation were declaratory of what was possible or practicable in the nature of things.

The language of the Evangelists in question, taken as it is from the ordinary dialect, and addressed to the common apprehension, evinces the same connexion of ideas: on an occasion, however, when such a manner of speaking should least of all surprise us, if, indeed, it might not have been naturally expected. Filled and wholly possessed with the persuasionnot of a human foresight, but of the prescience

of the All-perfect Mind, they speak of that prescience as if it were identical with the nature and constitution of things: as if it were the measure of all possible existence : as if God's foreknowledge of all things were the same as his creation and preordination of all things. Hence, in the words—“ They could not believe, because that Esaias said". the Evangelist simply declares that the Divine Inspirer of Esaias could not have been deceived, in foretelling the obstinate unbelief, and incorrigible character of the Jewish people. The phrase, "that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet," bespeaks the same impression of God's infallibility, with the additional and important persuasion, that it was his especial purpose to demonstrate the Scriptures to have been dictated by Himself, by the veracity of the prophecies contained in them. And such was the persuasion which suggested the words in the text-alluding, as they do, to the prophecy of Esaias-" that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand." We hold these forms of speech to import that the Almighty could not have been deceived in having announced events that should come to pass, or the purpose be frustrated for which He had foreshown