This reasoning, though not a little plausible, is, we suspect, but ill-considered and superficial. It overlooks this most important fact that imperfect knowledge, or defective wisdom, is the principal-the only reason why human laws are made capable of yielding; and that the penalty of crime is not certain in its infliction. In all cases of remission or commutation of punishment, there is either some doubt of the criminality of the condemned person, or an opinion is entertained that the punishment impending over him is more than adequate to the offence of which he stands convicted. It is assumed or conjectured that there exists some valid ground for an acquittal from the charge of guilt, or for a mitigation of its penalty. In truth, it is no more proper to human than to divine justice, to remit the sentence of law when guilt is palpable and unequivocal, and evidently equal to the punishment which it has incurred. That a compassionate sympathy with the condition of the criminal, or a reluctance to inflict pain or death, should operate to his escape from punishment, would, it is obvious, be accounted a fault in the judicial administration, and be universally deprecated as tending to the subversion of society. Our religion, it is true, instructs us to suppress the spirit of retaliation

towards those who have injured us; but, notwithstanding, as members of the social body, and bound, as such, to aim at the promotion of the common good, we aspire to a character of inexorableness towards the violators of right and law. We rigorously uphold, however we may deplore, the sentence which dooms the guilty to suffer or to die; and we account those to have been examples of heroic virtue, who, in this respect, have sacrificed the claims of kindred and friendship on the altar of political rectitude.

There appears to be no pure, intelligent principle of forgiveness in the judicial wisdom of this world. Human legislation discovers no other elements of mercy than its weaknesses and imperfections. What is called a discretionary power, and lauded as a prerogative of mercy, is simply a right of determination on grounds which the law is unable to anticipate, and consequently cannot decide upon. It is impossible, beforehand, to describe all the circumstances which may diminish the guilt of a particular offence; and hence it is expedient to leave ample scope for the supply of deficiency, or the correction of error; or, in more flattering, but, as it would seem, less accurate language, to place in the ruling power a right of dispensation, or

prerogative of mercy. Moreover, as men are so liable to error in their decisions, it becomes a principle of natural equity to incline to the side of clemency and remission. Unquestionably, however, in proportion as crimes become more clearly discriminated, the penalties annexed to them better selected or proportioned, and the rules of evidence more satisfactorily ascertained, punishment is more rarely remitted. In other words, the more comprehensive the wisdom of the legislature, the more certain is the execution of its enactments.

Now imperfect knowledge, or defective wisdom, appertains not to the Divine Being; and, consequently, that relaxation of law which is common to human societies-that mercy which is exercised on principles with which we are conversant-can have no place in the government of God. No such causes as those which incline a human judge to forbear the execution of penal law can act upon the All-perfect mind, and withhold the uplifted arm of the Almighty. With Him there is no faulty or suspicious evidence; no distance of time or place; and no obscurity or complication of circumstances. He is the faithful witness, as well as the incorruptible judge. Nor could any event have escaped his prescience, that might render an

amelioration of his law expedient or desirable. He could not, for example, have been surprised into forgiveness by the repentance of mankind, or influenced by any new or unexpected motive in their favour. His thoughts of mercy must have been coeval with his being; his design to spare the guilty must have been from everlasting. Yet is his law announced in most absolute terms, as cited by St. Paul,-" Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things, which are written in the book of the law to do them."*

So far then from assuming that the unerring Legislator of the universe would recall the sentence which had issued from his lips, or remodel the law which he had promulgated, it would seem a more rational conclusion, that mercy and forgiveness on the part of God, would proceed on some reconciling and harmonizing principle, wide from the scope of our analogies, and without the range of human intelligence.

We have not offered these remarks, you observe, in order to infer what the Scriptures only can determine, the necessity of some vicarious interference in behalf of the transgressor,-of some desert or plea of justification

*Gal. iii. 10.

to accrue to him from the agency of another being. We were concerned to show only that there is no foundation for the bold denial of such a necessity, and that no objection to this part of the Christian economy can be justly derived from the conduct and policy of mankind. Accordingly, we have deemed it important to remark, that the remission of punishment which takes place in human jurisdiction, can furnish no explanation of the pardon vouchsafed the guilty by a Being of perfect knowledge and wisdom, as well as benevolence. It may be a dictate of natural religion to supplicate forgiveness from the Father of our spirits, and to anticipate the pardon of our offences when conscious of the sincerity of our repentance: and certain is it, that the spirit of the Gospel is in all harmony with this prevailing impression of the divine benignity and compassion. But our preconceptions of the mercy of God have no warrant in the judicial wisdom of this world, inasmuch as the remission of punishment is no acknowledged or contemplated object of legislation : the growing perfection of laws, tending, as we have already observed, to the certain conviction and punishment of the offender, and, consequently, to preclude the exercise and