9. DAMAGES—INJURY CAUSING DEATH.-In New Jersey, no action lies for an injury caused by the death of a human being, with the exception of that provided by statute permitting a recovery by the personal representative of the decedent, for the benefit of the widow and next of kin, of the pecuniary loss resulting to them from such death. (Myers v. Holborn, 606.)

10. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY-EARNING POWER-PROFITS OF BUSINESS.-Evidence of business profits of a person injured, while showing the possession of business qualities, does not fix their value or show earning power; and the admission of evidence for such purpose is error, nor can the value of such earning power be fixed by expert evidence. The basis upon which this calculation must rest is not the possibility, as fixed by expert evidence, but the cold, commonplace facts as proved by those who know them. (Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 705.)

11. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY.-LOSS OF EARNING POWER as an element of damages for personal injury involves an inquiry into the value of the labor, physical or intellectual, of the person injured, before the accident happened to him, and his ability to earn money by labor, physical or intellectual, after the injury is received, but profits derived from an investment or the management of a business enterprise are not earnings to be considered. (Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 705.)

12. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY.-In computing damages sustained by an injured person, the calculation may include not only loss of time and loss of earning power, but, in proper cases, also an allowance because of suffering. (Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 705.)

13. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY.-COMPENSATION for pain and suffering is not to be understood as meaning price, or value, but as describing an allowance looking toward recompense for, or made because of, the suffering consequent upon the injury. (Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 705.)

14. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY-EARNING POWER -ELEMENTS OF.-In an action to recover for personal injury, the jury, in settling the question of the plaintiff's earning power, should consider, not only his past earnings, or the fair value of services such as he was able to render, but also his age, state of health, business habits, and manner of living. (Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 705.)

15. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY-PAIN AND SUFFERING.-INSTRUCTIONS which leave the jury to regard pain and suffering as an independent item of damages for personal injury, to be compensated by a sum of money that may be regarded as a pecuniary equivalent are not only inexact but erroneous. (Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 705.)

16. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY.-PAIN AND SUFFERING as elements of damages for personal injury are not capable of being exactly measured by an equivalent in money and have no market price. The question in any given case is not what it would cost to hire some one to undergo the measure of pain alleged to have been suffered, but what under all the circumstances, should be allowed plaintiff in addition to the other items of damage to which he is entitled, in consideration of the suffering necessarily en. dured. (Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 705.)

17. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY.-Expenses for which person may recover as an element of damages for personal inju

ry must be such as have been actually paid, or such as, in the judg ment of the jury, are reasonably necessary to be incurred, and he cannot recover for the nursing and attendance of the members of his own household, unless they are hired servants. (Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 705.)

18. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY consist of the expenses to which the injured person is subjected by reason of the injury complained of, the inconvenience and suffering naturally resulting from it, and the loss of earning power, if any, and whether temporary or permanent, consequent upon the character of the injury. (Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 705.)

19. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY-EVIDENCE.-In an action against a railroad company to recover for personal injury, evidence of cruelty, rudeness and incivility on the part of the company's physician in examining the plaintiff to ascertain the extent of his injury and the company's liability, is immaterial and irrelevant. The physician is alone liable for his cruelty. (Goodhart v. Pennsyl vania R. R. Co., 705.)

20. DAMAGES WILL NOT BE GIVEN FOR MERE INCONVENIENCE AND ANNOYANCE, such as are felt at every disappointment to one's expectations, if there is no actual physical or mental injury. Therefore, damages are not recoverable for anxiety and suspense of mind in consequence of delay caused by the fault of a common carrier. (Turner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 883.)

21. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED against one who, knowing a woman to be unchaste and then pregnant by him, for the purpose of inducing a man to marry her, represents to him that she is a virtuous and respectable woman. (Kujek v. Goldman, 670.)

22. DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF ATTORNEY'S TIME.-Where an attorney is entitled to recover from a railway corporation for loss of time occurring through its fault, the jury should be charged to weigh the probability of the attorney's being employed during the time he was thus delayed, even had he reached his point of destination without delay. (Turner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 883.)

23. DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF TIME BY AN ATTORNEY-EVIDENCE.-If an attorney who is a passenger on a railway train is delayed from a cause entitling him to recover damages against a railway corporation, the amount of his damages can only be established by showing what he had actually earned as an attorney either before or after that time. Evidence of what attorneys of his ability and learning were earning in active practice at that time is not admissible, when he does not appear to have been then engaged in such practice. (Turner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 883.)

24. DAMAGES.-LOSS OF COLLATERAL ENGAGEMENTS, depending upon the fulfillment of the principal contract, are too remote to be considered in estimating the damages for a breach of the principal contract. (Coffin v. State, 188.)

25. DAMAGES.-FOR THE BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO SELL STATE BONDS, the measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the bonds and the price agreed to be paid therefor, and cannot include the loss to a purchaser of the profits to be realized from his resale, when the vendor did not know of the contemplated resale. (Coffin v. State, 188.)

See Appeal, 9; Libel, 3; Negligence, 11; Railroads, 2, 3, 11, 12.

DEATH.

See Contracts, 11; Damages, 9: Equity, 1; Evidence, 6; Negligence,

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR

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ASSUMPTION OF DEBT.
A creditor may accept or reject the promise of a third person to pay
the debt. Without acceptance the original debtor alone has the right
to enforce the promise, while with acceptance there is only a change
of debtors and not payment of the debt. (Sampson v. Fox, 950.)
See Banks, 1-3; Duress; Fraudulent Conveyances; Payment. &

DEEDS.

1. DEEDS-STIPULATION BY GRANTEE TO ASSUME
MORTGAGE DEBT.-A stipulation in a deed inter partes, that the
grantee is to assume and pay a debt secured by mortgage on the
premises for the payment of which the grantor is personally liable,
is a contract by the grantee with the grantor for the indemnity of
the latter; and the obligation of the grantee to pay the debt inures
in equity for the benefit of the mortgagee, and he may enforce it
against the grantee to the extent of the unpaid part of the mortgage
debt after the proceeds of the mortgaged estate have been applied
thereon. The remedy in equity is independent of foreclosure. (Green
v. Stone, 577.)

2. DEEDS-ASSUMPTION OF MORTGAGE.-A vendee who ac
cepts a deed stipulating that it is made "under and subject to the
lien of certain mortgages," and that it is agreed between the parties
that the grantee accepts the title subject to the payment of the mort
gages, but does not assume the payment of the various outstanding
notes given for the debts secured by such mortgages, is personally
liable for the payment of the mortgage debt, and, if he fails to pay
it, his grantor may maintain an action against him to recover the
sum remaining unpaid. (Blood v. Crew Levick Co., 742.)

3. CONVEYANCE, INTENTION OF THE PARTIES, WHEN
IMMATERIAL.-Where there is no ambiguity in a conveyance,
what the grantors or grantees intended by its terms, or in what
manner they subsequently treated it, has no bearing on its con-
struction. (Wilkins v. Young, 162.)

4. DEEDS-EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE-PAROL EVIDENCE
TO VARY COVENANTS AND CONDITIONS.-If a vendee of land
accepts a deed from his vendor, containing covenants and condi
tions to be performed by such vendee, the latter is bound by such
covenants and conditions in the absence of proof that anything was
added to or omitted from the deed by fraud, accident, or mistake,
or that it was incorrectly read or explained to the vendee, and, in
such case, he cannot introduce parol evidence to vary the stipula-
tions contained in the deed. (Blood v. Crew Levick Co., 742.)

5. DEEDS-COVENANTS-EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE.-If a
grantor conveys land by his deed upon terms and conditions stated
therein, the grantee, by accepting the deed, consents to its condi-
tions and is bound by them as fully as he could have bound him-
self by signing and sealing the covenants and conditions contained
in the deed, and they may be enforced by the parties in whose be-
half they are made with substantially the same effect. (Blood v.
Crew Levick Co., 742.)

6. DEEDS-EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE-ASSUMPTION OF
MORTGAGE.-If a vendee of land accepts a deed therefor from his
vendor containing a covenant of general warranty, and also a coven-
ant on the part of the vendee to pay off a mortgage debt, existing
against the land, the failure of the grantor to pay off other incum-
AM, ST. KEP., VOL. LV.-63

brances existing against the land, does not relieve the vendee from
liability to pay the amount of the mortgage to the mortgagee. (Blood
V. Crew Levick Co., 742.)

Chattel Mortgage.

See Equity, 1; Evidence, 13, 14.

DEFINITIONS.

(Lumbert v. Woodward, 175.)

"Child or Children." (McDonald v. Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co., 185.)
"Conveyances." (Merrill v. Luce, 844.)

"Drifting in a tunnel." (Jurgenson v. Diller, 82.)
Lottery. (Lynch v. Rosenthal, 168.)

DEPOSITIONS.

1. DEPOSITIONS-EXHIBITS-BOOKS OF ACCOUNT.—If the
original books of entry of accounts are produced before a commis-
sioner who is taking depositions, and correct copies of the entries are
taken from such books, the books themselves need not be made ex-
hibits to the answers to the interrogatories, especially where the
books are the private property of witnesses who are not interested
in the litigation. (Hauenstein v. Gillespie, 569.)

2.

DEPOSITIONS-EXHIBITS-RECEIPT.-If an original re-
ceipt is produced before a commissioner taking a deposition, and the
witness furnishes a correct copy of such receipt as the exhibit to
his answer to one of the interrogatories, the receipt itself need not
be made an exhibit to the deposition, especially where it is the pri-
vate property of the witness. (Hauenstein v. Gillespie, 569.)

DESCRIPTION.

See Mechanics' Liens, 2, 3,

DESERTION.

See Marriage and Divorce, 8, 9.

DEVISE.

See Joint Tenancy, 2, 3.

DIRECTING VERDICT.
See Appeal, 6.

DISBARMENT.

Bee Appeal, 7; Attorney and Client, 18

DISCRIMINATION.
See Constitutions.

DISTRIBUTION.

DISTRIBUTION-WITHHOLDING FUNDS.-Funds ready

for distribution should not be withheld from those entitled to the
same under the will. (Succession of Allen, 295.)

DITCH COMPANY.
See Irrigation.

DRUGGISTS.
See Apothecaries.

DURESS.

1. DURESS, ACTION TO RECOVER MONEYS PAID UNDER.
If a debtor is caused to come within the state by the fraudulent rep-
resentations of his creditor and for the purpose of having him there
arrested, and he is so arrested after coming within such state, and
pays an amount of money to obtain his release, he may recover such
money as paid under duress, if when he paid it he was a stranger,
away from his friends, probably unable to give security, and without
counsel, though he might have obtained relief by properly bringing
the facts of his case to the attention of the court. (Sweet v. Kim-
ball, 406.)

2. DURESS, RECOVERY OF MONEYS PAID TO ANOTHER
PERSON THAN THE DEFENDANT.-If a creditor, by false repre-
sentation, procures his debtor to come within the state for the pur-
pose of arresting and detaining him, and while under such arrest and
detention, he pays money under duress to procure his release, he may
recover of such creditor all moneys so paid, though part of them
were paid upon a demand not held by that creditor, if the evidence
warrants the belief that persons other than the defendant who
profited by the plaintiff's arrest, did so through the connivance of
the defendant. (Sweet v. Kimball, 406.)

EASEMENTS

See Cotenancy, 3; Waters, 8.

ELECTIONS.

See Counties, 9.

ENTIRETIES.

See Husband and Wife, 4-6.

EQUITY.

1. ESCROW-DELIVERY OF DEED AFTER DEATH-IN-
TERPOSITION OF EQUITY.-Conceding that a depositary may,
upon the happening of the condition, deliver a deed held by him in
escrow, notwithstanding the death of one of the parties to the es-
crow agreement, the transaction is not placed beyond the control
of a court of equity, if the circumstances of the case require its in-
terposition. (Bradbury v. Davenport, 92.)

2. MISTAKE-UNILATERAL-RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS.
A court of equity may rescind a contract for a mistake which is unilat
eral, and in such case the whole contract is set aside and the parties
are restored to their original position, and no relief can be granted
in such case after the position of the parties has been so changed
that their original rights cannot be restored. (Green v. Stone, 577.)

3. MISTAKE REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENT - EVI-
DENCE.-Courts of equity may grant relief on the ground of mis-
take, by rescinding the entire contract or reforming it, but such
relief is not to be granted in case of a deed, unless upon proof that
is entirely satisfactory. (Green v. Stone, 577.)

See Chattel Mortgages, 5; Corporations, 20; Marriage and Divorce, 1;
Partnership, 8; Pleading, 5; Specific Performance, 1.

ESTATES.

LIFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMAN -

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INSURANCE

A life tenant is not bound to keep the premises insured for the bene-