He touched every form of literature, and had a fine sense for every form of art. He wrote some short poems at an early date, and a more elaborate work called Iter,16 composed on the way to Spain. Grammar and astronomy he took up with the same interest as politics. While crossing the Alps he wrote de analogia ad M. Tullium Ciceronem. The result of his attempt to reform the calendar is found in his De astris, published probably in 46 B.C. As an orator he is unanimously allowed to be first-rate; he showed power, grace, directness, clearness, and brilliancy.1 We cannot marvel at the ascendency of such a man. Even his opponents only upheld Pompey not because they loved Pompey more, but Caesar less. Had Caesar been born as a king or in the days of the Scipios, his rôle would have been widely different; but he lived at an epoch when he had no alternative but to be either anvil or hammer. could not, like Cicero, steer with the wind; he could and would control circumstances. The restoration of a republic-Cato's fond dream--was impossible; the time for it had passed. Caesar was a born king, and was conscious that he was so. 3. CAESAR IN GAUL. He At the beginning of B.C. 58, Caesar stayed on in Rome for another three months. There were still 16 Suet. c. 56. 17 Cp. Cic. Brut. 72. 252, 74. 258, 75. 261; Suet. c. 55; Quintil. i. 7. 34, x. 1. 114, 2. 25, xii. 10. 11; Tac. Ann. 13. 3, summis oratoribus aemulus. many obstacles to remove, which his angry political rivals kept throwing in his way, among others a charge of maladministration during his consulship.1 He waited for the sentence of banishment on Cicero, and for Cato's departure to Cyprus, and then, on 28th March, came the news that the Helvetii intended to gather in force upon the Rhone, and force their way through the province. In eight days he was at Geneva.2 3 Gaul at this time consisted of a large number of isolated communities, and was entirely wanting in unity. Keltic Gaul-that is, Gaul proper-was bounded by the Atlantic and the Alps, by the Garonne and the Seine. On the south lay Iberian tribes. The land north of the Seine and Marne was inhabited by the Belgae, who had crossed over from Germany into Gaul, and who remembered their extraction with pride. Not only these three stems, but the several tribes included in them, were so disunited by jealousy and party-feeling as to prevent any association for a common purpose. The efforts of individual tribes to win the leadership and so bring about political union (e.g. the Arverni in the second century B.C., and in Caesar's time, the Sequani on the one side, the Aedui on the other 4) tended to make the breach still wider. The rent was most conspicuous in the calling in of the Germans to crush the Aedui, who, again, by their 1 Suet. c. 2. 3. 3 ii. 4; vi. 32; Tac. Germ. 28. Gallia. 2 i. 6, 7. See Geogr. Index s. v. * i. 31; vi. 12. See Mommsen, vol. iii. friendship with Rome had brought a foreign element into Gaul. From hatred of the Aedui several tribes later on allied themselves with the Remi,5 who, in order to deprive the Bellovaci of their supremacy, made friends with the Romans.6 Within the States the knightly families with their retainers held sway, the form of government being sometimes republican, sometimes monarchical. The people consisted of clients who had no political rights, but attached themselves to the nobles; citizen class there was none.7 Above the nobles was the hierarchy of Druids, who were always in conflict with the nobles, and who proved equally dangerous to Caesar. The religious-political bond existing throughout Gaul and Britain was the one thing that held the Kelts together. To destroy the power of nobles and Druids, Caesar set up chieftains, e.g. Commius, Cavarinus, Tasgetius, among the Atrebates, Senones, and Carnutes respectively.8 All this made the conquest of Gaul easy for the Romans. What Tacitus says of the Britons applies equally to the wars of Caesar with the Gauls: rarus duabus tribusque civitatibus ad propulsandum commune periculum conventus; ita singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur. Only the Belgae in the second year made a united stand, when the Roman winter camp in free Gaul raised doubts; yet Caesar cleverly continued to keep the "conspirators against the Roman people" 10 5 vi. 12. 7. 7 i. 4 n.; vi. 13, 15. 6 ii. 3; v. 54; vi. 12; vii. 63. 8 iv. 21; v. 54; v. 25. 10 ii. 1. 1. separate, and Vercingetorix in the seventh year of the campaign was the first to combine to any extent. The Gauls, too, proved no match in military matters for the Romans with such a general as Caesar, though they were superior in numbers; despite their fiery courage and furious onset they had no staying power, so that, as a rule, they courted a bloody defeat; and often a campaign successfully begun was brought to an end by the deficiency of the commissariat. During the war they learnt from the Romans many things, especially the way to make an encampment. But Vercingetorix first saw that their tactics must be changed, and because his people were no match for the enemy in a pitched battle, he advised harassing the Romans on every side and cutting off supplies,11 and even persuaded the Bituriges to burn down their towns.12 His superiority in cavalry also stood him in good stead, for the Romans were weak in this arm. He might even have succeeded in throwing off the Roman yoke which had been imposed for six years, had he not committed the fatal mistake of throwing all his troops into one stronghold, where he could not maintain himself. But, in spite of all, the conquest of Gaul was still a hard task. The very isolation of the tribes made it longer; for a victory in one place was succeeded by a rising in another; the tribes that one year seemed 'pacati' in the next had to be subdued again. Other leaders besides Vercingetorix displayed great energy; Indutiomarus,13 for instance, and Ambiorix,1 who, by 11 vii. 14, 64. 12 vii. 15. 13 v. 55. 14 V. 26. the annihilation of fifteen Roman cohorts, inflicted a sensible defeat, and who cunningly avoided Caesar's pursuit.15 Caesar went to Gaul not merely to repel the Helvetii, but to start a war of conquest, for which he could excite general enthusiasm in Rome. For his campaign was against the ancestral enemy who had sacked Rome, and who had for centuries kept Italy disturbed. The invasion of the Cimbri, also, had left a terrible impression; so that a victory would ensure to the general such honour as could be won nowhere else. The prophecy of Sulla (mentioned above) was to be fulfilled in a way which no one had anticipated.16 The answer to the question how far Caesar was justified in robbing a free country of its liberty is not doubtful. Granted that he was justified in repelling 15 vi. 43; viii. 24. 16 Caesar's expeditions across the Rhine and to Britain, which hitherto was not known to be an island, added to his glory. We cannot believe that his assigned reason (iv. 16, 20) was the real one, nor that he was animated by mere love of adventure. The many excursions of the Gauls across the Rhine (that by the Usipetes and Tencteri in B.C. 56-5 was the earliest) gave Caesar good grounds for forcing them to regard the Rhine as their boundary. His reason assigned for the British expedition is paltry; but so close was the connection of the Kelts on the mainland in Britain (especially as the headquarters of Druidism) that Caesar may have felt it necessary in view of the recurring insurrections in Gaul, to show the British Kelts that they were not safe from the Romans even in their own land. His enemies assigned the lowest motives, e.g. Suet. c. 47, Britanniam petisse spe margaritarum; but Cicero's express statement-etiam illud iam cognitum est, neque argenti scripulum esse ullum in illa insula, neque ullam spem praedae nisi ex mancipiis-shows that a different idea was generally formed. |