part of the wine, moving about it, made the wine to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theae. Such certainly were our previous admissions.

So. But when it finds me out of health, does it not in the first place find one who is not the same? It comes to an unlike object.

Theae. Yes.

So. Such a Socrates, then, and the draught of wine, produce different things; in regard to the tongue a perception of bitterness, in regard to the wine a bitterness. beginning to be and moving; and the wine it makes not bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but one that perceives.

So. I then shall never become percipient of anything else in the same way; for perception of another is another thing, and makes the percipient different and another; nor will that which acts on me, if it concur with another, ever engender the same and become similar: for from another it will engender another and become different.

So. I then shall never become similar to my former self; nor will the object become similar to its former self. Theae. No, surely not.

So. When I perceive, I must needs become percipient of something for to become percipient, yet percipient of nothing, is impossible; and the object, when it becomes sweet or bitter, or anything of the kind, must become so to some one for to become sweet, yet sweet to no one, is impossible.

So. Then, I think, the inference remains, that to each other we are,' if we are, or we 'come to be,' if we come

to be since necessity binds our essence indeed, but binds it to nothing else, nor yet to ourselves individually; it remains then that we are bound to one another. So that if a person says that anything 'is' or 'becomes,' he must say that it 'is' or 'becomes' 'to something,' or 'of something,' or 'in relation to something'; but, if we have come to a right conclusion, he must not say or allow of anyone else saying, that anything 'is' or 'comes to be' absolutely.

Theae. Undoubtedly, Socrates.

So. And so, when that which acts on me is to myself and not to another, I perceive it, and no one else does.

Theae. Certainly.

So. Then my perception is true to me: for it belongs always to my being; and, according to Protagoras, I am judge of things which are to me, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not.

Theae. So it seems.

15 [Having thus by a series of plausible arguments brought to birth the suggestion of Theaetetus, that knowledge is sensuous perception, Socrates asks if he can bear to learn that the bantling after all is not worth rearing. Theodorus interferes, and pledges himself for the tolerant temper of his pupil. He is reminded that Socrates only professes to draw out the thoughts of those who converse with him.]

15

How then, being infallible and unerring in mind as regards things which 'are' and 'come to be,' can I be unknowing of things whereof I am percipient'?

Theae. In no sort of way.

So. Therefore you have said very well that knowledge

1 Alo@nrýs, a novel word, but here pretty certainly the true one.

is nothing else than perception; and it turns out to be one and the same thing, that (as Homer and Heracleitus, and their whole tribe, affirm) all things move like streams, and that (after the opinion of the consummately wise Protagoras) man is the measure of all things, and that (as Theaetetus infers from these premises) perception is proved to be knowledge. Is it so, Theaetetus? Must we say, that this, as it were, is your newborn child, and the product of my midwifery? What say you?

Theae. It must be so, Socrates.

So. This then, seemingly, we have with much difficulty brought to birth, whatever it prove to be. And now, after its birth, we must, in good sooth, run round the hearth with it in our discourse, not failing to observe whether the child be worth nurture, and not a wind-egg and an unreality. Or do you deem it absolutely necessary to rear your offspring, and not to put it away? Can you bear to see it confuted, and not be greatly out of temper if some one should filch from you your firstborn?

Theo. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates. He is not the least ill-tempered. But in heaven's name tell me, is not this then true?

So. You are a very gourmand of discussion, Theodorus, and a good creature, in that you take me to be a sack of arguments, and think I can pull out another, and aver that what we have said is untrue. But you do not note what is taking place that none of the arguments proceed from myself, but from him who is conversing with me at the time; and that I know nothing more than this little feat, how to obtain an argument from another wise person and to treat

2 The fifth day after a child's birth the festival was called 'AμpıSpóμia, when the babe was carried round the eoría and received its

name.

it fairly. And I will now try to obtain one from our friend, and not to say something of my own.

Theo. You put the thing well, Socrates: so be it.

16 [Socrates now assails the doctrine of Protagoras. If man is a measure, why not an ape or a frog? If his own sensation is true to every man, what makes Protagoras superlatively wise? or what is the good of arguing on any subject? Thcodorus, who was challenged as a friend of Protagoras, declines to take up his defence, and refers Socrates back to Theaetetus.]

So. Do you know then, Theodorus, what surprises me in your friend Protagoras?

Theo. What is that?

So. I am much pleased with everything else he has said, how what 'seems' to each 'is' to each. But the commencement of his treatise does surprise me. I wonder that in the outset of his 'Truth' he did not say that a pig, or a dog-faced baboon, or any other more monstrous specimen of things that have perception, is the measure of all things, that so he might have spoken to us at once in a magnificent and very disdainful style, ostentatiously shewing that, while we were marvelling at his wisdom, as if he were a god, he was all the while not a whit superior in judgment to a tadpole, not to say, to any of his fellow-men. how are we to put the case, Theodorus? nion shall be true to each man which he tion, and nobody's affection shall be better determined by another person, nor one be more entitled than another to review opinion, and to say whether it be true or false, but, as has been often said, each person singly shall form his own opinions, and all these shall be right and true-why in the world, my friend, is Protagoras so wise as to be justly deemed a worthy teacher with high fees, and we dunces in

Or

For if that opigets by percep

comparison, who must go to school to him, though each of us is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not say that Protagoras speaks thus to amuse the vulgar? while as to my case, and that of my art of midwifery, I forbear to say what ridicule we incur: so indeed does the whole practice of dialectic. For, as to reviewing and criticising each other's fancies and opinions, when each man's are right, is it not a tedious and monstrous folly, if the 'Truth' of Protagoras is true, and he did not proclaim it in jest from the shrine of his book?

Theo. He was my friend, Socrates, as you said just now. I cannot therefore allow Protagoras to be confuted by my admissions, nor yet resist you contrary to my opinion. So take in hand Theaetetus again. For certainly he appeared some time back to follow your lead very prettily.

So. If you went to the wrestling-courts at Lacedaemon, Theodorus, and there beheld naked people, some your inferiors, would you refuse to strip yourself beside them, and exhibit your own form competitively?

Theo. Why do you think I would not refuse, Socrates, with their permission and consent? So now I shall try to persuade you to let me look on, rather than be dragged to the play-ground in my present stiff condition, and to wrestle it out yourself with one who is younger and more supple.

[Socrates asks Theaetetus if his faith in the Protagorean doctrine is shaken 17 by what has been said. When he admits that it is, he is rallied by Socrates for his facility, and recalled to the question, 'Knowledge is sensation. Are we to say we know the barbarian tongues because we hear them spoken, or letters because we see them? Theaetetus replies that we know them in some respects, not in others.]

So. If such is your will, Theodorus, I don't say 'nill,' as proverbialists have it. So I must turn again to the wise