of justices under Nuisances Act may be enforced in, 185; goods received in one place and delivered in another not in jurisdiction, 185; judgment-creditor entitled to
realise his debt out of equitable assets, 281
as to use of water, construction of, 283
duty of Attorney-General to grant
fiat for error in misdemeanor, 65; habeas corpus, estoppel by record, jurisdiction of superior court, 99; showing cause against mandamus, 103; engraving Scotch bank note without authority, 118; ill-treat- ment of lunatic, 118; false pre- tences, credit given to prisoner instead of his proposed principal, 119; uttering counterfeit coin, evi- dence of guilty knowledge, subse- quent uttering, 119; neglect to provide infant with necessary food, 132; assault on a gamekeeper, averment of master's christian name, evidence, amendment, 133; fraudulent overcharge not a false pretence, 133; concealment birth, temporary disposal of body,
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR- right of a widow to freebench takes priority of creditor's claim, 20; deed of arrangement must abso- lutely give up all property, 49; bill of sale by trader when held good, 51; set-off, general account, part payment of debt, 89; costs of proceeding at law by judgment- creditor after administration de- cree, 104; conflict of laws, curator of lunatic in Scotland, 114; credi- tor insuring debtor's life to account for proceeds of policy, 137; as- signment for benefit of creditors, in- terest of assignee, assent, voluntary conveyance, 213; creditor's suit, assignment by testator in his life- time, reserving fund to his widow, 222; execution-creditor, lien on an equitable term of years, lien, 243; assignment of property sub- ject to debts, 250
substitutionary gift by subsequent deed, presumption against double portions, 41
liability of owner of, for injuries done by, 73
conveyance before Dower Act; old uses to bar dower of woman mar- ried after the Act, 262 Dramatic Authors' Act- construction of, 216
ECCLESIASTICAL LAW— right of equitable mortgagee to back rents in hands of sequestrators, 22; a note given by a clergyman on a trading contract can be enforced against him, 80; renewal of eccle- siastical lease, 93; Church Building Acts, mortmain, 111; agreement as to dilapidations is not simony, 198
See Church Building Acts Ejectment-
occupation, adverse possession, 101; equitable defence not permissible in, 181 Election Law
expenses of registration, charges of town-clerk, 197 Eridence-
admission of secondary to prove parcels, 30; parol to explain deed, 41; cross-examination of witnesses, 42; of deceased tenant as to right of common, 144; how secondary evidence may be admitted of origi- nal documents, 208; of appropria- tion, must be given by party setting it up, 262; award, informer, suit by plaintiff's tenant not ad- missible, res inter alios acta, 267; entry in a private memorandum- book of a party deceased, 278; of agreement to accept bill of ex- change, 308
Executor and Administrator— costs of, 43, 44; wilful default in
payment of legacies, 44; liability to make good a false representation of funds, on the faith of which a legatee has acted, 61; assets re- ceived in the colonies and trans- mitted to England, 78; release by one executor to another, 79; costs of proceedings at law by judgment- creditor after decree, 104; primary fund for payment of debts, 113; sale by one of two executors with- out the consent of the other will not be enforced, 125; plea in action against, on a promissory note, 146; contract by one of two for sale of property, 250; appropriation of payment, 292
birth of after decree, bound by pro- ceedings, 171 Injunction-
against Board of Health, 26; motion to dissolve an ex parte one, 78; against partner dealing with pro- perty other than in ordinary course of business, 90; against use of trade- mark, 211 Insolrency-
arrest of insolvent pending former petition, vesting order, 24; making away with property, deficiency in balance-sheet, vexatious defence, 24; committal to new custody, ap- plication to file new petition, 25; Chancery attachment, 25; atten- dance of creditor, entering opposi- tion, 25; attorney and counsel, making away with property, undue preference, 25; creditor's petition by public company, sealing instead of signing, 25; vexatious defence, 26; appointment of assignee in lieu of assignee deceased, 26; pro- tecting order, discharge from debts, description of debts in schedule, judgments on warrants of attorney, 52; description, trading, carrier, 88, the court will not entertain a second petition, 89; jurisdiction of equity as to surplus of insolvent's
ademption of by testator's change of residence, 29; reversionary legacy, assignment, executor, 192; specific of shares in a company, liability of legacies for calls, 209
privileged communication by deputy- clerk of the peace, where malice to be inferred, 156; privileged com- munication to Secretary of State, 194
estate, 91; residence out of juris-Legacy- diction, 119; satisfaction on judg- ment and re-assignment, bank- ruptcy, 120; discharge under In- solvent Act, plea of in bar, 126; description of debt in schedule, 130; application to admit to bail, action of assault, 134; assignment of future-acquired property, equit- able order, 135; inquiry after pro- perty, withholding discharge until accounted for, allocating salary, 135, 138; after discharge County Court may commit on a judgment- summons, 146; where court will not make a revesting order, 188; amending petition, 189; individual preferences, contracting debts in trade without reasonable expecta- tion of payment, 248; dismissal of petition for fraud, filing second petition, same debts, 258; com- mittal by County Court, 248; as- signee, mortgagees, special lien, election, 304; future-acquired pro- perty, heading of affidavits, vali- dity of affidavits sworn on Sunday, 311; conveyance of real estate, 311; can affidavits of absent cre- ditors be received in opposition to an insolvent's application for pro- tection, 318; trading description, 328; petition, description in and signature to, 328
rights flowing out of contract go- verned by the lex loci, when, 2 Interpleader-
costs of, principal and agent, 39
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY- action for calls on a certificated bank- rupt, deed prohibiting such calls, 22; liable as a corporation to be sued in the County Court, 55; foreign mining association, juris- diction of court, appointment of receiver, 63; right of property in a canal company, user of land vested in the company for special purpose, shares in Grand Junction Water- works are real estate, 138; elegit sci. fa. against shareholder, 182; informal transfer of shares, how far company bound by course of deal- ing by directors in violation of deed of settlement, 204; liability of legatees of shares to calls, 209; fraud of directors how far binding on company, effect of fraudulent reports as against third parties, 223; preference shares, guaranteed dividend, title to interest or divi- dend in arrear, 238; title to shares held by bankrupt, acceptance by assignees, when time begins to run, 248; right of gas company to break up streets, 277
Judgment- registration of, priority of mortgage, registration, effect of, 112; in the County Court may be realised out of equitable assets, 281 Jurisdiction- under Trustee Relief Act. 5; of Court of Chancery in patent, 208; of Court of Equity in case of lost bill of exchange, 287 Justice-
may not take part in an appeal against a rate by a company in which he is a shareholder, 128
of solicitor on deeds in hands of a third party, 230; does not entitle him to refuse to put deed in evi- dence, 231; of execution-creditor on equitable term of years, 243 Limitations, Stotutes of- having begun to run against tenant in tail, will continue against re- mainderman, 6; acknowledgment to bar operation of, 16; acknow- ledgment of open account, 75; effect of on debts where charged on real estate, 237
to King's College, Cambridge, 102: costs of showing cause against, 103 Malice-
action for maliciously suing out writ and signing judgment for nonap- Marriage— pearance, 157
of ward without consent of court, 5; treaty of, misrepresentation as to fortune, 29; conveyance by deed acknowledged of reversionary in- terest, 252; representations in contemplation of marriage by wife's father as to lady's fortune, 300
See Settlement. Master and Servant-
liability of master for death of servant,
58; engagement of, contributor to a newspaper, 80; master not liable for act of person employed to do work under superintendence of his own servant, 129; a journeyman tailor within the Master and Ser- vants' Act, 187; Combination Act conviction, 196 Mercantile Law-
See Merchant Shipping-Carrier. Merchant Shipping—
charter-party, custom, evidence, 23; Ship Registry Act, first and second mortgagee, equitable fraud, notice, 29, construction of charter-party, 66; liability of consignee, con- struction of bill of lading, 95; re- fusal to pay freight, part delivery by master, detention of ship, da- mages in nature of demurrage, 96; wages of mariner, dissolution of contract, 127; collision, prepon- derance of blame, 158; action for not loading pursuant to charter- party, plea of war, 160; charter- party, payment of freight, sea- worthiness, condition precedent, 174; captain's order for repairs, who liable for, 183; owner of ship and cargo, duty of shipowner, 199; Ship Registry Act, interest on the proceeds of sale of a ship, 251; liability of registered owner after sale for ship stores supplied, mas- ter's authority, 258; suit in Ad- miralty Court for freight, plea of, 284
See War, Laws of.—Admiralty. Militia-
place for keeping stores and ad- jutant's house exempt from poor- rate, 141
relative rights and obligations of the owners of surface and minerals, latter bound to leave support for surface, custom of mining, 97, boundary of coal mine, 319 Misdemeanor- See Criminal Law-
priority of, 16; permanent improve- ments by mortgagee in possession, 15; equitable mortgagees, right of to rents in hands of sequestrators, 22; production of title-deeds, laches, acquiescence, 40; parental influ- ence, fraudulent misrepresenta- tion to procure, 71; mortgagee of remainderman may maintain suit for production of title-deeds, 91; priority of incumbrancers, abandonment of security by mort- gagee, 109; priority of claim of consignee over mortgagee, 110; priority of, over judgment, 112; mortgagee of rates and tolls, pri- ority over judgment-creditor, 121; of machinery by deposit of deeds of factory, 148; interest on mort- gage of reversion paid by tenant for life, 169; supplemental order after decree, 174; security of mort- gagce, defendant in a foreclosure suit, impeached for usury, 209; by lunatic, acquiescence, 220; agree- ment to accept reduced rate of in- terest on punctual payment, pos- session by mortgagees, receiver, 264; by equitable tenant for life, right of trustees of settlement to retain as against mortgagee in re- spect of waste, 265; promise of a gift to take effect de futuro, invalid declaration of trust, imperfect in- struments, 286 Mortmain-
Church Building Acts, bequest of money arising from sale of land, 111; shares in Grand Junction Waterworks within Mortmain Act, 138; bequest to charity, 245; cove- nant to pay money after death to charity, 298; scheme for purchas- ing land with money bequeathed for charitable purposes, 301; de- vise to charitable trust, 309 Municipal Corporations-
renewal of lease by, must be at rack-
rent, 5; penalty of overseer for not signing burgess-list recovered by common informer, evidence, 158; grant of separate quarter sessions, contract with county for support of borough sessions, prisoners, contri- bution to county expenditure, 253
injunction against partner dealing with property, 90; stewardship- fees not protits of a solicitor's part- nership, what are profits, 139 Patent-
confirmation of void patent, costs of objection, 1; leave to file specifi- cation, 90; what is proper subject of, 170; sci. fa., practice, jurisdic- tion, 208
Pharmaceutical Chemists—
who entitled to be registered, 270 Pleading-
foreign law, how to be set out, 81; accord and satisfaction in an action on a bond, 81; equitable defence, 81; amendment after writ of error, 86; judgment recovered, 98; to action on a promissory note, 146; to action on an agree niet to indemnify, 147; form of replication that defendant was abroad and that plaintiff sued within six years after his return,
Equity-impeachment of mortgage, 209; charge of fraud, demurrer for vagueness, 310
See Poor-rate. Poor-rate-
place provided for militia stores and adjutant's house exempt, 141; Electric Telegraph Company liable to, 166; private streets, tolls, prin- ciple of rating, 175; equitable de- fence, conditional judgment not permissible, 197 Power-
execution of, 8; revocation and re- appointment, exhaustion of, revival of revoked appointment, 37; of appointment, how to be exercised, 155; of appointment to relations, exercise of, objects of power, next of kin at death of donee, 252; exercise of, by general devise, 266 Practice-
Equity-Special directions as to vouch- ing accounts, 4; jurisdiction under Trustee Act, 5; inarriage of ward without consent, contempt, 5; effect of disclaimer by answer, 7; evi- dence, 26th order, 20; erasure in affidavit, jurat, 22; contempt of court, costs, 36; filing interroga- tories, 61; demurrer for want of equity, and improper joinder of parties, 62; misdescription of plaintiff, security for costs, order to revive, 63; motion for decree, amendment of bill, 63; costs of abandoned motion to vary chief clerk's certificate, construction of orders, 70; money named in affi- davit must be in words, and not in figures, 73; taking bill pro con- fesso, 75; order to revive, 75; solicitor's lien, 75; order of revivor, motion to discharge, 77; order to solicitor to pay money into court refused, 77; motion to dissolve ex parte injunction, 78; record and writ clerk's certificate, setting down cause, 79; costs in pauper suit, 79; lunatic trustee, vest- ing order, 90; examination of witnesses viva voce, 90; demurrer, injunction, 90; plea, averments, 123; plea of discharge under In- solvent Act, 126, effect of an at- tachment on a decree registered under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, 139; indirect charge of fraud Hot per- mitted in a bill, 139; appointment of personal representative for pur- pose of suit, 154; motion to dismiss 29th order, Aug. 1852, orders 13th Jan. 1855, examination of wit- nesses, 170; birth of infant after decree, supplemental order, infant bound by proceeding, 171; motion for injunction after demurrer over- ruled, 171; supplemental order after decree, 174; plea of want of parties, insufficient denial of in- terest, 191; examination of wit- nesses abroad, 193; enrolment of decree, vacating decree, notice, surprise, 207; decree in foreclosure suit, effect of, 209; motion for decree, 234; production of docu- ments, affidavit, cross-examination, 242; power of attorney by guardian to proceed to suit in India on behalf of infant, 242; investment under direction of court, 245; in- junction, written copy of bill, filing printed copy, orders of Aug. 1852, 253; on issue, devisavit vel non,
Common Law-Amendment at trial, 52; inability of judge to seal bill of exceptions, new trial, 68; pleading foreign law, how to set it out, 81; plea of accord and satisfaction in an action on bond, 81; equitable de- fence considered, 81; debt due from garnishee, bond to indemnify, 85; amendment after writ of error, 86; sects. 148 and 149 of C. L. P. A. 1852, do not apply to quo warranto, 96; compelling plaintiff to carry in the roll in another action, plea of judgment recovered, 98; habeas corpus, estoppel by record, 99; motion for leave to proceed as if personal service had been effected under C. 1. P. A., 102; attach- ment of debts by executor of
judgment-creditor, 116; sects. 32 and 34 of C. L. P. A. are not retro- spective, 132; new trial refused where the omission of the judge to give some direction was acquiesced in by counsel, 144; as to affidavits in reply upon motions, 146; plead- ing on a promissory note, 146; costs and witnesses' expenses coming before commission-day, 147; plead- ing to action on agreement is un- necessary, 147; landlord may de- fend ejectment without giving se- curity for costs, 152; court will not issue commission to examine wit- nesses in an enemy's country, 164; plaintiff's counsel no right to sum up evidence where judge de- cides there is no evidence to go to the jury, 167; marriage of female defendant after judgment, entering suggestion to obtain execution against husband, 176; setting aside judgment on ground of mis- take, amendment of particulars of demand, 176; attachment of debts, effect of judge's order, title of as- signees in bankruptcy, 177; equit- able defence not allowed in eject- ment, 181; costs of reference by order of judge, 182; interroga- tories, ejectment, 185; creditor cannot attach a legacy in the hands of an executor, 185; interro- gatories not allowed in an action for forfeiture of lease, 186; judg- ment in court specially indorsed, affidavit to set it aside, defence on merits, 136; admitting to bail, depositions, 187; costs of the day for not proceeding to trial, default of defendant, 219; appeal under C. L. P. A., limitation of argument, 235; attachment under garnishee clauses, of C. L. P. A. 1854, 248; costs of judgment on special case,
Principal and Agent—
costs of interpleader suit, 39; pay- ment to principal, action by auc- tioncer for price of a horse sold by auction, 127
Principal and Surety- liability of surety after release of principal, 51; liability on a joint cheque is joint and not several, 61; bond, continuance of liability, 64; loss of primary fund, 104; surety entitled to interest on moneys paid for principal, 168; assignment of debt, solicitor and client, 191 Privilege-
of Queen's servant from imprison- ment by the County Court, 54; arrest of servant of the Crown,
on a marriage in England in Scotch form, 2; construction of, 8.; cove- nant by husband to settle rever- sionary interest on wife, 31; cove- nant to settle after-acquired pro- perty on wife, 193; right of trus- tees to retain as against mortgagee in respect of waste, 265; rectifica- tion of in case of marriage of a ward of court immediately after majority, 294; claim against wi- dow's second husband, election, 296; representations of wife's father as to her fortune, 300 Sequestration-
See Ecclesiastical Law Simony-
agreement for dilapidations is not simony, 198 Specific Performance-
only granted where compensation by damages would be inadequate, 7; of contract to supply coals, 50; inability of vendor to secure mort- gagee's execution of deed, 171; de- murrer to bill, 243
See Vendor and Purchaser Stamp-
an agreement to supply straw and receive manure is within Statute of Frauds, and needs no stamp, 130 Statute-
THELLUSON ACT- observations on, 189
See Landlord and Tenant. Tenants in Common-
application for appointment of re- ceiver, 106; allowed to deduct interest paid on incumbrances, 263
doctrine of presumption of surrender of, a question for the jury, court will not presume it, 54 Trade Marks- injunction for use of, 211 Trover-
possession, right of action, 100 Trusts and Trustees-
jurisdiction under Trustee Relief Act, 5; trustee and cestui que trust, acquiescence, 18; investment of trust-moneys, liability of cestui que trust, party to a breach of trust, 19; lunatic trustee of charity, 27; trustee and cestui que trust, prac- tice, 43; costs of, 43; bankruptcy of trustee, 58; neglect of trus- tees to obtain stop-order, 104; duty of trustee to preserve evidence, 231; breach of trust, 231; order vesting estate under Trustee Ex- tension Act, petition, practice, 252; liability of, for negligence, 272; evidence of breach of trust, 278; bankruptcy does not dis- charge assets of, 278
U. USURY- Impeachment of, mortgage for, 209
VENDOR AND PURCHASER- when purchaser not bound to accept vendor's covenant, 7; delay of three years deprives vendor of right to specific performance, 51; sale by
one of two executors without au- thority of the other, specific per- formance refused, 125; sale by auction, action by auctioneer for the price, 127; incomplete contract, payment of deposit, when time the essence of contract, 179; contraet to purchase, inability of vendor to procure mortgagee's execution of deed, 171; assignment of property subject to debts, charge of debts not specified does not affect a purchaser, 250; contract by one of two execu- tors, specific performance, costs, 250; payment by tenant for life of interest on incumbrances, 263; covenant in conveyance for use of water, construction of, 283; specific performance, 818; Voluntary Deed-
gift from child to parent, undue in- fluence, laches, 308
Waterman's Act- conviction under, 67; employment of non-freemen, validity of 38th bye-law, 95
construction of 10, 18, 20, 27, 56, 60, 74, 76, 142, 173, 211, 218, 244, 252, 264, 293, 296, 315; conditional be- quest until marriage, speaking from death of testator, 10; due execution, evidence of third party taking an interest under it, 10; meaning of word “surviving;" exe- cutory bequest, 18; meaning of words "then dead," 20; absolute be- quest, 20; condition of residence at mansion-house, tenant for life, costs of improvements, 21, 60; meaning of words "estate, effects and pro- perty," restricted to personal estate, 27; ademption of legacy by change of testator's residence after date of will, 29; attesting wit- nesses to codicils entitled to lega- cies under will, 30; revocation of, by contract of sale, secondary evi- dence to prove parcels, 30; period of vesting of income of shares, 56; personal representatives, when a class to be ascertained, 60; meaning
"next heir," annuity, costs, 74; devise to children and heirs of their respective bodies a joint tenancy for life and several inheritances, 76; bequest, revo- cation of, by assignment for benefit of creditors, 77; executed in
foreign country, English moveable property, domicil, 78; what is a contingent remainder, 99; where estate in trustees, rule as to cutting down estate in fee by showing a less estate sufficient for the purposes of the court, 142; what is a residuary devise, Wills Act, 154; power of 155; appointment, perpetuity, meaning of term" unmarried,"171; estate tail, rule in Shelley's case, 173; Observations on the Thelluson Act, 189; meaning of term "in such shares," what a good appointment, 211; meaning of words "in case either of them die without issue, that portion to be divided among the subscribers," 218; how far to be construed as speaking from death of testator, 230; effect of equitable life-estate, followed by legal re- mainder to heirs, &c., of tenant for life, 232; appointment of receiver where executrix a married woman, 233; general charge of debts on real estate, 237; intestacy, gift with terms of exclusion, perpetual annuity, remoteness, 244; bequest to charity, mortmain, 245; who within, gift to cousins, 252; out of what fund an annuity is to be paid, 261; bequests of all leasehold and other estates and effects whatsoever, does not include after-acquired real estate, 264; general devise, power of appointment, exercise of, Wills Act, 266; description by
testatrix of herself by maiden name, she having married her de ceased sister's husband, 288; mean- ing of the word “unmarried,” 293; meaning of "clear annuity," con version of stock, deficiency of divi- dends, and liability of capital to make it good, 293; meaning of the word
"effects," whether shares vested or contingent, 296; bequest, alternative or substitutionary, 5; devise to charitable trusts, 309; interlineations in, 311; lost codicil probate of paper containing sub- stance of its contents, 312; devise to "heir-at-law of my heir-at-iaw now in America," trust for an alien, rights of Crown and of trustees, 315; bequest, covenant, legacy. satisfaction, 327; vesting gift sub- ject to be divested, costs, resi due, 328
call may be made for payment of debts and costs, pending a ques tion of liability between the com mittee and ether shareholders, 9;1 right to recover back deposits, ex- penses of application to Parliament, dissentient shareholders, rule as to repayment of deposits, 34; liability of managing director, adoption of acts of codirectors, 136; when ac- tion will not lie against official manager of a company only pro- visionally registered, 165
All the Cases Argued and Determined
COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY,
IN BANKRUPTCY, INSOLVENCY, NISI PRIUS, THE CRIMINAL COURTS, AND IN IRELAND,
eported by JAMES PATERSON, Esq. of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law.
resent the Right Hon. JERVIS, C.J., T. PEMBERTON, LEIGH, Dr. LUSHINGTON, and Sir E. RYAN. Saturday, Feb. 10.
atent- Confirmation of a patent become void-Public and general use-5 and 6 Will. 4, c. 83, s. 2-Costs of opposing confirmation.
obtained a patent, believing he was the real inventor. He was afterwards informed of a prior invention, but having assigned his patent to B., and the fact not being brought before the Privy Council, B. obtained a grant for an extended term. During the latter term B. brought an action for infringement, when the jury gave a verdict for defendant on the ground that A. was not the first inventor. B. then petitioned the Privy Council for a confirmation of the patent under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 83, s. 2, which petition was opposed, and the prior invention proved: Teld, the petition ought to be dismissed, for if the facts
had been known to the Privy Council, neither the original nor the extended grant would have been made. Held further, though an objector to a confirmation of a patent will in general get his costs if he succeed; yet here the opposition was not properly conducted, and therefore costs refused. The grant of a patent for an extended term is a new grant by new letters patent, subject to the same conditions, open to the same objections, and generally entitled to the same advantages as the original grant. Where the original patentee has notice not only of a prior invention, but of its public use, he is bound to make inquiries, and a subsequent assignee of the patent cannot affect ignorance on applying for confirmation of the patent after it is found on a trial A grant of an extended term for a patent is anything but a matter of course; a very special case must be made out of novelty, merit, utility, and of a disproportionate remuneration.
This was a petition to her Majesty in, council praying to have certain letters patent for ship anchors confirmed, notwithstanding the verdict of a jury that the patentee was not the first inventor of the anchor.
The petitioner was the widow and executrix of Mr. James Honiball, who in 1853 was the assignee of letters patent granted to W. H. Porter for improvements in ships' anchors for a term of fourteen years from 15th Aug. 1838. By an order in council, dated 18th Aug. 1852, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council recommended an extension of this term for six years, and letters patent were accordingly granted on 9th Feb. 1853, making such grant; the six years to be computed from the expiration of the previous term of fourteen years. The petitioner in 1858 commenced an action against Messrs. Bloomer and Co., anchor-smiths of Liverpool, for infringing these letters patent; and on the case coming on for trial in June 1854, before Martin, B. at Westminster, the defendants impeached the validity of the patent by producing evidence of prior publication, viz., that one David Logan of Liverpool had made and sold in 1826 an anchor similar in principle to that for which W. H. Porter had obtained VOL. XXV.-No. 625.
ter of which petition shall be heard before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; and such committee, upon examining the said matter, and being satisand original inventor, and being satisfied that such fied that such patentee believed himself to be the first invention, or part thereof, had not been publicly and generally used before the date of such first letters patent, may report to his Majesty their opinion that such prayer, and the said letters patent shall be availthe prayer of such petition ought to be complied with; able in law and equity to give to such petitioner the whereupon his Majesty may, if he think fit, grant sole right of using, making and vending such invention as against all persons whatsoever, any law, usage, that any person opposing such petition shall be enor custom to the contrary notwithstanding: provided titled to be heard before the said Judicial Committee; be entitled to have notice of such petition before preprovided also that any person, party to any former suit or action touching such first letters patent, shall
the letters patent. Accordingly the plaintiff was nonsuited. The petitioner now stated in her petition that at the time the said Porter obtained the letters ignorant of the existence of any anchors similar to patent, and enrolled his specification, he was wholly his own, and bona fide believed that he himself was the original inventor; that the said Porter first became aware of Logan's anchor in 1839, when he showed to Logan a model of his patent anchor, whereupon Logan, recollecting that his firm had once made a similar anchor, took Porter over This anchor had been returned his premises and showed him an anchor some- by a steamer which had kept it on board for some and was the only one of the kind the Logans had time, and it had been lying in the yard ever since, ever made. That after receiving this information the said Porter and Honiball were advised that the va- lidity of their patent would not be affected by the fact of Logan having made the said anchor, for it was to be considered merely as an unsuccessful experi-senting the same." never come into public and general use; that the ment, abandoned after trial, and the anchor had ever been made, except the said experiment by Logan, petioner believed that no other similar anchor had prior to the letters patent obtained by Porter in 1838; that Porter's invention was admitted by competent judges to be most important; and that the letters patent granted to Porter and extended to the peti- tioner should be confirmed, notwithstanding the trial of the said action and verdict, and that the petitioner might be declared to have the sole right of using, making and vending the said invention as against all persons whatsoever within the United Kingdom.
Sect. 4. "If any person who now hath, or shall here- after obtain, any letters patent as aforesaid, shall adver- his Majesty in council for a prolongation of his term of his Majesty in council to that effect, it shall be lawful tise in the London Gazette, &c. that he intends to apply to sole using and vending his invention, and shall petition for any person to enter a careat at the council office; and if his Majesty shall refer the consideration of such petition to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and notice shall first be by him given to any nesses to prove his case, and the persons entering person or persons who shall have entered such caveats, the petitioner shall be heard by his counsel and wit- witnesses; whereupon, and upon hearing and inquiring Messrs. Bloomer appeared and entered seven grounds caveats shall likewise be heard by their counsel and of objection to the petition, which were, in substance- that the alleged invention had been in public and of the whole matter, the Judicial Committee may general use previously to the date of the patent; that report to his Majesty that a further extension of the anchors of the same description had been made and term in the said letters patent should be granted not sold by Messrs. Logan and other persons; that persons exceeding seven years, and his Majesty is hereby of the names of Hawkins, Somes, and Piper had authorised and empowered, if he shall think fit, to previously enrolled specifications of similar improve-grant new letters patent for the said invention for a ments, and that Porter was not the original inventor; term not exceeding seven years after the expiration of that no part of the invention was new at the date of the first term, any law, custom or usage to the con- The petition now came on to be heard, and wit- such extension shall be granted if the application by the patent; and that it was not of public utility. trary in any wise notwithstanding: provided that no nesses were examined on both sides. The questions petition shall not be made and prosecuted with effect raised were, whether the case made by the petitioner before the expiration of the term originally granted in brought her within the Act of Parliament 5 & 6 such letters patent." Will. 4, c. 83, ss. 2 and 4; and whether the Judicial Committee should exercise in her favour the discre- tion conferred by the statute.
The statute 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 83, s. 2, enacts "that found by the verdict of a jury, that any person, who if in any suit or action it shall be proved, or specially not the first inventor or supposed invention, was shall have obtained letters patent for any invention, thereof, or of some part thereof, by reason of some other person or persons having invented or used the same, or some part thereof, before the date of such letters patent; or if such patentee or his assigns shall discover that some other person had, unknown to such patentee, invented or used the same, or some part thereof, before the date of such letters patent, it shall and may be lawful for such patentee or his assigns to letters patent, or to grant new letters patent, the mat- petition his Majesty in council to confirm the said
Sir F. Thesiger and Webster, for the petitioner, concould not be said to be publicly and generally used tended that upon the evidence the invention of Logan so as to invalidate the patent obtained by Porter, who M. Chambers, Q. C., Atkinson, Serjt., and J. A. bona fide believed he was the sole original inventor. circumstances the patent of Porter was void, as it was aud that Honiball had been warned of the fact; Russell, for Messrs. Bloomer, contended that in such Welsby for the Crown. sufficiently proved that the invention was not new, besides, the invention was of no public utility.
Right Hon. T. PEMBERTON LEIGH.-In this case a patent was granted, on the 15th Aug. 1838, to a Mr. Porter, for an improvement in the manufacture 1852. On the 18th Feb. 1853 her Majesty was pleased, of anchors. The patent expired on the 15th Aug.
on a report of the Judicial Committee, to grant to the assignee of Porter's patent a further term of six years for the exclusive use of the invention. This term was granted by new letters patent, which contain a condition similar to that in the original patent, that "the grant is to be void, if it should appear that the said invention is not a new invention as to the public use and exercise thereof in England, or not invented and found out by the said W. H. Porter." In an action brought against a person of the name of Bloomer for the infringement of this patent, which came on for trial in the month of June 1854, it was proved that this was not a new invention within the condition of the letters patent, and it is agreed on all hands that the patent at present is merely void. The Legislature, however, has thought fit to vest in the Crown under certain circumstances, on the recommendation of the Judicial Committee, the power of restoring and giving effect to the grant so become void; and upon a petition by the grantee of the renewed patent to the Crown for the exercise of this power. and the confirmation of the patent, it has been referred to us by her Majesty to inquire, whether it is fit that the application should be granted. This power is conferred upon the Crown by section 2 of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 83, and it is admitted that if the petitioner brings herself within the provisions of the Act, it is still left to the discretion of the Judicial Committee to recommend or not the confirmation of the patent, as justice to all parties may appear to them to require. The clause is in these words: [His Lordship then read the section quoted above.] There are therefore two questions before us; first, whether the petitioner has proved those facts which are necessary in order to enable the committee to recommend a confirmation; secondly, whether the circumstances appearing before us are such as to make it fit that we should exercise our discretion by recommending a confirmation, if we have the power to do so. It was objected by the opponents of the petitioner that these questions do not arise in this case, for that the provisions for confirmation of a patent do not apply to a patent for an extended term. But the grant of an extended term is a new grant by new letters patent, subject to the same conditions, open to the same objections, and it should seem therefore, in ordinary cases at least, entitled to the same advantages as the original grant. In the case of Aube's patent, which was an application for an extension of the original term, and which came before this committee in Feb. 1854, it was decided that the grant of an extended term must be considered as a new grant, and as open to the same objection which would apply to an original grant. There appears to be nothing in the nature of the benefit now sought which should exclude its application to a patent for an extended term. We proceed therefore to the consideration of the question, whether the petitioner has established those facts which are necessary in order to give jurisdiction to the committee. The onus of proof lies on the petitioner, and she must satisfy the committee, first, that before the date of the original patent the invention was not publicly and generally used; and, secondly, that the grantee of the original patent believed himself to be the first or original inventor. It is proved by the evidence before us, that Mr. Porter was in no sense of the term the first inventor of this improvement. It appears distinctly, that the principle had been discovered and put in use by Mr. James Logan more than ten years before the date of Mr. Porter's patent; that he had made drawings of his invention, which he had shown to a great number of persons; that he had procured models of it to be made, which he had sent to anchor-smiths and other persons likely to bring the invention into use; that he had caused one of these models to be hung up in the room of the underwriters of Liverpool, where Mr. Logan carried on business, which model remained there for twelve or fifteen years, and must therefore have been there in all probability at the time when Porter took out his patent. It further appears that he had actually in 1826 manufactured a farge anchor upon this principle, and had sold it in that or the following year; that it was put on board a steamer called the William Huskisson, at that time trading to the Clyde; that it remained in use on board the William Huskisson (which was afterwards sold to the Dublin Steam Company) till the year 1836, when one of the toggles having been broken, it was sent to the yard of Messrs. Logan, as one of the witnesses says, to be repaired; and that from that time it lay in the yard open to the inspection of all the workmen who were employed there, amounting, we are told, to about 250, and of all persons whom business or other circumstances might bring to Messrs. Logan's works. If we could rely with confidence on the accuracy of Mr. James Logan's recollection, the case would be carried much further with respect to the uses of the invention; for he tells us, that before the manufacture of the anchor for the William Huskisson, he made and sold five or six of the same description and several others afterwards; but he is unable to give any particulars of such other anchors or of the persons to whom he sold them; no books or accounts have been produced in verification of such sales; his brother David Logan, who was in partnership with him, has no knowledge of any such anchors; and Irving, who
was in the employ of the firm of Logans for thirtyseven years, says that no anchors were made of a similar description to that for the William Huskisson. As to the evidence given by the seamen of the use of similar anchors on board the Mars, the Venus and the Atalanta, and many vessels in the Thames, we deem it wholly unworthy of attention, and calculated rather to discredit than to strengthen the case of the opponents of the petitioner. It is not very easy to define what is the exact meaning of the expression "publicly and generally used" contained in this section. No patent is likely to be taken out for a process or machine already in public and general use, in the ordinary sense of those words; but certainly we cannot consider the use of the invention on board a single ship, however public, or for whatever length of time, as a general user; and though negative evidence in its nature can hardly be very conclusive, and that produced by the petitioner applies only to a particular firm, we should be inclined to hold, if it were necessary to decide the point, that we were satisfied that the invention had not been generally, though it had been publicly, used at the date of the original letters patent. Whether the petitioner has made out the second point, viz., that the original patentee believed himself to be the first and original inventor, depends entirely upon the period at which the belief must be proved to have existed. There is no reason to doubt that he so believed himself when the original letters patent were granted. On the other hand, it is plain that he could entertain no such belief at the time when the renewed grant was made. It is proved that he had full notice in 1839 of James Logan's prior invention; and it appears to us to be clear on the context of this clause, that the expression "first and original inventor" was intended to mean a person who could claim the merit of the first invention, without reference to the user; but, however that may be, we think, according to the doctrine laid down by Lord Lyndhurst in Westrupp and Gibbins' patent (Webst. Pat. Cas. 555), a party cannot be permitted to shelter himself under wilful ignorance, but must be fixed with knowledge not only of what he did know, but of that which he would have known if he had made the inquiries which it was incumbent upon him to make. Now it appears from Mr. Porter's letters of the 26th June 1839, that he was at that time not only informed by the Logans that they had invented and made an anchor similar to his; but that he was shown the anchor itself, and was told that it had been put on board a steamer for some little time, and then returned. He had notice, therefore, not only of the prior invention, but of the use of the invention, and was bound to inquire into the circumstances of the user; of the importance of which, with reference to his own patent, he seems to have been aware. It is argued, however, very forcibly, that the belief of the original patentee here spoken of must mean a belief at the time when the original patent was taken out; and that neither the merit of the original patentee, nor the rights of the assignee, can be affected by circumstances which came to the knowledge of the former only after the patent had been granted; and when, possibly, as in this case, all his interest in it had ceased. It is impossible to deny that there is great weight in this argument; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that it is the new patent which it is sought to confirm; that it is as a new and original patent that it is brought within the meaning of the clause, and that there is nothing unreasonable when it claims the same advantages, in subjecting it to the same restrictions as an original grant. But, whatever doubts we may entertain upon other points in this case, upon that which is sufficient for its decision, viz., the mode in which
we are to exercise our discretion if the circumstances give occasion for it, we can entertain no doubt whatever. The power given to the Crown is to provide an extraordinary remedy for extraordinary cases, to supersede the ordinary rules of law at the expense of the public in favour of an individual; to give force and validity, as a quasi-legislative authority, to a grant of monopoly actually void, and to exclude from the use of the invention not only the other subjects of her Majesty in England, but even the first and original inventor who had actually brought it into public though not into general use, before the first patent was taken out. That this is the effect of a confirmation is perfectly clear, though it appears from Lord Lyndhurst's observations in Westrupp and Gibbins' case, that such was not the intention of the framer of the Act, nor its effect as it was originally introduced into and as it left the H. of L. To what extent under the language of the Act other objections to the validity of the patent are removed by the confirmation, may be doubtful. In the case of Card's patent, 6 Moore, P. C. 213, Lord Campbell suggests that the generality of the expression was probably intended to be limited to objections founded on the prior use of the invention. His Lordship also intimates that the provisions of the clause were meant to be confined to cases where either doubts might exist whether there had been such a prior use as to vitiate the patent, or where the use of the invention after some fruitless trials had been thrown aside and abandoned by the original inventor. Every judge who has had to consider the effect of this provision has felt, and
we entirely share that feeling, that the jurisdiction is one which is to be most cautiously and sparingly exercised. In the particular case before us there is no room for doubt, that if the fact which actually existed had been known at the time when the original patent was taken out, no patent ought to have been granted to Porter. The consideration for the monopoly created by a patent is the benefit derived by the public from the communication of a new and useful invention. What new discovery did Porter communicate, or what information did he afford, of which the public had not been for years in possession by the proceedings of the Logans, to which we have already referred? So far from having a right to the exclusive use of the invention against them, they would have had a clear right by taking out a patent, to the exclusive use against him, if they had not, by divulging and publishing their invention, made it a matter of common right and prevented it from being a fit subject of a patent either to themselves or to anybody else. There is not the least pretence for supposing that they had abandoned the use of the invention, though their efforts to bring it into general use had been unsuccessful, in consequence as it appears of the expense of the manufactured article being greater than the advantage supposed to be derived from it. If the facts now in proof had been known to their Lordships, when they recommended an extension of this patent, they never could have given any such recommendation to the Crown. It has been again and again stated in this place, that the grant of an extended time is anything but a matter of course; that in order to obtain it, a very special case must be made; that the novelty, merit and utility of the invention must be proved, and it must be shown that all reasonable means have been used in order to make the invention productive, but that in spite of such exertions the remuneration by the inventor has either entirely failed or has been quite disproportioned to his merits and to the benefits conferred upon the public. These rules are to be found laid down by Lord Brougham in Soame's case, Webst. Pat. Cas. 729; in Morgan's patent, Ibid. 737; and in Jones's case, Ibid. 579; by Lord Lyndhurst in Swaine's patent, Ibid, 560, and by other lords in a variety of subsequent cases down to the late case of Ex parte Heath, 8 Moore Pat. Cas. 217, and we think it of great importance that they should be strictly observed. If this extended grant ought never to have been made, still less can we now recommend that the ordinary rules at law should be superseded in order to give it validity. We have now considered what ought to be done with respect to the costs of the opponents. It is of great importance that the parties should not be discouraged from bringing important facts to the knowledge of the court by the fear of the costs which they may have to pay, even if their opposition be successful; and upon this ground in Westrupp and Gibbins' case the parties opposing were allowed their costs. But we are not satisfied with the manner in which this opposition has been conducted. Much expense has been occasioned by relying upon patents for inventions, which have really no resemblance to this, and witnesses have been produced to whose testimony, as we have already intimated, we cannot give the smallest credit. On the whole we shall humbly advise her Majesty that the petitioner's application ought not to be granted, but that no costs should be awarded to the opponents.
COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY.
Reported by C. H. KEENE, Esq. of Lincoln's inn, Barrister-at-Law.
Feb. 15, 16, and March 5. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) DUNCAN v. CANNAN.
Conflict of Laws-Rights flowing out of contract, governed by the lex loci contractus-Bankruptcy-Contingent debt.
Upon a marriage contracted in England, with a view to a Scotch domicil, a contract was executed in Scotch form, by which the husband covenanted to pay, after his decease, an annuity to his wife, and certain sums to the children of the marriage, if any surviving him and the wife assigned all the property which she should acquire during the marriage "in favour of herself and her promised spouse, in conjunct fee and liferent, and the children of the marriage; whom failing, herself, her heirs and assigns." The effect of such a contract, in Scotch law, is to give the husband a lifeinterest in the wife's property, and, subject thereto, to vest it in the wife absolutely; and the husband and wife are capable of giving a valid discharge for property so limited. Some time after the marriage the husband and wife acquired an English domicil, and property bequeathed to the wife by an English testator was paid by the executor to the husband and wife, upon their joint receipt. The husband afterwards became
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